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Chapter 1
Literature Overview
1.1 Introduction
We live in a world full of choices. Before we step outside the door in
the morning, we have already chosen what to eat for breakfast and which
clothes to wear. For the morning commute, we decide how to travel, by
what route, and whether we’ll pick up coffee along the way. Dozens of
small choices are made before it’s even time for lunch, and then there are
the less frequent, but more important decisions like buying a car, moving
to a new home or setting up retirement savings. It is no wonder that
decision making is a popular research topic. Within neoclassical economics,
it is hypothesized that choices are made so as to maximize utility. Given
this hypothesis, it follows that each choice tells us something about the
decision maker, it reveals information about her underlying utility function
and preferences. As we observe a decision maker over time, we can piece
together more and more information. Given this information, a number of
questions naturally arise:
i) Does there exist a utility function which is consistent with all the
information we have ?
ii) If such a utility function exists, is it of a specific class ?
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iii) If no such utility function exists, how close is the information to being
consistent ?
We look at revealed preference theory to answer these questions, i.e., we
are interested in characterizations of the models of behaviour that do not
rely on any functional specification. This approach allows for direct tests
of the decision models, without the risk that functional misspecifications
lead to rejections of the model. Revealed preference characterizations are
defined as conditions on the observed choices of decision makers. In this
chapter, we focus on the computational aspects of revealed preference tests.
In particular, we look at computational methods, i.e., algorithms that test
whether data satisfies the revealed preference conditions. We also look
at the tractability, i.e., the computational complexity of answering these
questions, and we focus on the worst-case time-bounds of algorithms for
such questions. Thus we are interested in whether a particular question is
easy (solvable in polynomial time) or hard (np-complete), and what the
best-known method is for answering such a question. For two other recent
overviews on revealed preference, we refer to Varian (2006) and Crawford
and De Rock (2014).
Let us proceed by first motivating this computational point of view. In a
very general way, it is clear that computation has become more important
in all aspects of science, and economics is no exception. This is reflected
in the scientific literature where computational challenges are explicitly
mentioned. We illustrate this view with three quotes from recent papers.
Echenique et al. (2011)
“Given [that calculating money pump costs can be a huge com-
putational task], we check only for violations of garp that in-
volve cycles of limited length: lengths 2, 3, and 4.”
Choi et al. (2014) (In the online appendix)
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“Since the algorithm is computationally very intensive, for a
small number of subjects we report upper bounds on the con-
sistent set.”
Kitamura and Stoye (2014)
“It is computationally prohibitive to test stochastic rationality
on 25 periods at once. We work with all possible sets of eight
consecutive periods, a problem size that can be very comfort-
ably computed.”
Another trend that supports computation in the domain of revealed pref-
erence is the ever-increasing size of datasets. It is becoming more and more
common to track purchases of individual consumers/households, which can
give researchers datasets far beyond the size laboratory experiments can
provide. This only reinforces the need for efficient methods, such that con-
clusions can be drawn from such datasets.
Because of such issues, there is a quickly growing body of work on com-
putation and economics. In this chapter, we wish to give an overview
specifically of computation and revealed preference. To make this work
broadly accessible, we will begin this survey by briefly introducing both
revealed preference in Section 1.1.1 and some key concepts from complexity
theory in Section 1.1.2. The main part of this text will then be a tour of the
areas in which revealed preference methods have been applied. To begin,
we will look at the classic revealed preference setting, with a single deci-
sion maker in Section 1.2. We include a subsection on goodness-of-fit and
power measures, which respectively quantify the severity of violations and
give a measure of how stringent the tests are. Next, we explore collective
settings, where the observed choices are the result of a joint decision (Sec-
tion 1.3). Furthermore, we look at stochastic preferences. In this setting,
the decision maker still chooses so as to maximize utility, but preferences
are not fixed. Instead, the decision maker has a number of different utility
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functions, and which of these utility functions she maximizes at any given
time is probabilistic. We handle this setting in section 1.4.
To close this subsection, we wish to make a note on the use of the words
dataset and data throughout this thesis. Within social sciences, these
terms usually refer to empirical observations of behaviour. While the main
goal of this thesis is to study methods for analysing observed behaviour,
we will use a broader definition of data. Since from an algorithmic point
of view, it does not matter whether the input reflects actual observed
behaviour or is constructed in some other way, we refer to all input of
algorithms as ‘data’, no matter the origin.
1.1.1 Revealed Preference
Let us now introduce the basic ideas of revealed preference, by looking
at revealed preference in the simple setting of a person making purchases.
Specifically, suppose we are in a world with m different goods, whose prices
are denoted by the vector p ∈ Rm++. Given these prices and a budget, the
decision maker buys a bundle of goods, given by the vector q ∈ Rm+ . (It
is generally assumed the budget available to the decision maker is equal
to p × q. In what follows we will shorten this product to pq.) Observing
these prices and quantities at n different points in time gives a dataset
S = {(pi, qi)|i ∈ N} with N = {1, . . . , n}. We use the word observation
to denote the information (pi, qi), i ∈ N . If we now suppose the decision
maker has a well-behaved (concave, continuous and strictly monotone)
utility function u(q) : Rm+ → R+, which she attempts to maximize, then
knowledge of an observation (pi, qi) gives a lot of information about u. For
example, we know that the bundle qi must give her at least as much utility
as any other bundle with an equal or lower cost given prices pi. If not,
she is not maximizing her utility. Then, in terms of revealed preference,
we will say she prefers the chosen alternative over the other alternatives,
formalized by the direct revealed preference relation.
Definition 1.1.1. Direct Revealed Preference Relation
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For any pair of observations i, j ∈ N , if piqi ≥ piqj, we say that qi is
revealed preferred over qj, or qi R0 qj.
It is important to note that if a person chooses a bundle qi while an alter-
native qj was available for the same price, she does not necessarily think
qi gives her more utility than qj . It may also be the case that she is in-
different between the two. However, if the bundle qi is more expensive
than the bundle qj (at prices pi), then choosing qi gives more information.
Since saving money also has positive utility, the decision maker thinks qi
will give her more utility than qj , in other words, that qi is strictly better
than qj . This is formalized in the strict direct revealed preference relation.
Definition 1.1.2. Direct Strict Revealed Preference Relation
For any pair of observations i, j ∈ N , if piqi > piqj, we say that qi is
strictly revealed preferred over qj, or qi P0 qj.
Because of the nature of utility and preferences, it is also important to take
transitivity into account. Indeed, if a person at one point in time makes a
choice revealing she values qi more than qj , and at another point in time
she reveals to prefer qj over qk, then if she has a consistent utility function,
she should also value qi over qk. As such, we define the revealed preference
relation.
Definition 1.1.3. Revealed Preference Relation
For any set of bundles qi, qj , . . . , qk, i, j, . . . , k ∈ N , if qi R0 qj R0 . . . R0 qk,
we say that qi is revealed preferred over qk and we write qi R qk.
We have now shown what kind of information can be learned from ob-
serving choices by a decision maker. Now suppose we have a dataset of
purchasing decisions S = {(pi, qi)|i = 1, . . . , n}, from which we extract all
of these revealed preference relations. A question then arises: is there some
utility function u(q), such that the bundles bought maximize this function
for all observations ? This is the rationalizability question.
Definition 1.1.4. Rationalizability
A dataset S is rationalizable by a utility function, if and only if there exists
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a utility function u(q), such that the observations present in the dataset are
consistent with maximizing u(q) under budget constraints.
A main goal of a revealed preference approach is to find conditions on
the dataset such that it is rationalizable. For example, a necessary and
sufficient condition for rationalizability by a well-behaved utility function
is given by the general axiom of revealed preference (garp).
Definition 1.1.5. General Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp)
A dataset S satisfies garp if and only if for each pair of distinct bundles,
qi, qj, i, j ∈ N , if qi R qj, then it is not the case that qj P0 qi.
To conclude this section, we note that this rationalizability question is
not limited to general utility functions. Datasets can also be rationalized
by utility functions of a specific form, such as separable utility functions.
Likewise, they can be rationalized by different forms of collective decision
making, stochastic utility functions, or even heuristic choices.
1.1.2 Computational Complexity
We will close this introduction with a short and informal primer on com-
putational complexity. We refer to Garey and Johnson (1979) or Cormen
et al. (2001) for a more thorough introduction. We will look at two impor-
tant topics in complexity. First, we consider the analysis of algorithms, in
particular their worst-case complexity. Second, we will look at the theo-
retical complexity of computational problems.
It is clear that an algorithm for a computational problem performs a num-
ber of elementary operations such as addition, multiplication, comparison,
etc. Also, it is clear that the larger an instance of a problem, the more
of these operations will be needed to solve the problem. Thus, we see the
number of operations needed by the algorithm as a function of the size
of the input. In our case, the input consists of a dataset S, whose size is
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measured in the number of observations n. (There is also the number of
goods m, but this is rarely an important factor in computation time, and
as such is usually ignored.) Next, we let the worst-case time-complexity of
an algorithm be the maximum number of operations the algorithm needs
to solve the problem for any dataset of size n. We will use Big O notation
to describe this time-complexity of an algorithm (Cormen et al., 2001).
Big O notation characterizes functions by their growth rate, leaving out
constant factors and smaller terms. For example, if we are given a dataset
S consisting of n observations, we might have an algorithm which needs
at most 3n3 + n2 operations to test whether garp holds. Since both the
n2 term and the factor 3 have a negligible impact on the increase in com-
putation time as n increases, we will say this algorithm has a worst-case
time-complexity of O(n3).
The previous paragraph describes how to express the complexity of an al-
gorithm. One can also speak of the complexity of a (decision) problem.
A problem is a decision problem if an instance of this problem has a yes
or no answer. The complexity of a decision problem depends, to some
extent, on the time-complexity functions of algorithms solving the prob-
lem. For instances, if a decision problem can be solved by an algorithm
whose time-complexity function is polynomial, then the problem is said to
be in the class p. Informally, we will call these efficiently solvable or easy
problems; the computation time needed for such a problem rises relatively
slowly with the size of the instance, and as such even large instances can
usually be handled. p is a subclass of the class np, which can be defined
informally as follows: if an instance of a problem in the class np has a
yes-answer, then a polynomial size proof of this exists, which can be ef-
ficiently checked. For example, consider the following problem: given a
dataset S, is garp violated? This question is in np, because if there is
a violation, the sequence of at most n revealed preference relations which
constitute the violation can be given as a proof. While testing garp is
easy (in p), the class np also contains seemingly more difficult problems,
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for which no polynomial time algorithms are known. However, as of today
a proof that no polynomial time algorithms can exist for these problems
is lacking. This has led to the notion of np-Completeness: a problem is
np-Complete if it is in np and at least as difficult as any other problem
in np. This is usually proven by reducing another known np-Complete
problem to it, thereby showing that if a polynomial time algorithm for the
problem exists, this can be used to solve the other np-Complete prob-
lem, (and thus all np-Complete problems) in polynomial time. Since this
is unlikely, proving a problem to be np-Complete is a strong indication
that the problem is in fact difficult. We will also refer to np-Hardness in
the remainder of the text, problems that are np-Hard are not necessarily
in np, but are at least as difficult as the np-Complete problems.
To conclude this section, we would like to note that for np-Complete or
np-Hard problems, it can be the case that some special cases are easy,
because of structure in the dataset. This may be relevant for much of the
revealed preference literature, as almost all of the hardness results we will
see are for the general case of these problems. In a recent paper, Deb and
Pai (2013) show that if the number of goods in a dataset is small enough,
some structure will appear. So far, we are unaware of any papers describing
what kind of structure instances with low numbers of goods have, or how
to exploit that structure.
1.2 Single Decision Maker
In the previous section, we have already given a quick introduction into
revealed preference. In this section, we will begin by stepping back and
exploring some of the history of revealed preference theory. We will start
with the seminal paper by Samuelson (1938). Here, a decision maker is
faced with purchasing decisions (indexed by i). Given prices, represented
by the vectors pi ∈ Rm++, she will buy a bundle of goods qi ∈ Rm+ , provid-
ing a dataset of n observations, S = {(pi, qi)|i = 1, . . . , n}. As we have
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seen in the previous section, all of these decisions will provide us with re-
vealed preference relations. Using the direct revealed preference relation,
Samuelson formulated the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference.
Definition 1.2.1. Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (warp)
A dataset S satisfies warp if and only if for each pair of distinct bundles,
qi, qj, i, j ∈ N , if qiR0qj, then it is not the case that qjR0qi.
warp is the first rationalizability condition described in the literature and
requires the revealed preference relation to be asymmetric. As the axiom
does not require transitivity, satisfying it is only a necessary condition for
rationalizability by a single-valued utility function. A single-valued utility
functions is such that, for every combination of prices and expenditures,
there is only a single bundle of goods which maximizes utility. In the special
case in which the dataset contains only two goods, warp is a necessary and
sufficient condition for rationalizability by a single-valued utility function
(Samuelson, 1948; Little, 1949). The work of Samuelson was followed by
Houthakker (1950), who extended warp to incorporate transitivity. Using
indirect revealed preference relations, he formulated the Strong Axiom of
Revealed Preference.
Definition 1.2.2. Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (sarp)
A dataset S satisfies sarp if and only if for each pair of distinct bundles,
qi, qj, i, j ∈ N , if qi R qj, then it is not the case that qjR0qi.
sarp is a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability by a single-
valued utility function for any number of goods. Rose (1958) formally
proved the equivalence of warp and sarp for two goods. Conditions for
a general utility function were provided by Afriat (1967b), in the form of
what is now known as the Afriat Inequalities, a linear programming for-
mulation, and the Cyclical Consistency condition. Diewert (1973) clarified
these results further and provided another linear programming formula-
tion. Finding both the linear programs and cyclical consistency hard to
test directly, Varian (1982) sought and found a condition similar to sarp
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which does allow for multiple utility-maximizing bundles, garp. As shown
in the previous section, for GARP, strict preference relations are identified,
and indifference is allowed if the revealed preference relations are not strict.
Having defined these core axioms of revealed preference, let us look at the
computational difficulty of testing whether they are satisfied. First, warp
allows for a straightforward O(n2) test, since testing each pair of obser-
vations for a violation is sufficient. Next we turn to sarp, for which a
first attempt at providing a test was made by Koo (1963). Using a matrix
representation of the direct revealed preference relations, he describes a
sufficient condition for consistency with sarp. Dobell (1965) was the first
to describe conditions which are both necessary and sufficient. Dobell’s
test is also based on the matrix representation of direct revealed prefer-
ence relations. He proposed checking whether every square submatrix of
the direct revealed preference matrix contains at least one row and one col-
umn consisting completely of 0 elements. Due to the fact that there exist
an exponential number of such submatrices, this test runs in exponential
time. Koo (1971) later published another paper which is the basis for the
most efficient test of sarp consistency. In it, he describes a digraph rep-
resentation of revealed preference relations. In this graph, there is a node
for each bundle qi in the dataset. An arc from node i to j exists if and
only if piqi ≥ piqj and qi 6= qj . Thus, to each dataset S we can associate
its revealed preference graph GS . Any cycle within the graph GS points
to a violation of sarp in the dataset S. Since testing whether a graph is
acyclic can be done in O(n2), this is the most efficient known algorithm
for testing consistency with sarp.
Rationalizability tests for general utility functions, or equivalently for con-
sistency of datasets with garp, have also gone through a number of stages,
though in this case efficient and correct tests were known from the start.
Afriat (1967b) provides a linear program, the Afriat Inequalities, which is
polynomially solvable, although it is interesting to note that no polyno-
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mial time algorithms for solving linear problems were known at the time
Afriat published his work. Diewert (1973) then published a further linear
program. Varian’s formulation of garp (Varian, 1982) provides another
algorithm for testing rationalizability. This formulation shows rational-
izability can be tested by computing the transitive closure of the matrix
of direct revealed preference relations. This transitive closure gives all
revealed preference relations, direct and indirect. Given the transitive
closure, garp can be tested by checking, for each pair of bundles qi, qj ,
i, j ∈ N , whether both qi R qj and qj P0 qi. The bottleneck in this
procedure is the computation of the transitive closure. For its ease of im-
plementation, Varian suggests using Warshall’s algorithm (Warshall, 1962)
to do so, which has a worst-case bound of O(n3). Varian also noted faster
algorithms did exist based on matrix multiplication, which at the time
reached O(n2.74) (Munro, 1971). By now, these algorithms have improved,
the best known algorithms for general matrices reaching O(n2.373) (Cop-
persmith and Winograd, 1990; Williams, 2012; Gall, 2014). In Chapter 2,
we describe an algorithm with a lower worst-case bound of O(n2), based
on the graph representation of Koo and the computation of strongly con-
nected components. We also prove a lower bound on testing garp, showing
no algorithm can exist that is faster than O(n log n) time.
To finish our overview on rationalizability by a general utility function, we
note recent work on indivisible goods and non-linear budget sets. Fujishige
and Yang (2012) and Polisson and Quah (2013) extend the revealed pref-
erence results to the case with indivisible goods. They find that garp is a
necessary and sufficient test for rationalizability, given a suitable adapta-
tion of the revealed preference relations for their setting. Forges and Minelli
(2009) give a revealed preference characterization for non-linear budgets,
for which garp is a sufficient and necessary condition for rationalizabil-
ity by a locally non-satiated utility function. Cherchye et al. (2014a) give
a characterization for an increasing, concave and continuous utility func-
tion for the setting with non-linear budgets in the form of a set of linear
12 Literature Overview
equalities. Cosaert and Demuynck (2013) look at choice sets which are
non-linear and have a finite number of choice alternatives. They provide
revealed preference characterizations for weakly monotone, strongly mono-
tone, weakly monotone and concave, and strongly monotone and concave
utility functions, all of which are easy to test, either by some variant of
garp or a system of linear inequalities.
Besides the basic tests discussed in the previous paragraphs, conditions
and tests have been derived for testing rationalizability by various spe-
cific forms of utility functions. First, we look at weakly separable utility
functions. A utility function u(q) is separable, if the vector of goods q
can be split into at least two subvectors q1 and q2 and a subutility func-
tion f(q2) exists, such that u(q) = u¯(q1, f(q2)). Following his paper on
general utility functions, Afriat also wrote an unpublished work on sep-
arable utility functions (Afriat, 1967a). Varian (1983) built further on
this, giving a non-linear system of inequalities, for which the existence of
a solution is a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability by
a concave weakly separable utility function. Diewert and Parkan (1985)
extended this result to multiple separable subsets. Unfortunately, the non-
linear systems resulting from Varian’s and Diewert and Parkan’s work are
difficult to test. An implementation by Varian attempts to overcome the
computational difficulties by finding a solution to the linear part of the sys-
tem of inequalities and then fixing variables based on this solution, which
linearises the remainder of the inequalities. This implementation can be
too restrictive, as the variables are usually fixed with values making the
system infeasible, even if a solution exists, as shown by Barnett and Choi
(1989). Fleissig and Whitney (2003) take a similar approach, but improve
on it by fixing variables with values that are more likely to allow solutions
to the rest of the system of equalities. Exact tests of (adaptations of)
Varian’s inequalities are described in Swofford and Whitney (1994) and
Fleissig and Whitney (2008). Both use non-linear programming packages
to find solutions and are limited in the size of datasets they can handle.
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The difficulty of the problem is established by Cherchye et al. (2014b),
who prove np-Hardness of the rationalizability question. Additionally,
they provide an integer programming formulation which is equivalent to
Varian’s non-linear set of inequalities. Closely related, Echenique (2014)
proves rationalizability is also np-Hard for weakly separable utility func-
tions when dropping the concavity assumption and even if the dataset is
limited to 9 goods. Quah (2012) provides a testing algorithm for weakly
separable utility functions without concavity assumption. Other works on
weakly separable utility functions include Swofford and Whitney (1994),
who modify the system of inequalities of Varian to account for consumers
needing time to adjust their spending.
For strong or additive separability (u(q1, q2) = f1(q1) + f2(q2)), Varian
(1983) gives a linear programming formulation, allowing for tests in poly-
nomial time. Furthermore, a number of results have been published on ho-
mothetic utility functions. These functions are of the form u(q) = f(l(q)),
with l a homogeneous function and f monotonically increasing. In ef-
fect, if for two bundles qi, qj , u(qi) ≥ u(qj), then for any constant α > 0,
u(αqi) ≥ u(αqj). Afriat (1972) was the first to provide a system of linear
inequalities for which the existence of a solution is a necessary and sufficient
condition for rationalizability by a homothetic utility function. In this for-
mulation, the number of inequalities is exponential. Varian (1983) proposes
an alternative test, which is equivalent to finding a negative length cycle
in a graph (this is not the graph GS described earlier). In the same paper
he also provides a test for homothetic, separable utility functions, which is
again a difficult-to-solve system of non-linear inequalities. Finally, utility
maximization in case of rationing (i.e., there are additional constraints on
the bundles which can be bought, on top of the budget constraint) is also
handled by Varian. He provides a linear system of inequalities, for which
the existence of a feasible solutions is a necessary and sufficient condition
for rationalizability.
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As we have seen, various forms of utility functions usually have an associ-
ated system of inequalities, for which the existence of a solution is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for rationalizability by such a utility function.
The difficulty of these rationalizability tests generally depends on whether
these systems have linear or non-linear inequalities. General, single-valued
and strongly separable utility functions are easy to rationalize, as their as-
sociated systems of inequalities are linear. The same holds true for utility
maximization by a general utility function under rationing constraints. For
general and single-valued utility functions, more straightforward tests were
developed. A polynomial test also exists for rationalizability by a homoth-
etic utility function. For utility functions for which the associated system
of inequalities are non-linear, weakly separable and homothetic separable
functions, no efficient tests are known. For weakly separable utility, for-
mal np-Hardness results exist. For homothetic separable functions, this
remains an open question.
1.2.1 Goodness-of-Fit and Power Measures
An often cited limitation of rationalizability tests is that they are binary
tests: either the dataset is rationalizable or it is not. Thus, if violations
of rationalizability conditions are found, there is no indication of how se-
vere they are. Likewise, if the rationalizability conditions are satisfied, this
could be because the choices faced by the decision maker make it unlikely
that violations would occur. To get this information, so-called goodness-
of-fit measures and power measures have been proposed in the literature.
Goodness-of-fit measures quantify the severity of violations, while power
measures give a measure of how far removed the choices are from violating
rationalizability conditions.
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Goodness-of-Fit Measures
A first class of goodness-of-fit measures are based on the systems of in-
equalities which are used to describe rationalizability conditions for many
different forms of utility functions, as described earlier in this section. Ex-
tra slack variables are added to these systems, which relaxes the constraints
on the data. An optimization problem can be defined, for which the objec-
tive function is the minimization of the value of the slack variables, under
the constraint that the system of equalities is satisfied. The goodness-of-fit
measure is then equal to the value of the optimal solution to this optimiza-
tion problem. Such an approach was first described by Diewert (1973) and
has since been used in a number of different papers for various forms of
utility functions (See Diewert and Parkan (1985); Fleissig and Whitney
(2005, 2008) for weak separability, Fleissig and Whitney (2007) for addi-
tive separability). Minimizing these slack variables is easy if the system
of inequalities is linear, which is the case for general utility functions and
additive separable utility functions. In the case of non-linear systems of
inequalities, minimizing the slack variables is at least as hard as finding a
solution to the system without slack variables. Since this is already np-
Hard for weakly separable utility functions, the hardness result remains
valid for the problem of minimizing the slack variables.
A second class of goodness-of-fit measures is due to work by Afriat (1973),
and is based on relaxations of the revealed preference relations. In this
relaxation, revealed preference relations are used if the difference in price
between the chosen bundle and an another affordable bundle is big enough.
This is done by adding efficiency indices 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 for each observation
i ∈ N , and defining the revealed preference relations as follows.
For all i, j ∈ N , if eipiqi ≥ piqj , then qi R0(ei)qj . (1.1)
Obviously, if ei = 1, conditions (1.1) are the same revealed preference rela-
tions as those described in Definition 1.1.1; if ei < 1, this can be interpreted
as having a revealed preference relation between two bundles if the price
difference between bundles exceeds a certain fraction of the budget. As a
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result, there will be fewer revealed preference relations, and axioms such as
warp, sarp and garp will be easier to satisfy. A goodness-of-fit measure
is then to maximize the sum of ei values, under the constraint that a given
axiom of revealed preference is satisfied. Goodness-of-fit measures based on
this idea have been described by Afriat (1973), Varian (1990) and Houtman
and Maks (1985). Of these three, Afriat’s index is the simplest, as the value
ei is constrained to be equal for every observation (e1 = e2 = . . . = en).
This makes it easy to compute, even though for a long time the only pub-
lished algorithm was an approximation algorithm due to Varian (1990).
Varian’s index allows ei values to differ between observations. This makes
computation less straightforward and the computation was thus perceived
to be hard. This led to work on heuristic algorithms for computing Var-
ian’s index by by Varian himself (Varian, 1990), Tsur (1989) and more
recently by Alcantud et al. (2010). Finally, Houtman and Maks (1985)
proposed to constrain the ei values to either 0 or 1. In effect, this means
removing the minimum number of observations such that the remaining
dataset is rationalizable. Houtman and Maks established a link between
the known np-Hard problem of feedback vertex set and their index for the
strong axiom of revealed preference, showing its difficulty. Dean and Mar-
tin (2010) propose a weighted variant of Houtman and Maks’ index. To be
able to compute these measures for larger datasets, Dean and Martin make
use of an equivalence to set covering problems. While this problem is also
np-Hard, it is well studied and good algorithms exist. We establish the
complexity of computing all three of these indices in Chapter 3, providing
polynomial time algorithms to calculate Afriat’s index for various axioms
of revealed preference. Varian’s and Houtman and Maks’ index are shown
to be np-Hard and even stronger, it is shown that no constant-factor ap-
proximation algorithms running in polynomial time exist unless p = np.
Furthermore, we distinguish a third approach introduced by Varian (1985).
If a dataset fails to satisfy the rationalizability conditions, their goal is to
find a dataset which does satisfy the conditions and is only minimally dif-
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ferent from the observed dataset. The problem of finding these minimally
different satisfying datasets is a non-linear optimization problem, which,
in general, are hard problems to solve. To avoid having to solve large scale
non-linear problems, De Peretti (2005) approaches this problem with an
iterative procedure. Working on garp, his algorithm tackles violations one
at a time, also perturbing only one observation at a time. If a preference
cycle exists between two bundles of goods qi and qj , i, j ∈ N , he computes
the minimal perturbation necessary to remove the violation both for the
case in which qi R0 qj (in which case qi is perturbed) and for the case in
which qj R0 qi (in which case qj is perturbed). The smallest perturbation
of the two is then used to update the dataset, and the updated dataset is
checked for new garp violations. While this does not guarantee an opti-
mal solution, it does allow for handling larger datasets, especially if the
number of violations is small.
Showing the continuing interest in goodness-of-fit measures, a number of
recent papers introduce new goodness-of-fit measures. Echenique et al.
(2011) define the mean and median money pump indices. In this paper,
the severity of violations of rationality is measured by the amount of money
which an arbitrageur could extract from the decision maker by exploiting
her irrational choices. This is reflected by a money pump index for every
violation of rationality. Echenique et al. propose to calculate the money
pump index of the mean and median violation as a measure of the ir-
rationality of the decision maker. In Chapter 4, we show that computing
these measures is np-Hard, but that computing the money pump index for
the most and least severe violation can be done in polynomial time. Fur-
thermore, Apesteguia and Ballester (2014) introduce the minimal swaps
index. Informally, the swaps index of a given preference ordering over the
alternatives is calculated by counting how many better alternatives (ac-
cording to the preference order) were not chosen over all choice situations.
The minimal swaps index is then the the swaps index of the preference
order for which this index is minimal. Apesteguia and Ballester show that
computing the minimal swaps index is equivalent to the np-Hard linear
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ordering problem.
Power Measures
Power measures were first introduced by Bronars (1987). Informally, the
goal of power measures is to quantify how unlikely it is that choices gener-
ated by an alternative model of behaviour satisfy rationalizability condi-
tions for utility maximization. The more likely this is, the lower the power
of the test. Indeed, suppose we have a large number of datasets for which
we know that choices were not made to maximize a utility function. If
these datasets can often be rationalized by a utility function, then it is
obvious that the test is not good at discriminating between utility maxi-
mizing and other behaviour. Bronars proposes to use random choices as
an alternative model. The likelihood of this alternative model satisfying
the conditions is determined by Monte Carlo simulation. Andreoni and
Miller (2002) use a similar approach, they generate synthetic datasets by
bootstrapping from observed choices, and use these to establish the power
of their test.
Bronars’s Monte Carlo approach has also been applied to goodness-of-
fit measures. The value of a Goodness-of-fit measures is hard to inter-
pret without context. There is no natural level which, if crossed, indi-
cates a large deviation from rational behaviour. Furthermore, the values
of goodness-of-fit indices which point to large deviations may vary from
dataset to dataset, as the choices faced by a decision maker may or may
not allow large violations of rationalizability. One way to establish what
values are significant, is to use a Monte Carlo approach and calculate the
goodness-of-fit measures for these generated datasets. This gives a dis-
tribution of the values of goodness-of-fit measures for datasets of random
choices. It can then be checked whether the goodness-of-fit measures found
for the actual decision makers are significantly different. For example,
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Choi et al. (2007) and Heufer (2012) use this approach. As this approach
requires the goodness-of-fit measures to be calculated a large number of
times, there is a strong incentive to use efficient algorithms and measures
which are easy to calculate.
Beatty and Crawford (2011) propose measuring the power of a test by
calculating the proportion of possible choices which would satisfy the con-
ditions. Finally, we refer to Andreoni et al. (2013), who give an overview
of power measures and indices and introduce a number themselves. The
measures they introduce are adaptations of goodness-of-fit measures. For
example, they introduce a Jittering index, which is the minimum pertur-
bation of the data so the rationalizability conditions are no longer satisfied,
in line with of the work of Varian (1985). They also introduce an Afriat
Power Index, which is the reverse of the Afriat’s goodness-of-fit measure,
i.e., instead of finding the minimum e value such that the dataset no longer
satisfies the considered axiom of revealed preference, it is the maximum e
value such that the dataset does not satisfy the conditions.
1.3 Collective Choices
In the preceding section, data were analysed as if a single person bought
or chose goods, to maximize her own utility function. However, in many
cases purchasing decisions are observed at the household level. Analysing
these data calls for collective models, which account for individually ra-
tional household members, and some decision process for splitting up the
budget. The initial revealed preference contributions on this subject were
published by Chiappori (1988), for the labour supply setting. Leisure time
is observed for each member in the household, as well as the aggregated
consumption. The behaviour of this household is then rationalizable if the
consumption can be split up such that the resulting individual datasets
of leisure and consumption are rationalizable for all household members.
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Chiappori provides conditions for rationalizability, both for the cases with
and without externalities of private consumption. For both cases, these
take the form of non-linear systems of inequalities, making testing hard.
Snyder (2000) provides a reformulation of Chiappori’s conditions and uses
it in empirical tests. Testing her reformulation in a straightforward method
requires a linear integer program. Whether a polynomial test for the labour
supply setting exists remains an open question.
The work by Chiappori was generalized by Cherchye et al. (2007). Leaving
the labour supply setting, they provide conditions for an arbitrary number
of goods and without any prior allocation of goods, as was the case with
leisure time in Chiappori’s work. Cherchye et al. derive separate necessary
and sufficient conditions for collective rationalizability by concave utility
functions. In a later paper, Cherchye et al. (2010) show that the necessary
condition given in their earlier work is both necessary and sufficient, when
dropping the assumption of concave utility functions. However, testing this
condition is np-Hard, as shown by Talla Nobibon and Spieksma (2010).
Due to the hardness of rationalizability in collective settings, a number of
papers have appeared on how to test this problem. An integer program-
ming formulation is given by Cherchye et al. (2008) and an enumerative
approach is provided by Cherchye et al. (2009). Talla Nobibon et al. (2011)
take a different approach, giving a heuristic algorithm. The goal of this
algorithm is to quickly test whether the rationalizability conditions are
satisfied. If this heuristic can not prove the conditions are satisfied, an
exact test is used. Using this heuristic pre-test, many computationally de-
manding exact tests can be avoided. Deb (2010) strengthens the hardness
results by proving that a special case of this problem, the situation depen-
dent dictatorship setting, is also np-Hard. In this setting, the household
decision process is such that each purchasing decision is made by a sin-
gle household member, the dictator. At different points in time, different
household members can be the dictator, the goal is thus to partition the
observations into datasets, so that each dataset is consistent with (unitary)
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garp. Crawford and Pendakur (2013) also consider this problem in the
context of preference heterogeneity, they provide algorithms for computing
upper and lower bounds on the number of ‘dictators’. In Chapter 6, we
give further hardness results for a collective version of warp: we find that
dropping transitivity makes the test easy for households of 2 members, but
the problem remains open for 3 or more.
Another branch of the literature returns to Chiappori’s setting, in the sense
that observers know whether specific goods are either publicly or privately
consumed. Given this information, rationalizability is tested by checking
whether there exists a split of prices (for public goods) or quantities (for
private goods), such that the datasets of personalized prices and quantities
for each household member satisfies garp. This model, for an arbitrary
number of goods, is first described by Cherchye et al. (2011); these authors
also give a integer programming formulation. Talla Nobibon et al. (2013)
provide a large number of practical and theoretical computational results
for this problem. First, they prove it is np-Hard. Furthermore, they
describe a more compact integer programming formulation, and provide
a simulated annealing based meta-heuristic. They compare the compu-
tational results of these different integer programming formulations and
heuristics and find that the heuristic approach is capable of tackling larger
datasets and seldom fails to find a feasible split if one exists. In contrast
to the result in the general case, our results in Chapter 6 show that, even
when dropping transitivity, the test remains np-Hard.
1.4 Revealed Stochastic Preference
In the previous sections, we looked at methods that decide whether a set
of observations can be rationalized by one or more decision makers, using
different forms of utility functions, or different ways in which the deci-
sion making process can be split over different decision makers. However,
we assumed that utility functions and preferences remained constant. As
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a result, if a choice situation repeats itself, we expect that the decision
maker chooses the same alternative. However, it is commonly observed in
experiments on choice behaviour that if a person is given the same choice
situation multiple times, the choice she makes changes. One possible way
of explaining this behaviour is by stochastic preferences, as pioneered by
Block and Marschak (1960). Theories of stochastic preferences state that,
while at any point in time a decision maker has a preference ordering over
all alternatives, these preferences are not constant over time. Observed
behaviour is rationalizable by stochastic preferences, if and only if there
exists a set of utility functions and a probability distribution over those
utility functions, such that the frequency that an alternative is chosen
in a choice situation is equal to the probability that this alternative has
the highest utility in that situation. We also note that many results on
stochastic preferences are for the case of finite choice sets, as opposed to
the consumption setting, where there exist an infinite number of bundles
that can be bought for a expenditure level and prices. For an overview,
we refer to McFadden (2005).
A very general result was given by McFadden and Richter (1990), the ax-
iom of revealed stochastic preference (arsp), which gives a necessary and
sufficient condition for rationalizability by stochastic preferences. The gen-
erality of this axiom allows it to be used for any form of choice situation,
and all classes of decision rules. Besides the axiom, McFadden and Richter
also provide a linear programming problem for which the existence of a
solution is a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability. Both
are not straightforward to operationalize, since arsp places a condition on
every possible subset of observations, which gives an exponential number
of conditions in the number of observations. Furthermore, each condi-
tion requires finding a decision rule from all allowed decision rules which
maximizes some function, which can in itself be an np-Hard problem (for
example when the class of decision rules being tested are decisions based on
linear preference orders, as this means solving an np-Hard linear ordering
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problem (Karp, 1972)). The linear program on the other hand contains
one variable for every possible decision rule within a class of decision rules,
a number which is often exponential in the number of choice alternatives.
We will now look at some rationalizability tests for specific classes of deci-
sion rules and specific choice settings.
Binary choice settings have attracted considerable attention within the lit-
erature on stochastic preferences. In such a setting, decision makers are
faced with only two options in each choice situation. Block and Marschak
(1960) work with this setting and search for conditions for rationalizability
by stochastic strict linear preferences. Using the observed frequency with
which alternatives are chosen over other alternatives, they find two sim-
ple classes of inequalities which are necessary conditions, and they prove
sufficiency for datasets containing three choice alternatives. It was con-
jectured that these conditions are also sufficient for any number of choice
alternatives, until a counter-example by Megiddo (1977) showed this was
not the case for thirteen alternatives. Dridi (1980) closed the discussion by
proving the conditions were sufficient for five alternatives and by providing
a counterexample for six. Later, Suck (1992) showed that the necessary
and sufficient conditions were equivalent to a membership test of the linear
ordering polytope. This proves np-hardness of the rationalizability test,
and thus that no polynomial size system of linear conditions exists unless
p = np. Research on the linear ordering polytope has provided a full facet
description for up to seven alternatives (Mart´ı and Reinelt, 2011), which
already contains over 87,000 constraints. For eight alternatives, this rises
to above 480 million. As a result, current tests restrict themselves to about
5 choice alternatives in the dataset (Regenwetter et al., 2011; Regenwetter
and Davis-Stober, 2012). In Chapter 7, we propose using column genera-
tion on McFadden and Richter’s linear program for testing rationalizability
for datasets containing a larger number of choice alternatives.
We are aware of two classes of decision rules for which stochastic rational-
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izability is easy to test. Davis-Stober (2012) provides a polynomial number
of conditions which are necessary and sufficient for stochastic rationaliz-
ability by a simple heuristic decision rule. In Davis-Stober’s setting, choice
alternatives have two attributes. The levels of these two attributes are such
that, if the attributes are ranked according to the level of the attributes,
the ranking according to the first attribute is the reverse of the ranking by
the second. When faced with a choice, decision makers first set a difference
threshold for the first attribute. For each alternative, the level of the first
attribute is compared to the maximum level of this attribute in the choice
set. Only alternatives for which this difference is below the threshold are
considered in the second step. In this second step, the alternative with
the highest level of the second attribute is chosen. In Chapter 8, we give
a polynomial number of conditions which are necessary and sufficient for
single-peaked preferences, a special case of strict linear preferences. In this
setting, all alternatives are ranked along an axis. A single-peaked prefer-
ence order then has a peak, which is the most preferred alternative, and
for any pair of alternatives on the same side of the peak, the alternative
closest to the peak is always preferred to the one further away.
Returning to the setting of consumer purchases (and thus infinite choice
sets), Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999) formulate the weak axiom of stochastic
revealed preference (warsp). This axiom provides a necessary condition
for rationalizability by stochastic preferences. Analogue to warp, warsp
compares pairs of choice situations. Since the condition placed on these
pairs is easy to test, warsp allows a polynomial time test. Heufer (2011)
and Kawaguchi (2014) build further on this work. Heufer provides a suf-
ficient condition for rationalizability in terms of stochastic preferences.
Kawaguchi (2014) constructs the strong axiom of revealed stochastic pref-
erence (sarsp), a necessary condition for rationalizability by stochastic
preferences. Both of these conditions seem difficult to test, requiring in the
case of Heufer a feasible solution to a linear program with an exponential
number of constraints and variables. Kawaguchi’s sarsp likewise requires
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checking an exponential number of inequalities. Despite these challenges,
Kitamura and Stoye (2014) develop a test which can be used to test ra-
tionalizability by stochastic preferences on consumption data, though for
relatively small datasets. A key element in their approach is discretizing
the dataset, to return to a setting with a finite number of choice options.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we surveyed some areas where revealed preference theory
has been applied. We looked at unitary, collective and stochastic models
of choice behaviour, with a focus on the computational aspects of testing
these models. In the remainder of this thesis, we will present work on
models in all three of these groups. Chapter 2 presents a short note on a
more efficient algorithm for testing garp and we also derive a lower bound
on the computation time for warp, sarp and garp. Next, we look at
goodness-of-fit measures. In Chapter 3 we present complexity results for
Afriat’s, Varian’s and Houtman and Maks’ index, showing the latter two
are hard to compute, while for Afriat’s index we present a polynomial time
algorithm. Chapter 4 then looks at the Money Pump Index, showing that
computing the MPI of an ‘average’ (mean or median) violation is difficult,
but that the minimum or maximum MPI can be computed efficiently. In
the next two chapters, we look at collective models. Chapter 5 investigates
the (non)-equivalence between collective versions of warp and sarp. In
Chapter 6, we look at the computational complexity of collective versions
of warp, showing that most of these are already hard for 2 decision makers.
However, for the most general model, where goods are not known to be
private or public, the test for 2 decision makers is still easy. The final two
chapters of this thesis handle stochastic preferences. Chapter 7 presents
a model of stochastic strict preferences orderings. Testing this model is
np-Hard, we present an algorithm based on column generation to test
it. Finally, Chapter 8 presents a stochastic model, where preferences are
restricted to single-peaked preferences and we show this model is easy to
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Chapter 2
Testing the Axioms of Revealed
Preference
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the computational complexity of testing
three well-known axioms of revealed preference: the weak, strong and gen-
eralized axioms of revealed preference (warp, sarp and garp). As far as
we are aware, each known method for testing garp relies on computing
the transitive closure of a directed graph. A straightforward algorithm for
computing the transitive closure runs in O(n3) time, with n the number
of observations in the dataset. Algorithms based on matrix multiplica-
tion have better worst-case bounds of O(nα), with α ≈ 2.37. The main
contribution of this chapter is the description of an O(n2) time algorithm
for testing garp, based on computing strongly connected components, for
testing garp. Furthermore, we also argue that any algorithm for testing
warp, sarp or garp will need at least O(n log n) number of operations.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe a graph
This chapter is the result of a collaboration with Fabrice Talla Nobibon and Frits
C.R. Spieksma. A paper corresponding to this chapter will appear in the Journal of
Optimization Theory and Applications (Talla Nobibon et al., 2014).
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representation of the revealed preference relations and warp, sarp and
garp. In Section 2.4, we present an O(n2) time algorithm for testing
garp. Finally, in Section 2.5 we prove the lower bound on any algorithm
for testing warp, sarp or garp and we conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Notation and Definitions
Consider a unitary household acting in an economy with m goods and
suppose that we have observed n (non-negative) consumption quantity
bundles qi ∈ Rm+ with corresponding positive prices pi ∈ Rm++, for i =
1, . . . , n. We denote the set of observations by S = {(pi, qi) : i ∈ N}
(N = {1, . . . , n}). A bundle qi is revealed preferred over another bundle
qj , denoted by qi R0 qj , if and only if piqi ≥ piqj (and qi 6= qj). For
every dataset S, there exists an associated graph G(S) = (V,A), defined
as follows. For every observation i in the dataset, there exists a vertex
i ∈ V . For every pair of vertices i, j, an arc (i, j) ∈ A exists if there is a
direct revealed preference relation qi R0 qj and qi 6= qj . The length of an
arc, denoted by `(i, j), is given by piqj − piqi. This means that the length
of an arc is either exactly 0, or negative. We now define warp, sarp or
garp in terms of this graph G(S).
Definition 2.2.1. A dataset S satisfies warp if and only if the associated
graph G(S) contains no cycles consisting of 2 arcs.
Definition 2.2.2. A dataset S satisfies sarp if and only if the associated
graph G(S) contains no cycles.
Definition 2.2.3. A dataset S satisfies garp if and only if the associated
graph G(S) contains no cycles of negative length.
The equivalence with the definitions given in Chapter 1 is straightforward.
A cycle consisting of 2 arcs will only exist if and only if there is a pair
of observations such that qi R0 qj and qj R0 qi, which is a violation of
warp. A cycle of any length is likewise only possible if there is a sequence
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of bundles i, j, . . . , k, such that qi R0 qj R0 . . . R0 qk R0 qi, which is a
violation of sarp. A cycle of negative length implies at least one of the
direct revealed preference relations in the previous sequence is strict; a
violation of garp.
In this chapter, we are interested in the following decision problems.
Problem 2.2.1. Testing garp (warp, sarp)
Instance: A dataset S.
Question: Does S satisfy garp?
(
warp, sarp
)
2.3 The current State-of-the-art concerning warp,
sarp and garp
The question of testing whether a given dataset S satisfies warp, sarp
or garp can be answered in polynomial time. We now give an informal
sketch of the procedures used (see Varian (2006)). Using G(S), warp
can be tested by checking for each pair of vertices i, j ∈ V , whether both
(i, j) ∈ A and (j, i) ∈ A; warp is violated if and only this is the case.
Because building the graph G(S) can be done in O(n2), and we perform
O(n2) comparisons in total, we infer that testing warp can be done in
O(n2) time. For testing sarp, the graph G(S) is tested for acyclicity.
Checking whether G(S) is acyclic is done in time O(n2) using, for example,
a topological ordering algorithm. Thus, testing sarp can be done in O(n2)
time.
The current algorithm for testing garp is based on computing the tran-
sitive closure of the graph G(S) (Varian, 1982, 2006) and proceeds as fol-
lows. Given G(S) = (V,A), its transitive closure is represented by the
graph GC(S) = (V,AC). The set of arcs AC is constructed as follows, if
there is an arc (i, j) ∈ A, then there is an arc (i, j) ∈ AC , with length
`(i, j) = piqj − piqi. If there is no arc (v0, vt) ∈ A, but there is a sequence
of vertices [v0, v1, . . . , vt], such that (vi−1, vi) ∈ A for all i = 1, . . . , t, i.e.,
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there is a path from v0 to vt in G(S), then there is an arc (v0, vt) ∈ AC ,
with `(v0, vt) = 0. For this graph GC(S) it can then be tested whether
there exists a pair of vertices i, j ∈ V , such that both (i, j) ∈ AC and
(j, i) ∈ AC and either `(i, j) < 0, `(j, i) < 0 or both. The bottleneck of
this procedure is the computation of the transitive closure graph GC(S).
Varian (1982) uses the O(n3)-algorithm proposed by Warshall (1962) and
mentions the possibility of computing the transitive closure using matrix
multiplication. In the literature, the best-known algorithms for matrix
multiplication on general matrices runs in time O(n2.376) (Coppersmith
and Winograd, 1990), some recent papers improve this bound to O(n2.373)
(Williams, 2012; Gall, 2014).
2.4 The Algorithm
The algorithm we present in this section is based on the computation of
strongly connected components of the graph G(S) = (V,A). A strongly
connected component of a graph is a maximal (sub)set of vertices Vk ⊆ V ,
such that for every pair of vertices i, j ∈ Vk, there is a path from i to j
and vice versa (Tutte, 1961). Notice that for every pair of distinct strongly
connected components Vk, Vl (k 6= l), it is the case that Vk∩Vl = ∅. Indeed,
if this were not the case, there exists a vertex i ∈ (Vk ∩ Vl), and for every
vertex a ∈ Vk and every vertex b ∈ Vl, there is a path from a, through i, to b
and a path from b, through i, to a. Thus, the set Vk∪Vl is a single strongly
connected component. We now define the graph GSCC(S) = (V,ASCC) as
follows. If there exist an arc (i, j) ∈ A, and vertices i and j are in the
same strongly connected component, then (i, j) ∈ ASCC . If i and j are
in different strongly connected components, then (i, j) /∈ ASCC . We now
state the following result.
Lemma 2.4.1. A dataset S satisfies garp if and only if, for every arc
(i, j) ∈ ASCC , `(i, j) = 0.
Proof. ⇒ ) Suppose that the dataset S satisfies garp. In this case, the
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graph G(S) has no cycles of negative length. Now consider the graph
GSCC(S). By construction, any arc (i, j) ∈ A, which is part of a cycle in
G(S), is included in ASCC . This is straightforward, since if there is a cycle
involving the arc (i, j), by definition there is a path from i to j and from j
to i and i and j are in the same strongly connected component. Also, for
any arc (i, j) ∈ A which is not part of any cycle, (i, j) /∈ ASCC , since there
is no path from j to i, and the two vertices are in different components.
Given that for each arc `(i, j) ≤ 0, the existence of any arc in a cycle with
`(i, j) < 0 implies a cycle of negative length. Now suppose there is an arc
(i, j) ∈ ASCC with `(i, j) < 0. By the previous arguments, there is a cycle
of negative length in G(S).
⇐ ) Now suppose that for every arc (i, j) ∈ ASCC , `(i, j) = 0. By con-
struction, for each arc (k, l) ∈ A involved in a cycle in G(S), it is also the
case that (k, l) ∈ ASCC . Since there is no arc (i, j) ∈ ASCC with `(i, j) < 0,
this implies there are no arcs of negative length involved in any cycle in
G(S) and thus garp is satisfied.
We propose the following algorithm for testing garp. In step 1, graph
G(S) is built from the dataset S. The second step involves computing the
strongly connected components of G(S). We will be basing our complexity
result on Tarjan’s algorithm (Tarjan, 1972), which achieves a strong worst-
case bound and is relatively simple. This algorithm uses a depth-first
search, sequentially labelling all vertices in a graph while following the
arcs. When previously labelled nodes are encountered a cycle exists, and
the algorithm works backwards towards a root node of the corresponding
strongly connected component. Given the strongly connected components,
we build the graph GSCC(S) = (V,ASCC). Given this graph and its set
of arcs, we can test whether all arcs in ASCC have a length of 0. The
main difference between Algorithm 1 and the current procedure (see Varian
(2006)) for testing garp stems from the fact that the former algorithm
computes the strongly connected components of a directed graph whereas
the latter computes the transitive closure of a matrix.
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Algorithm 1 An algorithm for testing garp
1: Build the graph G(S)
2: Compute the strongly connected components of G(S)
3: Build the graph GSCC(S) = (V,ASCC)
4: if every arc (i, j) present in ASCC has `(i, j) = 0 then return garp
satisfied
5: else return garp violated
Theorem 2.4.1. Algorithm 1 tests garp in time O(n2).
Proof. The correctness of the algorithm results from Lemma 2.4.1. Let
us now analyse its complexity. The first step of the algorithm, building
the directed graph G(S), can be done in time O(n2) because we check
piqj − piqi for every pair of observations. The second step, computing
the strongly connected components, is completed in time O(n2) when im-
plemented using Tarjan’s algorithm (Tarjan, 1972). Given the strongly
connected components, building GSCC(S) = (V,ASCC) also takes O(n
2)
time, since for every pair of nodes we test whether they are in the same
strongly connected component. Finally, the last step (the if loop) has a
running time of O(n2). Therefore, the overall running time of the algo-
rithm is bounded from above by 4×O(n2) = O(n2).
2.5 Lower Bounds
Of course, a valid question is whether the O(n2) algorithms for warp, sarp
and garp can be sped up even further. We note that, in the discussion so
far, the number of goods, m, is seen as fixed. However, if the number of
goods is part of the input, our algorithm becomes a O(n2m) method. Of
course, in that case reading the data takes O(nm) time, and can be seen
as a lower bound for any algorithm testing warp, sarp and garp. In this
section, we derive a lower bound for testing these problems that does not
rely on the effort needed to read the data. We will show that, even when
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the data are known implicitly, an Ω(n log n) lower bound still applies. More
precise, we derive a lower bound of Ω(n log n) on testing warp, sarp and
garp under an algebraic computation tree model of computation. This is
achieved by using a reduction from the Element Distinctness problem (Ben-
Or, 1983; Yao, 1991).
Problem 2.5.1. Element Distinctness
Instance: A set x1, x2, . . . , xk of k positive integers.
Question: Are the integers xi, i = 1, . . . , k, pairwise distinct?
Using a topological method, Yao (1991) proves that any algebraic com-
putation tree that solves the k-Element Distinctness problem has a lower
bound complexity of Ω(k log k). We next show that this lower bound is
valid for warp, sarp and garp by arguing that an algorithm for testing
these can also be used for determining whether k integers are pairwise
distinct.
Given an instance x1, x2, . . . , xk of the Element Distinctness problem,
we build a dataset S as follows. We assume that there are k goods. To
describe the prices and the quantities of all goods for each observation we
make use of a ‘default’ price (quantity) for each good. The vector of default
prices is (x1 − 0.1, x2 − 0.1, . . . , xk − 0.1) whereas the vector of default
quantities is (0, 0, . . . , 0). Notice that to describe these default vectors, we
need O(k) operations. We consider a dataset S with k observations where
an observation is identified by the index of a good. This index means that
for the considered observation, that particular good, let us say j, has the
price of xj + 0.1 (instead of xj − 0.1 as in the default vector) whereas
the quantity of that good is now 1 (instead of 0 in the default quantity
vector). The price (respectively the quantity) of each remaining good is
exactly its default price (respectively its default quantity). Notice that all
the quantities in S are pairwise distinct. Also, observe that this second
part of our reduction requires O(k) operations because given the default
price and quantity vectors, we need exactly O(k) numbers to describe the
dataset S. We now prove that the dataset S satisfies warp, sarp or garp
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if and only if the considered instance of the Element distinctness problem
is a yes instance.
Consider the directed graph G(S) built from S and observe that there is
an arc from i to j if and only if piqi ≥ piqj ; that is xi + 0.1 ≥ xj − 0.1,
as xi and xj are integers, this is equivalent to xi ≥ xj . As a result, if
there is a cycle (s, u), (u, v), . . . , (z, t)(t, s) then the two-cycles (s, u)(u, s),
(u, v), (v, u), . . . , and (t, s)(s, t) are all present. This observation implies
that if the graph does not contain any two-cycle then it does not contain
any cycle and vice-versa. As a result, S satisfies warp if and only if S
satisfies sarp. Another remark is that for all pair of observations i and
j we have piqi = xi + 0.1 6= xj − 0.1 = piqj , because xi and xj are
integers. This means that for any pair of observations i and j we have
piqi 6= piqj . These inequalities imply that S satisfies garp if and only if
S satisfies sarp. Thus, for this particular dataset S, testing sarp, warp
or garp is equivalent. Observe now that a two-cycle (i, j), (j, i) is present
in our graph if and only if xi = xj ; in other words, there is a two-cycle
in our graph if and only if the two elements xi and xj are identical. It
immediately follows that the dataset S satisfies warp, sarp and garp if
and only if the considered instance of the Element Distinctness problem is
a yes-instance. This proves that any algorithm for solving warp, sarp or
garp can be used to solve the Element Distinctness problem. Therefore,
the lower bound of Ω(k log k) for solving the Element Distinctness problem
is directly applicable to any algorithm for solving warp, sarp or garp.
We formalize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5.1. Any algorithm for testing either warp, sarp or garp
on a dataset S with n observations has a running time bounded from below
by Ω(n log n).
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents an O(n2) algorithm testing garp, which improves
upon the best known complexity for algorithms for testing garp. Fur-
thermore, we show that the element distinctness problem can be seen as a
special case of testing warp, sarp or garp. As it has been proven that
element distinctness cannot be tested in less than Ω(n log n) time, this
provides a lower bound of the computational complexity of tests for these
axioms.

Chapter 3
Goodness-of-fit Measures for
Revealed Preference Tests
3.1 Introduction
As we noted in Chapter 1, tests of the axioms of revealed preference are
‘sharp’ tests: they only tell us whether or not observed behaviour is con-
sistent with the revealed preference axiom that is being tested. When the
dataset does not pass the test, there is no indication concerning the severity
or the number of violations. To deal with this, a number of goodness-of-
fit measures have been proposed in the literature to express how close a
dataset is to satisfying rationality. In this chapter, we will focus on some
classical goodness-of-fit measures, which are often used in applied work.
In particular, we look at Afriat’s index (ai) (Afriat, 1973), Houtman and
Maks’ index (hi) (Houtman and Maks, 1985) and Varian’s index (vi) (Var-
ian, 1990). These goodness-of-fit measures can be computed for different
This chapter is the result of a collaboration with Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock
and Frits C.R. Spieksma. An article based on parts of this chapter has been pub-
lished in Transactions on Economics and Computation (Smeulders et al., 2014b). We
gratefully acknowledge helpful discussions with Gerhard Woeginger and Fabrice Talla
Nobibon and interesting comments by the referees.
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axioms of revealed preference. In the previous chapters, we looked at the
weak, strong and general axioms of revealed preferences (warp, sarp and
garp). In this Chapter, we will also consider the homothetic axiom of
revealed preference (harp). Section 3.2 provides a precise description of
this axiom and the different goodness-of-fit measures.
These revealed preference axioms and goodness-of-fit measures have been
used intensively in the literature. The first tests of the axioms of revealed
preference go back to the sixties and seventies. Aggregated household
consumption data was used in tests of sarp by Koo (1963, 1971), Koo and
Hasenkamp (1972), Mossin (1972) and Landsburg (1981). Varian (1982)
tested garp using similar data. Only Koo tried to measure the severity of
the rejections by focusing on the number of violations and using a measure
similar to hi. Over the last decade, the goodness-of-fit measures have been
used more and more often. Sippel (1997) tests relaxations of warp, sarp
and garp related to ai. ai and garp are used in papers by Mattei (2000),
Harbaugh et al. (2001), Andreoni and Miller (2002), Fe´vrier and Visser
(2004), Choi et al. (2007, 2014), Dean and Martin (2010) and Burghart
et al. (2013); the last four papers also use hi. vi and garp appears in
Cox (1997), Mattei (2000), Choi et al. (2007, 2014) and Dean and Martin
(2010). For warp, all three indices appear in Choi et al. (2007). To
the best of our knowledge, there do not exist any studies that compute
goodness-of-fit measures for harp, although there exist papers in which
harp is tested (see for example Manser and McDonald (1988)).
It is generally thought that calculating ai is easy. However, to our knowl-
edge, no exact algorithm is described in the literature. Varian (1990)
provides an approximation algorithm, which comes within an additive er-
ror of
(
1
2
)m
of the true index-value in m garp tests. As for the other
two indices (hi and vi), it has been empirically recognized that computing
them is computationally intensive. For instance, Varian (1990) writes:
“Computing the set of efficiency indices [vi] that are as close
as possible to 1 in some norm is substantially more difficult . . .
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This approach is significantly more difficult from a computa-
tional perspective.”
Similarly, Choi et al. (2014)1 state:
“All indices [vi and hi] are computationally intensive for even
moderately large datasets.”
In fact, because of the apparent difficulty to exactly calculate VI, some au-
thors have focused on designing approximate heuristics, see, for example
Varian (1993), Tsur (1989) and Alcantud et al. (2010).
The goal of the current chapter is to give a theoretical foundation for these
practical observations and to strengthen the existing results. As far as we
are aware, explicit complexity results are known only for index HI. More
specifically, Houtman and Maks establish a link between their index for
sarp and feedback vertex sets on a digraph, which implies NP-Hardness.
Next, Dean and Martin (2010) state that hi for garp is also NP-hard.
We establish the computational complexity for every combination of the
three goodness-of-fit measures (ai, vi and hi) and the four revealed pref-
erence axioms (garp, sarp, warp and harp) mentioned above. We will
refer to these problems as {a,v,h}i-{g,s,w,h}arp, where choosing a sym-
bol from the set {a,v,h} and a symbol from the set {g,s,w,h} identifies
the particular problem. For example, ai-garp is the problem of computing
the maximum index ai such that the dataset satisfies a relaxation of garp.
Our main results are summarized in Table 1, where a column corresponds
to a specific axiom and a row to a specific measure, and where n stands for
the number of observations. ‘Inapproximable’ stands for: no polynomial-
time algorithm can achieve a constant-factor approximation unless p =
np.
1 This quote is found in a working paper version (January 2011) of this article.
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ai (sec 3.6) vi (sec 3.4) hi (sec 3.5)
warp n2 Inapproximable Inapproximable
sarp n2 log n Inapproximable Inapproximable
garp n2 log n Inapproximable Inapproximable
harp n3 Inapproximable Inapproximable
Table 3.1: Overview of Results
The rest of this chapter unfolds as follows. The next section sets the stage
by introducing harp and the considered goodness-of-fit measures in more
detail. Section 3.3 provides a statement of the computational problems we
focus on. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present our results on the computational
complexity for the indices vi and hi. Section 3.6 contains a polynomial
time algorithm for ai. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Revealed preference concepts
We start by stating the homothetic axiom of revealed preference in 3.2.1.
For the exact definitions of the other axioms of revealed preference, we
refer to Chapter 1. Subsequently, we present the different goodness-of-fit
measures in 3.2.2.
3.2.1 The Homothetic Axiom of Revealed Preference
As before, our analysis starts from a dataset S = {(pi, qi)|i ∈ N}, (N =
{1, . . . , n}) where pi ∈ Rm++ and qi ∈ Rm+ correspond to observations i =
1, . . . , n. In this chapter, we will assume, without loss of generality, that
prices are normalized such that piqi = 1 for every observation i. Using this
normalization, Varian (1983) gives the following definition of harp.
Definition 3.2.1. A normalized dataset S satisfies harp if and only if
for every sequence of observations, i, j, k, . . . , l: (piqj)(pjqk) . . . (plqi) ≥ 1.
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This definition can be rewritten in the following way, which we will use
throughout this chapter.
Definition 3.2.2. A normalized dataset S satisfies harp if and only if,
for every sequence of observations, i, j, k, . . . , l: log(piqj)+log(pjqk)+ . . .+
log(plqi) ≥ 0.
As is the case with warp, sarp and garp, there also exists a graph rep-
resentation of harp, which is convenient to test the axiom. We will refer
to this graph as GH(S) = (V,AH). In this graph, nodes are defined in the
same way as for the graph G(S), i.e., there is a node for every observa-
tion. However, unlike the graph G(S), there exists an arc (i, j) ∈ AH and
(j, i) ∈ AH for every pair of nodes i, j ∈ V , i.e. the graph GH(S) is com-
plete. The length of an arc (i, j) is equal to log piqj for each (i, j) ∈ AH .
Note that unlike the graph G(S) used for the other axioms of revealed
preference, the length of arcs can be strictly positive in the graph GH(S).
In terms of this graph, harp can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.3. A normalized dataset S satisfies harp if and only if
the associated graph GH(S) contains no cycles of negative length.
The main differences between the alternative axioms we consider in this
chapter can be summarized as follows (see Varian (2006) for a more exten-
sive discussion on the meaning of the axioms). Data consistency with warp
implies that the direct revealed preference relation R0 is asymmetric. By
construction this direct revealed preference relation is not transitive since
qiR0qj and qj R0 qk does not need to imply qi R0 qk. This is no longer
the case for the revealed preference relation R, which is the transitive clo-
sure of R0. Data consistency with warp is a necessary condition for data
consistency with sarp and implies that the revealed preference relation is
asymmetric (and transitive).
Next, data consistency with sarp means that consumption behaviour can
be described as maximizing a utility function that generates single-valued
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demand. Similarly, data consistency with garp means that consumption
behaviour can be described as maximizing a utility function that generates
multi-valued demand. As such, garp is a generalization of sarp and data
consistency with garp still makes the revealed preference relation R an
asymmetric and transitive relation. Finally, data consistency with harp
means that consumption behaviour can be described as maximizing a util-
ity function that is homothetic. This implies that garp is a necessary
condition for harp and that the revealed preference relation is asymmet-
ric and transitive. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relations between the different
axioms of revealed preference.
Figure 3.1: Relations of the axioms of revealed preference
3.2.2 Goodness-of-Fit Measures
In practice, direct application of any of the above revealed preference ax-
ioms to some given dataset effectively obtains a ‘sharp’ test: a dataset
either satisfies the axiom or it does not. In other words, such a test allows
us to conclude whether or not observed behaviour is ‘exactly’ consistent
with the hypothesis of utility maximization (of a particular form, depend-
ing on whether we consider warp, sarp, garp or harp). However, a
dataset that is not exactly consistent may actually be very close to consis-
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tency. For example, there may be only a limited number of observations
that cause the observed violations of the axiom that is subject to testing.
Or, the violations may be very insignificant in that small adjustments of
the observations’ expenditures (i.e. prices times quantities) may suffice to
obtain consistency. Generally, it is interesting to quantify the degree to
which a given dataset is close to consistency (see Varian (1990) for exten-
sive motivation).
To account for these considerations, a number of goodness-of-fit measures
have been described in the literature. Three often used measures are
Afriat’s efficiency index (ai), Varian’s efficiency vector index (vi) and the
Houtman and Maks index (hi). Essentially, the indices ai and vi look for
minimal expenditure perturbations to obtain consistency with the revealed
preference axiom under evaluation: the ai index applies a common pertur-
bation to all observations, while the vi index allows a different perturbation
for each individual observation. Next, the index hi identifies the largest
subset of observations that are consistent with the axiom. Essentially, this
quantifies the degree of violation in terms of the number of observations
that are involved in a violation of the revealed preference axiom that is
tested. We refer to Varian (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the
different goodness-of-fit measures we evaluate.
To formally introduce our goodness-of-fit measures, we make use of the
vector e = (e1, e2, . . . , en), with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1. This vector introduces an
index ei for each observation i ∈ N , which relaxes the revealed preference
relations R0 and P0 as follows:
if ei(= eipiqi) ≥ piqj then qiR0(e)qj ,
if ei(= eipiqi) > piqj then qiP0(e)qj .
R(e) and P (e) represent the transitive closures of R0(e) and P0(e). These
newly defined relations R0(e), P0(e), R(e) and P (e) give rise to relaxed
versions of the earlier axioms of revealed preference, which are defined for
a given vector e. Clearly these axioms comply with the original versions
of warp, sarp, garp and harp as soon as ei = 1 for all i ∈ N .
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Definition 3.2.4. For a given e = (e1, e2, . . . , en), with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, a
normalized dataset S satisfies
• warp(e): If and only if, for each pair of distinct bundles, qi, qj: if
qi R0(e) qj then it is not the case that qj R0(e) qi.
• sarp(e): If and only if, for each pair of distinct bundles, qi, qj: if
qi R(e) qj then it is not the case that qj R0(e) qi.
• garp(e): If and only if, for each pair of distinct bundles, qi, qj: if
qi R(e) qj then it is not the case that qj P0(e) qi.
• harp(e): If and only if, for every sequence of observations, i, j, k, . . . , l(=
1, . . . , n): log(piqj) + log(pjqk) + . . .+ log(plqi) ≥ log(ei) + log(ej) +
. . .+ log(el).
To define the Afriat Index (ai), we assume that e1 = · · · = en, which
does indeed comply with a common perturbation for all observations. The
index ai equals the supremum over all values for which the data is consis-
tent with the tested revealed preference axiom. More precisely, if e = 1,
then the data is consistent with the tested axiom, while if e < 1, then this
indicates that we need to pertubate the data to make it consistent with
the revealed preference axiom under study. The smaller the number e is,
the higher the perturbation or, alternatively, the more severe the rejection
of the axiom. Finally, we notice that e is well-defined. If for a given e
the data is consistent with, for example, warp(e), then the same holds for
all e′ < e. Indeed, by construction we have that the revealed preference
relations in terms of e′ are always a subset of the ones in terms of e (e.g.
R0(e
′) ⊆ R0(e)).
The Varian Index (vi) differs from the index ai by allowing for observation
specific perturbations. The index vi equals the vector e that is closest to
1, for some given norm, such that the data satisfies the revealed preference
axiom under study. For example, if we use the quadratic norm, then vi
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should minimize
∑
i(1− ei)2 such that, for example, warp(e) is satisfied.
Further, the index vi is subject to the same qualifications as the index ai.
Finally, the Houtman and Maks index (hi) equals the size of the largest
subset of observations which satisfy the axioms of revealed preference.
Formally, this complies with restricting the possible values of ei so that
ei ∈ {0, 1}.
Graph representation
In order to verify whether a dataset actually satisfies some revealed pref-
erence axiom for a given vector e, it is natural to adapt the graphs G(S)
and GH(S). For a given dataset S and vector e, we construct the asso-
ciated graph Ge(S) as follows. In this graph, there is a node for every
observation. Next, for each pair of observations i, j (qi 6= qj), there is an
arc from node i to node j when ei ≥ piqj . The length of this arc is equal
to piqj − ei. The graph Ge(S) will be used to test warp, sarp and garp.
To test harp, we make use of another graph GHe (S). In this graph, nodes
are defined in the same way as for the graph Ge(S), i.e., there is a node for
every observation. Furthermore, for every pair of nodes (i, j), there exists
an arc from i to j and an arc from j to i. The lengths of these arcs are
given by log(piqj)− log(ei).
The axioms of revealed preference can then be formulated as follows:
Definition 3.2.5. For a given e = (e1, e2, . . . , en), with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, the
dataset S satisfies
• warp(e): If and only if each cycle consisting of 2 arcs in the graph
Ge(S) involves observations that have identical bundles.
• sarp(e): If and only if each cycle in the graph Ge(S) contains only
observations with identical bundles.
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• garp(e): If and only if the graph Ge(S) does not contain any cycles
of negative length.
• harp(e): If and only if the graph GHe (S) does not contain any cycles
of negative length.
3.3 Problem statement
In this section we introduce the tools that we need to prove the results
announced in Table 3.1. Using the graph representation described in Sec-
tion 3.2.2, we are now in a position to define an optimization problem that
measures how close a given dataset is to satisfying a particular axiom of
revealed preference. This leads to twelve different optimization problems.
For example, for sarp(e) we obtain the problems ai-sarp, vi-sarp and hi-
sarp, each corresponding to a specific index. Straightforward adaptations
define the problems ai-{w,g,h}arp, vi-{w,g,h}arp and hi-{w,g,h}arp.
For compactness, we only state the optimization problems with respect
to sarp; the optimization problems corresponding to {w,g,h}-arp are
defined analogously.
Problem 3.3.1. vi-sarp
Given a dataset S, maximize
∑n
i=1 ei, with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 for each i, while S
satisfies sarp(e).
Clearly, objective functions other than
∑n
i=1 ei are possible. We will come
back to this issue in Section 3.4.
Problem 3.3.2. hi-sarp
Given a dataset S, maximize
∑n
i=1 ei, with ei ∈ {0, 1} for each i, while S
satisfies sarp(e).
Results concerning this problem will be given in Section 3.5.
Problem 3.3.3. ai-sarp
Given a dataset S, maximize e, with 0 ≤ e ≤ 1, while S satisfies sarp(e).
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3.4 Varian’s Index
Clearly, when given a vector e = (e1, . . . , en), there are different ways to
specify an objective function measuring the quality of e. Obvious can-
didates are minimize
∑n
i=1 (1− ei), minimize
∑n
i=1 (1− ei)2 or minimize
maxi (1 − ei). In fact, all these objective functions can be captured by
considering minimize
∑n
i=1 (1− ei)ρ for ρ ≥ 1. Observe that, since min-
imize limρ→∞
∑n
i=1 (1− ei)ρ is equivalent to minimize maxi (1 − ei), the
Afriat index arises when ρ → ∞. The results in this section are phrased
for ρ = 1, i.e., for the case where we minimize
∑n
i=1 (1− ei) or equiva-
lently maximize
∑n
i=1 ei. At the end of the section we point out that the
reduction remains valid for every fixed ρ ≥ 1. Notice that for every fixed
ρ the problem is hard, while for ρ→∞ the problem becomes easy.
Let us now consider the following decision problem associated with vi-
sarp (vi-sarpd):
Problem 3.4.1. vi-sarpd
Instance: A dataset S and a number Z.
Question: Do there exist n numbers ei, with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, such that
(i) The dataset S satisfies sarp(e), and
(ii)
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ Z?
Obviously, being able to solve Problem 3.3.1 from Section 3.3, i.e., being
able to solve vi-sarp, in polynomial time implies that vi-sarpd can be
solved in polynomial time. That, however, is unlikely, as witnessed by our
next result:
Theorem 3.4.1. vi-sarpd is NP-complete.
Proof. First, we show that the vi-sarpd is in NP, i.e., we show that for
every Yes-Instance, there is a ‘short’ certificate. Suppose an instance of
vi-sarpd is a Yes-Instance, and (e1, e2, . . . , en) is a solution, then there
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exists a solution (e′1, e′2, . . . , e′n) which can be described as a function of
the p and q vectors and Z. Indeed, since an ei value basically determines
the presence or absence of arcs emanating from the node corresponding to
observation i, only O(n) breakpoint values of ei are relevant (and these
can be described as piqj/piqi). Thus if (e1, e2, . . . , en) is a solution, we can
increase an individual ei value until it meets a breakpoint value (bpi). At
this breakpoint value, sarp may no longer be satisfied, since the newly
appearing arc(s) can lead to a violation. However, for any value of ei
below this breakpoint, no new arcs appear and sarp is satisfied. We set
e′i = bpi − (
∑n
k=1 bpk − Z)/n, for all i ∈ N . Notice that (e′1, e′2, . . . , e′n) is
feasible, since
n∑
i=1
e′i =
n∑
i=1
(bpi − (
n∑
k=1
(bpi)− Z)/n) = Z. (3.1)
Also notice that (e′1, e′2, . . . , e′n) is a short certificate, which can be com-
pletely described in a polynomial number of bits in regards to the inputs,
p, q and Z. Given this certificate, calculating
∑n
i=1 e
′
i, building the graph
Ge′(S) and testing it for acyclicity can be done in polynomial time, thus
the problem is in np.
Next, we prove that vi-sarpd is NP-hard by a reduction from the well-
known NP-hard independent set problem Karp (1972), which is formulated
as follows:
Problem 3.4.2. independent set
Instance: A graph G = (V,E) and a number k.
Question: Does there exist a subset V ′ ⊆ V of at least k vertices, such that
for every pair of vertices i, j ∈ V ′, the edge (i, j) is not in E?
Given an instance of IS we now construct the following instance of vi-
sarpd. For every node i ∈ V , there is an observation in vi-sarpd: n := |V |.
The vectors pi = (pi,1, . . . , pi,n), qi = (qi,1, . . . , qi,n) are created as follows.
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We set, for i = 1, . . . , n, qi,i := 1, all remaining qi,j := 0. Further, we set
pi,i := 1, for i = 1, . . . , n. If there is an edge between node i and node
j in G, i.e., if {i, j} ∈ E, then pi,j :=  (for some 0 <  < 1n), other-
wise pi,j := 2. Finally, we set Z := k. This completes the description of
the instance of vi-sarpd. Notice that this construction implies that if an
edge exists between i and j in G, then piqj = pjqi = , else piqj = pjqi = 2.
We now argue the equivalence between IS and vi-sarpd. Suppose the in-
stance of independent set is a yes-instance, i.e., an independent set of size
at least k exists. For every vertex in that independent set, set ei = 1 and for
every other vertex set ei = 0. It is clear that
∑
ei ≥ Z. Consider the graph
Ge(S), and recall that an arc is present from i to j if and only if piqj ≤ ei.
We claim that the graph Ge(S) is acyclic. Indeed, notice that vertices out-
side the independent set will not have any outgoing arcs in Ge(S) since for
each such vertex i: piqj − ei = piqj > 0. Also notice that no arc connects
two observations corresponding to nodes in the independent set, since for
a pair of such observations i, j we have piqj − ei = pjqi − ej = 2 − 1 > 0.
Thus, arcs in Ge(S) only exist from vertices in the independent set to ver-
tices outside the independent set. It follows that the graph is acyclic.
Now, suppose that the instance of vi-sarpd is a yes-instance, so
∑
ei ≥
Z = k. Then for at least k observations ei > ; if not, at most k − 1 ei-
values exceed ; since ei ≤ 1,
∑
ei is then bounded by k−1+(n−k+1) <
k − 1 + 1 = k, which contradicts the requirements for a yes-instance. We
will call such an ei value large. We claim that the vertices with large ei-
values constitute an independent set in G. Indeed, consider two vertices
i and j with large values ei and ej . If i and j are connected in G, then
piqj = pjqi = , implying that there is an arc in the graph Ge(S) from i to
j and from j to i, which is a cycle. Therefore i and j are not connected in
G. Thus, the set of vertices with large ei is an independent set of size at
least k.
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We now proceed with vi-garp; its corresponding decision problem is vi-
garpd:
Problem 3.4.3. vi-garpd
Instance: A dataset S and a number Z.
Question: Do there exist n numbers ei, with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, such that
(i) The dataset S satisfies garp(e), and
(ii)
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ Z?
Theorem 3.4.2. vi-garpd is NP-complete.
Proof. This proof is an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 3.4.1. Observe
that we are now interested in the question whether there exists a cycle in
the graph Ge(S) that has negative length (see Definition 3.2.5).
Again, vi-garpd is easily seen to be in NP. The certificate is the same,
calculating
∑n
i=1 ei, building the graph Ge(S) and testing Definition 3.2.5
can all be done in polynomial time.
The instance that we build using independent set is exactly the same as in
the proof of Theorem 3.4.1. We now show the equivalence. From the proof
of Theorem 3.4.1, we know that if an independent set of size k exists, we
can find a vector e for which
∑
ei ≥ Z = k and sarp(e) is satisfied. As
garp(e) is a relaxation of sarp(e), garp(e) holds as well.
Vice versa, we now argue that a yes-instance of vi-garpd corresponds with
an independent set of size at least k. Consider two nodes in G, i and j,
and assume that both ei and ej are large. If i and j are connected in G,
then an arc from i to j, and an arc from j to i, both with negative length
are present in Ge(S). This however, is impossible since the instance of
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vi-garpd is a yes-instance. Thus, since there are at least k observations
with a large e-value, an independent set of size at least k exists in G.
Next we consider the problem vi-warp and its corresponding decision
problem vi-warpd:
Problem 3.4.4. vi-warpd
Instance: A dataset S and a number Z.
Question: Do there exist n numbers ei, with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, such that
(i) The dataset S satisfies warp(e), and
(ii)
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ Z?
Theorem 3.4.3. vi-warpd is NP-complete.
Proof. For vi-warpd, the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 is also easily adapted.
Again no changes are made to the graph construction, the only difference
compared to vi-sarpd is that cycles are now allowed, as long as they in-
volve more than 2 vertices (see Definition 3.2.5). Clearly, vi-warpd is in
np.
From the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, we know that if an independent set of
size k exists, we can find a vector e for which
∑
ei ≥ Z = k and the graph
Ge(S) is acyclic. As it is acyclic, clearly no cycles involving only two ver-
tices exist and warp(e) is satisfied.
Finally, if the instance of vi-warpd is a yes-instance, we claim that an
independent set of size k exists. As shown before, the observations for
which the ei value is large are not connected in the graph G, so they form
an independent set.
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We end this section with the problem vi-harp; here is the corresponding
decision version:
Problem 3.4.5. vi-harpd
Instance: A dataset S and a number Z.
Question: Do there exist n numbers ei, with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, such that
(i) The dataset S satisfies harp(e), and
(ii)
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ Z?
Theorem 3.4.4. vi-harpd is NP-complete.
Proof. As with the other axioms, vi-harpd is in NP since the certificate
consists of the ei values. Testing the graph for Definition 3.2.5 can be done
using a minimum cycle mean algorithm. This algorithm identifies the cycle
for which the mean weight of its arcs is the minimum mean weight of all
cycles in the graph. If the mean weight of the arcs of this cycle is positive,
harp(e) is satisfied.
An instance of vi-harpd is built in the same way as the instances in the
proofs of the previous Theorems. Consider now the equivalence. If an
independent set of size k exists in G, we choose ei = 1 for observations
corresponding to nodes in the independent set and ei = 
n+1 for the other
nodes. Observe that the resulting graph GHe (S) has the following proper-
ties:
(i) an arc in GHe (S) emanating from an observation corresponding to a
node not in the independent set has a length of either log − log n+1,
if there exists an edge between both nodes in G or log 2 − log n+1
otherwise.
(ii) an arc in GHe (S) emanating from an observation corresponding to a
node in the independent set has a length of either log −log 1, if there
exists an edge between both nodes in G or log 2− log 1 otherwise.
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Any cycle that contains only observations corresponding to nodes within
the independent set has positive length, since the length of each arc equals
log 2. Further, a cycle in GHe (S) going through an observation correspond-
ing to a node not in the independent set contains an arc with length at
least log  − log n+1. Hence, the length of this cycle is at least log  −
log n+1 + n log  = (n + 1) log  − log n+1 = 0. Thus each cycle has non-
negative length and the instance is a yes-instance of vi-harpd.
Consider now a yes-instance of vi-harpd. Clearly, there will be at least
k observations with a large ei value. Consider two nodes in G, each cor-
responding to an observation with a large e-value. If these two nodes are
connected in G arcs of length log  − log ei and log  − log ej are present,
yielding a negative cycle. Thus, two observations with large e-values can
not correspond to nodes that are connected in G.
From the NP-completeness of the decisions problems, it follows that the
optimization problems vi-{w,s,g,h}arp are NP-hard. Next, we show that
not only is computing Varian’s Index NP-hard, but also that approximat-
ing it in polynomial time is difficult, unless p = np.
Theorem 3.4.5. For each fixed δ > 0, the existence of a polynomial time
approximation algorithm vi-{w,s,g,h}arp achieving a ratio of O(n1−δ)
implies p = np.
Proof. Consider an instance of Independent Set, and the corresponding
instance of vi-{w,s,g,h}arp as constructed in Theorem 3.4.1. Clearly,
if the optimum value of the vi-{w,s,g,h}arp instance equals z, then the
optimum value for the IS instance equals bzc (if not, then then there exists
an independent set of size bzc+ 1, and by the previous reduction, we can
find e so that
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ bzc+ 1). Now, let z represent the optimum value
of the instance of vi-{w,s,g,h}arp, and let us assume that we have a
polynomial time approximation algorithm for vi-{w,s,g,h}arp achieving
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a ratio O(n1−δ). Thus, more concrete, assume that we can compute in
polynomial time a vector index e such that
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ 2zn1−δ . Given this
vector-index we can find an independent set of size max(1, b 2z
n1−δ c). Since
n1−δ ×max(1, b 2z
n1−δ c) ≥ n1−δ ×b 2zn1−δ c ≥ n1−δ ×
b2zc
n1−δ+1 ≥ n1−δ ×
b2zc
2n1−δ ≥
b2zc
2 ≥ bzc, we conclude:
max(1, b 2z
n1−δ
c) ≥ bzc
n1−δ
It follows that we have a polynomial time algorithm achieving a ratio n1−δ
for IS. H˚astad (1999) and Zuckerman (2006), have shown that an approx-
imation algorithm for IS that runs in polynomial time can not guarantee
a ratio of n1−δ, unless p = np. Our result follows.
Let us now return to the general objective function
∑n
i=1 (1− ei)ρ (with
ρ ≥ 1) given at the start of this section. We now consider the following
problem:
Problem 3.4.6.
Instance: A dataset S and a number Z.
Question: Do there exist n numbers ei, with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, such that
(i) The dataset S satisfies sarp(e), and
(ii)
∑n
i=1 (1− ei)ρ ≤ Z?
Theorem 3.4.6. Computing Varian’s Index is NP-hard for objective func-
tions of the form
∑n
i=1 (1− ei)ρ, for any fixed ρ ≥ 1.
Proof. Given an instance of Independent Set, create an instance of vi-
{w,s,g,h}arp as in the proof of their respective theorems with the follow-
ing differences. Set Z := n− k and let 0 <  < 1− ( n−kn−k+1)(1/ρ). It can be
easily checked that the equivalence holds.
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3.5 Houtman and Maks’ Index
In this section, we consider the problems hi-{w,s,g,h}arp. We give the
problem hi-sarp, all other problems are analogous, differing only in the
axiom of revealed preference to be satisfied. Notice that, in their origi-
nal paper, Houtman and Maks (1985) already showed hi-sarp is an np-
complete problem, through a reduction from feedback vertex set, see also
Dean and Martin (2010).
Problem 3.5.1. hi-{w,s,g,h}arpd
Instance: A dataset S and a number Z.
Question: Do there exist n numbers ei, with ei ∈ {0, 1}, such that
(i) The dataset S satisfies {w,s,g,h}arp(e), and
(ii)
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ Z?
Theorem 3.5.1. hi-{w,s,g,h}arpd is NP-complete.
Proof. Note that this result has been proven for hi-sarpd by Houtman
and Maks (1985). For the other axioms of revealed preference, the proofs
of NP-completeness for VI are easily extended to HI. As the choice of ei
is now limited to either zero or one, it is clear that every large ei = 1 and
every other ei = 0, i ∈ N .
The NP-hardness of the optimization problems follows from the NP-completeness
of the decision problems.
Theorem 3.5.2. For each fixed δ > 0, the existence of a polynomial time
approximation algorithm hi-{w,s,g,h} achieving a ratio of n1−δ implies p
= np.
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Proof. Consider an instance of Independent Set, and the corresponding
instance of hi-sarp as constructed in Theorem 3.4.1. Clearly, if the op-
timum value of the hi-sarp instance equals z, then the optimum value
for the IS instance also equals z (if not, then then there exists an inde-
pendent set of size z + 1, and by the previous reduction, we can find e so
that
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ z + 1). Now assume that there exists a polynomial time
approximation algorithm achieving a ratio of n1−δ for hi-sarp, then we
can find a vector-index so that
∑n
i=1 ei ≥ zn1−δ . Given this vector-index
we can find an independent set of size d z
n1−δ e as follows, for every i for
which ei = 1 add the vertex i to the independent set. This would give us
a n1−δ-approximation for IS in polynomial time. Relying on the same re-
sults as in Theorem 3.4.5, this provides the bound of Houtman and Maks’
index.
3.6 Afriat’s index
3.6.1 Introductory observations
As with the previous indices, it is our goal to find the maximum value
of e (e1 = e2 = . . . = eT = e), such that a given dataset still passes
{w,s,g,h}arp. However, such a maximum value frequently does not exist.
For example, consider the following matrix of the values piqj (for two
observations), i, j = 1, 2: (
1 0.50
0.60 1
)
.
As long as e ∈ [0; 0.6[, all axioms of revealed preference will be satisfied,
but for e ≥ 0.6 a cycle of negative length exists between the two vertices
in both Ge(S) and G
H
e (S) and, thus, the axioms are violated. Since there
is no maximum feasible value for e, we look for the value e∗ that is the
supremum of the values of e for which the axioms of revealed preference
are satisfied. Varian (1990) describes an approximation algorithm which
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approximates e∗ to within (1/2)t by testing t times the axiom under e. In
an overview paper, Varian (2006) mentions that it is also easy to calcu-
late e∗ exactly and exact values are calculated for ai-garp in a number
of papers, see for instance Choi et al. (2007). However, to the best of
our knowledge, no exact polynomial algorithm has been described in the
literature. In the next section we provide such a polynomial time exact
algorithm for ai-{w,s,g,h}arp and a separate algorithm for ai-harp.
3.6.2 Complexity results
Consider the following algorithm for ai-warp.
Algorithm 2 ai-warp, (input: S = {(pi, qi)|i ∈ N}; output e∗)
1: Set e∗ := 1.
2: for all pairs i, j ∈ N do
3: if piqj < e
∗ and pjqi < e∗ then
4: Set e∗ := max{piqj , pjqi}.
5: end if
6: end for
Theorem 3.6.1. Algorithm 3 solves ai-warp in O(n2) time.
Proof. We first argue that Algorithm 2 is correct. Clearly, there is a vio-
lation of warp(e) if and only if there exists a pair of observations i, j ∈ N
(qi 6= qj), such that both piqj ≤ e and pjqi ≤ e. By construction, the
Algorithm ensures that for every pair of observations k, l ∈ N (qk 6= ql)
either pkql ≥ e∗ or plqk ≥ e∗ or both. It follows that for any e < e∗, it is
the case that either pkql > e or plqk > e and thus warp(e) is satisfied. It
follows that Algorithm 2 is correct.
The complexity of this Algorithm is straightforward, there exist O(n2) pair
of observations i, j ∈ N . For each of these pairs, piqj and pjqi are calculated
and compared against e∗, which is done in constant time. Depending on
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the outcome of these comparisons, at most one variable is changed, again
in constant time. The total number of operations in the Algorithm is thus
determined by the number of pairs, O(n2).
Next, we consider an algorithm for ai-sarp.
Algorithm 3 ai-sarp, (input: S = {(pi, qi)|i ∈ N}; output e∗)
1: Initialization: Construct an array A of all values piqj ≤ 1, i 6= j and
add an element with value equal to 1. Sort all values in ascending
order, and let x be the median value in A.
2: Test sarp(x). If sarp(x) is satisfied, remove all values lower than or
equal to x from A, otherwise remove all higher values.
3: If more than one element remains in the array, repeat step 2; otherwise
x is the remaining value in A. Set e∗ = x
Theorem 3.6.2. Algorithm 3 solves ai-sarp in O(n2 log n) time.
Proof. We first argue that Algorithm 3 is correct. Clearly, if the dataset
satisfies sarp(e), then it satisfies sarp(e’) for all e′ ≤ e. Moreover, the
dataset satisfies sarp(0). Thus, for an increasing e, sarp(e) becomes vi-
olated at some value e∗. This can only happen when an arc, completing
a cycle, is added to the graph Ge(S), i.e., at some value piqj . If there is
no value e < 1 for which sarp(e) is violated, then e∗ = 1. It follows that
Algorithm 3 is correct.
Next we analyse the complexity of this algorithm. To construct A, piqj
must be calculated for all pairs of observations, which takes O(n2) time. In
the worst case, this array is of size O(n2), so sorting is done in O(n2 log n).
In the second step of the algorithm, sarp(e) is tested for different values
of e. As the array is halved in each iteration, at most O(log(n2)) such tests
are needed and each such test can be done in O(n2) using, for example, a
topological ordering algorithm (Ahuja et al., 1993). This gives a total time
complexity for the second step of O(n2 log n). The total time complexity
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is thus determined by the sorting of the array and the second step and is
O(n2 log n).
Algorithm 4 ai-garp, (input: S = {(pi, qi)|i ∈ N}; output e∗)
1: Initialization: Construct an array A of all values piqj ≤ 1, i 6= j and
add an element with value equal to 1. Sort all values in ascending
order, and let x be the median value in A.
2: Test garp(x). If garp(x) is satisfied, remove all values lower than x
from A, otherwise remove all higher values.
3: If more than two element remains in array A, repeat step 2.
4: Let the lowest of the two remaining values be x1 and the highest x2.
Test garp(e) for e = x1, and for e = x2. Then
i. If garp(x1) and garp(x2) are satisfied, test garp(x2+), (where
 > 0 is an arbitrarily small number). If garp(x2 +) is satisfied,
then e∗ = 1 otherwise e∗ = x2.
ii. If both are not satisfied, e∗ = x1.
iii. If garp(x1) is satisfied and garp(x2) is not, test garp(x1 + ).
If garp(x1 + ) is satisfied, e
∗ = x2, otherwise e∗ = x1.
In the case of ai-sarp and ai-warp, an e∗ value is computed that corre-
sponds to some arc appearing in the graph, at which point a cycle appears.
In garp(e) however, a cycle does not necessarily indicate a violation since
the length of the cycle may be 0. Therefore, we need a subtle change as
can be seen in in Algorithm 4.
Theorem 3.6.3. Algorithm 4 solves ai-garp in O(n2 log n) time.
Proof. We first notice that the value e∗ can be feasible for garp(e), if for
that value a cycle of length 0 exists in the graph G(S). Therefore, we
consider Algorithm 4, which does not discard the highest known feasible
value of e.
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The time complexity of this algorithm is similar to that for ai-sarp.
Throughout most of the algorithm, the only difference is the testing of
garp(e) instead of sarp(e). In the final step, garp(e) is tested twice,
which has no impact on the overall bound. Since testing garp can be
done in O(n2) time, as shown in Chapter 2, the overall complexity is thus
O(n2 log n).
Finally, we provide a polynomial time algorithm for ai-harp. In this al-
gorithm we need to compute the minimum cycle mean: the cycle with the
shortest average arc length.
Algorithm 5 ai-harp, (input: S = {(pi, qi)|i ∈ N}; output e∗)
1: Initialization: Construct the graph GH1 (S).
2: Calculate the minimum cycle mean (MCM), which is the shortest av-
erage length of the arcs in any cycle in the graph GH1 (S).
3: Calculate e∗ as follows: e∗ = exp (MCM).
Theorem 3.6.4. Algorithm 5 solves ai-harp in O(n3) time.
Proof. We will show that computing the minimum cycle mean (MCM) of
GH1 (S) is sufficient to find e
∗. harp(e) is satisfied if there are no cycles
of negative length in GHe (S). Thus, if such a cycle exists, we need to re-
move it by lowering e. A decrease in e will lengthen every arc in the graph
by the same amount, as the length of an arc is log(piqj) − log(e). It is
clear that the if we set the value of e∗ so that the cycle with the shortest
average arc length has a length of zero, the average arc length of every
other cycle will be non-negative and no cycles of negative length will re-
main. Indeed, by setting e∗ := exp(MCM), the length of each arc becomes
log(piqj)− log(exp(MCM)) = log(piqj)− MCM.
The time complexity of this algorithm is polynomial as there exist algo-
rithms for finding the MCM in O(nm) time (Karp, 1978), with m being the
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number of arcs in the graph. In GH1 (S) there will be n
2 arcs, as there exist
arcs from every vertex to every other vertex in the graph. The building
of the graph in the initialization step takes O(n2) time. The overall time
bound of the algorithm is thus O(n2 log n+ n3) = O(n3) time.
3.7 Conclusion
Motivated by the increasing availability of large scale consumption datasets,
and by the observed empirical difficulty of computing goodness-of-fit mea-
sures, we have investigated the computational complexity of testing the
utility maximization hypothesis in revealed preference terms. In partic-
ular, we have focused on three goodness-of-fit measures for four different
revealed preference axioms (i.e. warp, sarp, garp and harp). We have
demonstrated that, for all four axioms, both Varian’s and Houtman and
Maks’ index is inapproximable. Next, we have shown that these conclu-
sions do not apply to Afriat’s index, and we have presented exact poly-
nomial algorithms for computing this index (for every revealed preference
axiom that we considered).
There are different avenues for further research. Clearly, when insisting on
optimal solutions for one of the indices considered here (except Afriat), one
needs to accept long running times. It is therefore interesting to develop
bounds: not only heuristics should be defined and tested, but also the
design of good upper bounds for the indices is an interesting (and largely
unexplored) issue. Another direction is to consider datasets or utility max-
imizations models that are in some way restricted. Essentially this may
ensure that the graphs built in our analysis simplify such that computation
of the respective indices becomes easier.

Chapter 4
Goodness-of-fit Measures: The
Money Pump Index
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we considered a number of classical goodness-
of-fit measures for revealed preference tests. As we noted in Chapter 1,
there is continuing interest in these measures. In particular, a number of
new goodness-of-fit measures have been proposed in the literature over the
past few years. In this chapter, we will look at one of these measures, the
Money Pump Index (MPI), proposed by Echenique et al. (2011). The MPI
is based on the idea that irrational behavior makes consumers vulnerable,
as it allows arbitrageurs to “pump money” from them. In particular, ar-
bitrageurs can extract money from irrational consumers by following an
opposite purchasing strategy. Echenique et al. (2011) propose to use the
amount of money a consumer can lose in this way as a measure of the
irrationality of his behaviour.
This chapter is the result of a collaboration with Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock
and Frits C.R. Spieksma. An article based on parts of this chapter has been pub-
lished in The Journal of Political Economy (Smeulders et al., 2013). We gratefully
acknowledge helpful remarks from Federico Echenique.
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This chapter is concerned with the practical computation of the MPI. As
we will explain below, if a consumer violates rationality, then typically
there will be multiple purchase observations implying such a violation. In
principle, we can compute a money pump cost for each violation. This
calls for an aggregate MPI that summarizes these money pump costs into
a single metric. In their original contribution, Echenique et al. (2011)
propose the mean and median money pump cost as such aggregate MPIs.
Obviously, these Mean and Median MPIs have an intuitive interpretation
in terms of the money lost by the consumer due to irrational behaviour.
A first contribution of this note is that we show that computing the Mean
and Median MPIs is a #p-complete problem. As a polynomial time
algorithm for a #p-complete problem would imply p = np, this result
provides a formal statement of the fact that it is computationally challeng-
ing to compute these measures in practice, in particular for datasets with
large numbers of observations.
Notable examples of such large datasets are household-level “scanner”
datasets, which Echenique et al. (2011) also considered in their empir-
ical application. Scanner datasets contain information on household-level
purchases collected at checkout scanners in supermarkets. They typically
consist of multiple purchase observations for many households. Such large
datasets are increasingly available, and Echenique et al. provide a particu-
larly convincing case on the usefulness of their MPI concept in combination
with scanner data. At this point, however, it is worth emphasizing that
they also extensively discussed the computational complexity of the MPI
for their own scanner dataset (see in particular their Remark 1 on p. 1207).
To mitigate the computational burden, they therefore suggested as a prac-
tical method to compute approximations of the Mean and Median MPIs.
Essentially, these approximations focus on violations of revealed preference
axioms that involve only a small number of observations (see Section 4.4
for more details).
Because of the computational difficulties associated with the Mean and
Median MPIs, our second contribution is that we propose the Maximum
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and Minimum MPIs as easy-to-apply alternatives. The Maximum MPI
gives the percentage of money lost in the most severe violation of rational-
ity, while the Minimum MPI does the same for the least severe violation.
Clearly, these measures preserve the intuition underlying the Mean and
Median MPIs. In particular, they figure as natural bounds on the amounts
of money that an arbitrageur can extract from irrational consumers.
Importantly, our newly proposed Maximum and Minimum MPIs have clear
practical usefulness. We show that the Maximum and Minimum MPIs can
be computed efficiently (i.e. in polynomial time), which makes them easily
applicable to large (e.g. scanner) datasets. We also indicate how such com-
putation can proceed in practice. Next, we use the dataset of (Echenique
et al., 2011) to demonstrate the application of the Maximum and Mini-
mum MPIs. Here, our particular focus is on assessing the performance
of these measures relative to the Mean and Median MPIs. In addition,
we show that comparing the values of the Maximum and Minimum MPIs
can reveal interesting information to the empirical analyst. This makes
us believe that our results may contribute to the further dissemination of
the intuitive MPI concept in empirical analyses of (ir)rational consumer
behaviour.
The rest of this note unfolds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the MPI
concept and the associated notions of Mean and Median MPI. Section
4.3 contains our core results, it introduces Maximum and Minimum MPI
and defines the computational complexity of the different MPIs that we
consider. Section 4.4 shows the practical usefulness of our results through
an application to the scanner dataset of Echenique et al. Section 4.5,
finally, concludes.
4.2 Money Pump Index
As in previous chapters, we consider a dataset S = {(pi, qi)|i ∈ N}, of n
observed purchases by a consumer, with prices pi ∈ Rm++ and quantities
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qi ∈ Rm+ for every observation i = 1, . . . , n. We denote by qi,j (pi,j) the
quantity (price) of the j-th good in observation t.
As explained by Echenique et al. (2011), if garp is violated, a money
pump cost (MPC) can be calculated for every violation. This MPC is
the amount of money an arbitrageur could gain from the consumer by
following an appropriate trading strategy. More precisely, suppose that
we have two observations i and j for which piqi ≥ piqj and pjqj > pjqi.
This implies a violation of garp that involves the observations i and j.
Then, the arbitrageur can make money by buying bundle qi at prices pj
and reselling it at pi, and by buying qj at prices pi and reselling it at pj .
The total profit following from these transactions gives the corresponding
MPC, which equals
pi(qi − qj) + pj(qj − qi). (4.1)
Generalizing this argument, we can compute the MPC associated with a
garp violation involving a sequence of observations v1, v2, . . . , vk as follows
MPC =
k∑
j=1
pvj (qvj − qvj+1), (4.2)
with qvk+1 = qv1 .
To be able to make meaningful comparisons between garp violations in-
volving different sequences, the Money Pump Index (MPI) of a violation
is calculated by dividing the associated MPC by the total budget of the
observations that are involved in the violation. That is
MPI =
∑k
j=1 pvj (qvj − qvj+1)∑k
j=1 pvjqvj
, (4.3)
with again qvk+1 = qv1 .
If a dataset for a given consumer violates garp, then there are typically
several sequences of observations that are involved in a violation. There-
fore, Echenique et al. (2011) introduce the Mean and Median MPI of con-
sumers as measures of consumer irrationality. More precisely, each viola-
tion gives rise to an MPI value (as defined in (4.3)). The Mean MPI is then
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defined as the mean of these MPI values, while the Median MPI equals the
median of these values. These measures indeed have an intuitive meaning
as quantifying the severity of consumer irrationality.
4.2.1 Graph Representation
As in previous chapters, we will represent the graph associated with a
dataset S by G(S) = (V,A). There exists a vertex i ∈ V for every obser-
vation i = 1, . . . , n in the dataset S. An arc (i, j) ∈ A exists if and only
if piqi ≥ piqj . The length of an arc `(i, j), is given by piqi − piqj . Beside
a length, arcs are now also given a weight w(i, j) = piqi, which is equal
to the expenditures in observation i. If there is a sequence of observa-
tions v1, v2, . . . , vk, such that there is a cycle (v1, v2), (v2, v3), . . . , (vk, v1),
we call this a cycle in the graph, and denote it by C. By construction, the
following holds.
MPI =
∑k
j=1 pvj (qvj − qvj+1)∑k
j=1 pvjqvj
=
∑
j:vj∈C `(vj , vj+1)∑
j:vj∈C w(vj , vj+1)
(4.4)
In what follows, we will denote the MPI of a given violation or cycle by
MPI(C).
4.3 Complexity results
In their original contribution, Echenique et al. already argued that com-
puting the Mean and Median MPI is a challenging task and, therefore,
they propose to approximate these MPIs in practical applications (see also
Section 4.4). In what follows, we will formally state that computing the
Mean and Median MPI is indeed a #p-complete problem.
To demonstrate that the Mean and Median MPI are computationally hard,
we derive a reduction from the #Cycle problem. We first give the defini-
tion of this problem.
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Problem 4.3.1. #Cycle
Instance: A graph G = (V,A).
Question: How many cycles are contained in the graph G ?
Valiant (1979) shows that the #Cycle problem is #p-complete. Thus,
our reduction implies that computing the Mean and Median MPIs is also
#p-complete, as such, a polynomial time algorithm for these problems
implies p = np.
Theorem 4.3.1. Calculating the Mean MPI is a #p-complete problem.
Proof. Consider an instance of the problem #Cycle, that is we have a
directed graph G = (V,A), |V | = n with the question: how many directed
cycles exist in G ? We will answer the question by computing the Mean
MPI of two specially constructed sets of consumer data S1 and S2. Both
datasets consist of n+2 observations and m+2 goods. In fact, observations
1, 2, . . . , n are identical for S1 and S2 and can be described as follows.
For each vertex i ∈ V , we construct a price vector pi with pi,j =  for
i 6= j ( < 12n) and pi,i = 1. For every vertex i we create a quantity
vector qi with qi,i = 1, qi,j = 0 if there is an arc from j to i in G (for
i 6= j), and qi,j = 2 if there is no arc (again for i 6= j). Observe that an
arc in G corresponds to an arc in the graph representation of the dataset
consisting of these n observations, and vice versa. We will denote this part
of the dataset by S¯. We now finish the description of S1, by specifying
observations n+ 1 and n+ 2 as follows. Let pn+1 = (2, 1, 1, . . . , 1), pn+2 =
(1, 2, 1, . . . , 1), qn+1 = (3, 2, 2, . . . , 2) and qn+2 = (2, 3, 2, . . . , 2). Notice
that no observation {1, 2, . . . , n} is preferred over observation n + 1 and
n + 2. Further notice that observation n + 1 is preferred over n + 2, and
vice versa. Hence, the number of cycles in G(S1) is 1+ the number of
cycles in G, or 1+ #Cycle for short. In particular, we can easily verify
that the MPI (see (4.3)) of the additional cycle equals 12n+4 . Let us write
MPI(C) for the value of the MPI corresponding to a cycle C in the graph
representation of the dataset S. Then, the mean MPI of dataset S can be
written as:
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MPI =
∑
C∈G(S1)MPI(C)
#Cycle+ 1
= MPI =
∑
C∈G(S¯)MPI(C) +
2
2n+4
#Cycle+ 1
(4.5)
Now, we finish the description of dataset S2 by specifying observations
n + 1 and n + 2 as follows: pn+1 = (2, 1, 1, . . . , 1), pn+2 = (1, 2, 1, . . . , 1),
qn+1 = (4, 2, 2, . . . , 2) and qn+2 = (2, 4, 2, . . . , 2). As in dataset S1 there is
one additional cycle between nodes n+ 1 and n+ 2, which has MPI equal
to 22n+6 . Thus, the mean MPI of dataset S2 can be written as.
MPI =
∑
C∈G(S1)MPI(C)
#Cycle+ 1
= MPI =
∑
C∈G(S¯)MPI(C) +
2
2n+6
#Cycle+ 1
(4.6)
Now suppose we have a polynomial time algorithm for finding the mean
MPI of a dataset, then we can find the mean MPI for S1 and S2, compute
the difference and with the knowledge that this difference is
2
2n+6
− 1
2n+4
#Cycle+1 find
#Cycle. This implies that we would have a polynomial time algorithm
for solving #Cycle, which in turn implies the Mean MPI problem is #p-
complete.
Theorem 4.3.2. Calculating the Median MPI is a #p-complete prob-
lem.
Proof. Consider an instance of the problem #Cycle. We will solve this
problem by computing the median MPI of a polynomial number (n log(n))
of specially constructed sets of consumer data. First, number the vertices
of G from 1 to n. We will then construct a dataset S− with n observations
and n goods as follows. For every vertex i ≤ n we construct a price vector
pi with pi,j =  for j 6= i ( < 12n2 ), pi,i = 1. For every vertex i we create
a quantity vector qi with qi,i = 1, qi,j = 0 if there is an arc from j to i
in G (for i 6= j), and qji = 2 if there is no arc (again for i 6= j). It can
be easily checked that the graph representation of S− has the same set of
arcs as the original graph G. It follows that both have the same number
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of cycles. Given the construction, we can compute upper bounds on the
budgets and lower bounds on the arc lengths. The budget is maximized
if, for observation i, qi,i = 1 and qi,j = 2, (i 6= j); the budget then becomes
1 + 2(n − 1) < 1 + 2(n−1)
2n2
. A lower bound on the arc lengths is given
by the combination of a lower bound on piqi, which is easily seen to be
1, and an upper bound on piqj . This upper bound on piqj is reached if
qj,j = 1, qj,k = 2, (i 6= k 6= j) and since the arc (i, j) exists, qj,i = 0.
The upper bound on piqj then equals 2(n − 2) + , which, in turn, is
bounded from above by 1n − 1n2 . A lower bound on the arc lengths is then
1 − ( 1n + 1n2 ). Given these bounds, for any given arc (i, j), it is the case
that `(i,j)w(i,j) =
n2−(n−1)
n2+n−1 > 0.5 and thus
n2−n+1
n2+n−1 > 0.5 is also a lower bound
on the MPI of any given cycle. Finally, this is also a lower bound on the
minimum MPI of the dataset S−.
We now add 2 more observations and 2 goods to S−, creating S. For every
observation i < n + 1, pi,n+1 = pi,n+2 = 2 and qi,n+1 = qi,n+2 = 0. Set
pn+1 = (, . . . , , 1, 0.5), pn+1 = (, . . . , , 0.5, 1), qn+1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0) and
qn+1 = (0, . . . , 0, 0, 1). It is clear that n + 1 and n + 2 are preferred over
every other observation and that no observation i < n is preferred over
either n + 1 or n + 2. In this way, one more violation is added, with an
MPI of 0.5. It follows that the minimum MPI of dataset S has a value of
0.5 and that there is one unique violation that has this MPI.
Now, consider that we add additional goods and observations, denoted by
D, to the dataset S, creating S∪D = S+. For these new goods and obser-
vations, the prices and quantities are so that all existing violations remain,
and have the same MPIs, while a known number of new violations are cre-
ated, and the MPIs of these new violations are smaller than the minimum
MPI of violations in S. It is clear that if the Median MPI of S+ is equal
to the minimum MPI of S, then the number of new violations created in
S+ is equal to the number of violations in D and thus one more than the
number of cycles in G. We will now show that we can efficiently add new
goods and observations to S to create a known number of extra violations
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in S+, and that creating a polynomial number of datasets is sufficient for
finding a S+ for which the median MPI is equal to the minimum MPI of S.
First, we notice that G has less than O(n×n!) < O(nn+1) cycles. A binary
search over this number can be done in O(log(nn+1)) = O((n+ 1) log(n))
time. At each step in this binary search, we add a componentD to S so that
S∪D = S+. This component is created as follows. Let f(k) be the number
of cycles in a fully connected digraph with k nodes. Now assume x arcs
must be added to S to form S+, then find maxk(f(k) < x) and add
⌊
x
f(k)
⌋
subcomponents of k observations to D. The prices and quantities of these
observations are set such that all observations within one subcomponent
are preferred over all other observations in that subcomponent, and so that
the MPIs of these violations are smaller than the minimum MPI of S and
so that no cycles that include observations of multiple subcomponent exist.
This is done as follows; we use a number of goods equal to the number
of observations, and rank all the subcomponents. For every observation
i added, set qi,i = 1, qi,j = 0 otherwise. Set pi,i = 1, pi,j = 0.75 if j
is associated with another observation in the same subcomponent, and
if j is associated with an observation in a higher-ranked subcomponent
pi,j = 2. Finally, if j is associated with an observation in a lower-ranked
subcomponent or D, set pi,j = . It is easy to see that for a given x we can
efficiently find the groups to be added and, as (2k + 1)× f(k) > f(k + 1),
the number of subcomponents is polynomial.
In conclusion, the #Cycle problem for a graph G can be solved by calcu-
lating the Median MPI of at most O((n+ 1) log(n)) graphs, which can be
constructed in polynomial time and have a size that is polynomial in the
size of the graph G. As such, a polynomial time algorithm for the Median
MPI would mean a polynomial time algorithm for #Cycle, which in turn
implies the Median MPI problem is #p-complete.
In these proofs, the number of goods, m, is not bounded by a constant.
Hence, it remains an open question whether or not polynomial-time algo-
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rithms exist when the number of goods is fixed. Recent results by Deb
and Pai (2013) show that, given a large number of observations compared
to the number of goods, some structure will appear in the preference rela-
tions. It is possible that this structure can be exploited to find polynomial
time algorithms in these cases.
We suggest using the Maximum and Minimum MPIs as easy-to-apply alter-
native measures of irrationality. These measures are calculated as, respec-
tively, the maximum and minimum MPI values defined over all violations.
Interestingly, we can prove that these Maximum and Minimum MPIs can
be computed in polynomial time, which makes them particularly attractive
from an empirical point of view.
Theorem 4.3.3. The time required to compute the Maximum MPI and
the Minimum MPI is polynomial in the number of observations.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows directly from the graph repre-
sentation. Given the length and weights assigned to arcs, the problem of
finding a Maximum MPI is equivalent to the known Minimum Cycle Ra-
tio problem. (See Ahuja et al. (1993), notice that every arc has negative
length, and the worst violation, the maximum MPI, thus corresponds to
the cycle with the minimum cycle ratio.) Since constructing the graph is
possible in O(n2) time, and Megiddo (1979) showed that computing the
Minimum Ratio Cycle has a time complexity of O(n3 log n), the theorem
follows. The Minimum MPI can likewise be found in polynomial time, by
choosing the length of the arcs to be piqj − piqi.
4.4 Empirical application: deterministic test re-
sults
We next compute the newly proposed Maximum and Minimum MPIs for
the dataset reported in Echenique et al. (2011). This dataset contains
494 households (i.e. 494 consumers), with 26 purchase observations per
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household. Out of these 494 households, there are 396 that violate garp.
The numbers reported in Table 4.1 pertain to this subset of households.
To compute our results for the Maximum and Minimum MPIs, we im-
plemented an algorithm described in Ahuja et al. (1993) for solving the
Minimum Cycle Ratio problem. This algorithm is very quick in practice:
we needed only a few seconds to compute the results for all 494 households.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the different MPIs under consid-
eration. Let us first consider our findings for the maximum and minimum
MPIs. As indicated in the Introduction, we believe these results reveal
interesting information, as they give the maximum and minimum amounts
of money that an arbitrageur can extract from irrational consumers. We
find that the average Maximum MPI equals 9.35%, while the average Min-
imum MPI amounts to 3.41%. However, the corresponding standard de-
viations also reveal that these numbers hide quite some variation across
households. Next, we observe that the range between the Maximum and
Minimum MPIs is on average 5.95%, and that this range also varies quite
substantially across households. In this respect, however, it is also worth
noting that the range turns out to be zero for no less than 74 households,
i.e. for about one-fifth of the 396 households exhibiting violations of garp,
we obtain that the Maximum MPI exactly equals the Minimum MPI.
As a final base of comparison, we compare our results to the ones reported
by Echenique et al. (2011). As indicated above, these authors recognized
the complex nature of computing the Mean and Median MPIs and therefore
resorted to computing approximations of these MPIs in their empirical ap-
plication. In particular, they approximated the Mean and Median MPIs by
focusing on short violations only, i.e. violations consisting of at most four
observations. Table 1 reports the associated descriptive statistics. When
comparing Echenique et al.’s results for the Mean and Median MPIs to the
ones for our Maximum and Minimum MPIs, we conclude that, in many
cases, these last two “extreme” MPIs spread symmetrically around the first
two “central” MPIs. This suggests that the average of the Maximum and
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Minimum MPIs may actually provide relevant information. In particular,
these numbers can be used to obtain a good estimate of the Mean and
Median MPIs.
4.5 Conclusion
We have shown that the Mean and Median MPIs originally proposed by
Echenique et al. (2011) are generally difficult to compute (#p-complete),
which makes them impractical in the case of large datasets. As alternatives,
we therefore proposed the Maximum and Minimum MPIs. These MPIs can
be computed efficiently (i.e. in polynomial time) and preserve the attrac-
tive interpretation of the Mean and Medium MPI. We also demonstrated
the practical usefulness of these Maximum and Minimum MPIs through
an application to the scanner dataset which Echenique et al. also studied.
We hope that our results will contribute to the further dissemination of
the intuitive MPI concept in empirical analyses of (ir)rational consumer
behaviour.
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Chapter 5
Transitive Preferences in
Multi-Member Households
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we studied rationalizability by unitary decision
makers. In this chapter and the next, we change focus and study con-
sumption decisions (including labour supply decisions) of multi-member
households. By now, it is well established that the collective model of Chi-
appori (1988) is both conceptually and empirically attractive for analyzing
consumption behavior (see, for example, Vermeulen (2002) for an overview
of the relevant literature). This collective model assumes that the differ-
ent household members are endowed with individual preferences defined
over privately and publicly consumed goods (inside the household). These
members enter into a decision process of which the outcome is assumed to
obtain a Pareto optimal allocation (of the aggregate household budget). In
what follows, we say that multi-person household behavior is collectively
rational if it is consistent with the collective model, see Section 5.2.
This chapter is the result of a collaboration with Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock,
Fabrice Talla Nobibon and Frits C.R. Spieksma. An article based on this chapter is
accepted for publication in Economic Theory Bulletin (Smeulders et al., 2014a).
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In the tradition of Afriat (1967b) and Varian (1982), we are interested
in the revealed preference characterization of collective models. Such a
revealed preference characterization does not rely on any functional speci-
fication regarding the household consumption process, and starts directly
from the observed finite set of prices and quantities. Varian (1982) intro-
duced the revealed preference axioms that summarize the empirical impli-
cations of theoretical consumption models for single-member households,
while Cherchye et al. (2011) provided a revealed preference characteriza-
tion of collective models for multi-member households. See also Peters
and Wakker (1994), Varian (2006), Cherchye et al. (2007), Cherchye et al.
(2010) and Cherchye et al. (2013) for more discussion.
Our following analysis focuses on two popular revealed preference axioms:
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (warp) introduced by Samuelson
(1938), and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences (sarp) introduced
by Houthakker (1950). For single-person households, these axioms summa-
rize the testable implications of rational (i.e. utility maximizing) consump-
tion behavior. Essentially, sarp extends warp by requiring preferences to
be transitive. In this respect, a classical result due to Rose (1958) shows
that warp and sarp are empirically equivalent in a setting with 2 goods.
In other words, transitivity has no empirical bite if the analysis includes
only 2 goods. Because warp is generally easier to test than sarp, this
result can considerably facilitate the empirical analysis.
In what follows, we investigate the possibility to extend the result of Rose
(1958) towards multi-member households. Therefore, we define the con-
cepts of L-warp and L-sarp, which capture the testable implications of
collectively rational (i.e. Pareto efficient) consumption behavior in the
case of L household members. In a first instance, we assume a general set-
ting in which we only observe the aggregate household consumption, i.e.
no information is available on the intrahousehold allocation of the private
goods. Here, we obtain two main results. First, we show that L-warp and
L-sarp are empirically vacuous (i.e. non-rejectable) if there are no more
than L goods. Next, and more importantly, we show that warp and sarp
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are not equivalent if L > 1 and there are at least L+1 goods. Thus, Rose’s
conclusion does not generalize to L-member households (even with as few
as four observations). Transitivity of individual preferences is a testable
requirement even if there are only L+ 1 goods for L household members.
Finally, we also study a more restricted setting where we exclusively assign
a single good to each different household member, i.e. L (out of L+1) goods
are exclusive. Thus, in contrast to the general setting, this restricted set-
ting assumes that we observe the intrahousehold allocation of L goods. We
call this a “labour supply” setting as it formally coincides with Chiappori’s
original labour supply model, in which each household member exclusively
consumes his/her (observed) leisure while the remaining consumption is
captured by a Hicksian aggregate (that is to be shared among the house-
hold members) (Chiappori, 1988). Interestingly, we can show that L-warp
and L-sarp do become equivalent under these empirical conditions (with
L+ 1 goods). Thus, the empirical analysis need not explicitly account for
transitivity, which can substantially alleviate the computational burden in
practical applications.
The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. In Section 5.2 we introduce
the collective model and the corresponding revealed preference axioms. In
Section 5.3 we investigate the equivalence between L-warp and L-sarp for
both the general setting and the restricted labour supply setting. Section
5.4 concludes.
5.2 Notation and Definitions
We consider an L-member household that consumes m1 private goods and
m2 public goods (with L,m1,m2 ∈ N0). The vector q ∈ Rm1+ represents
the quantities that are privately consumed by the household, i.e., these
goods are assigned to members of the household, and only the amount
assigned to an individual member has an effect on the member’s utility.
p ∈ Rm1+ stands for the corresponding price vector. Similarly, the vector
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Q ∈ Rm2+ represents the publicly consumed quantities, these goods are not
allocated to individual members, rather they have an effect on the util-
ity of every household member. P ∈ Rm2+ gives the price vector for the
public goods. Next, the vector q` ∈ Rm1+ contains the privately consumed
quantities for each individual member `, with
∑L
`=1 q
` = q. The collective
model of household consumption explicitly recognizes the individual pref-
erences of the household members. These preferences may depend on the
private quantities, the public quantities, or both. Throughout, we assume
that preferences of member ` can be represented by a well-behaved (i.e.
continuous, positive monotonic and concave) utility function U `(q`,Q),
` = 1, . . . , L.
Our analysis starts from the dataset S = {(pt,Pt; qt,Qt) , t = 1, ..., n},
which contains n household choices that are characterized by prices pt,Pt
and quantities qt,Qt. In our general setting, we do not know which quan-
tities are privately consumed by which member, i.e. q`t is unobserved.
Therefore, we need to introduce (unobserved) feasible personalized quan-
tities that comply with the (observed) aggregate quantities qt. That is, we
consider all possible decompositions q`t ∈ RN+ that satisfy
∑L
`=1 q
`
t = qt.
In what follows, our main focus will be on this general setting. However, as
indicated in the previous section, we will also consider a restricted (labour
supply) setting that is characterized by exclusive goods. An exclusive good
is a private good that is exclusively consumed by a given member. Evi-
dently, this setting implies extra information on q`t.
A collective rationalization of a set of observations S requires the exis-
tence of member-specific utility functions for which each observed quantity
bundle can be characterized as Pareto efficient. The following definition
provides a formal statement.
Definition 5.2.1. Let S = {(pt,Pt; qt,Qt) , t = 1, ..., n} be a set of obser-
vations. Then, the utility functions U1, . . . , UL provide a collective ratio-
nalization of S if, for each observation t, there exist feasible personalized
quantities q`t such that:
5.2. Notation and Definitions 81
1.
L∑`
=1
q`t = qt.
2. For all possible quantities z`,Z with
L∑`
=1
ptq
`
t + PtQt ≥
L∑`
=1
ptz
` + PtZ,
if there exists a member ` for whom U `(z`,Z) > U `(q`t,Qt) then there
is some member m for which Um(zm,Z) < Um(qmt ,Qt).
Our revealed preference characterizations of collectively rational behav-
ior make use of the concepts L-warp and L-sarp, which provide multi-
member extensions of the warp and sarp concepts that apply to single-
member households. To formally define L-warp and L-sarp, we need
the concept of feasible personalized prices. These are prices P` ∈ Rm2+
such that
∑L
`=1 P
` = P. Intuitively, these personalized prices capture the
fractions of the household prices for the public goods that are borne by
the individual members `. Given the Pareto efficiency assumption that
underlies the collective consumption model, these prices can also be inter-
preted as Lindahl prices. We refer to Cherchye et al. (2011) for a detailed
discussion.
Assume that we observe a dataset S = {(pt,Pt; qt,Qt) , t = 1, ..., n}, and
consider a given specification of feasible personalized quantities q`t and
prices P`t. Then, for household member `, we say that the consumption
allocation s is directly revealed preferred over another allocation t (denoted
sR`0t) if psq
`
s+P
`
sQs ≥ psq`t+P`sQt. The transitive closure of this relation
is denoted by R`. Essentially, the relation R` extends R`0 by exploiting
transitivity of individual preferences. We can now define our concepts
L-warp and L-sarp.
Definition 5.2.2. Let S = {(pt,Pt; qt,Qt) , t = 1, ..., n} be a set of obser-
vations.
1. S satisfies L-warp if and only if there exist, for all ` = 1, . . . , L
and for all pairs of observations s, t = 1, ..., n, feasible personalized
quantities q`t and feasible prices P
`
t, such that tR
`
0s implies either
psq
`
s + P
`
sQs < psq
`
t + P
`
sQt or (q
`
t = q
`
s and Qt = Qs).
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2. S satisfies L-sarp if and only if there exist, for all ` = 1, . . . , L
and for all pairs of observations s, t = 1, ..., n, feasible personalized
quantities q`t and feasible prices P
`
t, such that tR
`s implies either
psq
`
s + P
`
sQs < psq
`
t + P
`
sQt or (q
`
t = q
`
s and Qt = Qs).
If L = 1, Definition 5.2.2 reduces to the standard definition of warp and
sarp in Varian (1982). When L ≥ 2, then this definition states that,
for the given specification of feasible personalized quantities and prices, S
satisfies L-warp if and only if, for each member `, the feasible personal-
ized prices and quantities satisfy warp. A directly similar interpretation
applies to L-sarp, except that this concept also accounts for (indirect)
revealed preference relations that are induced by transitivity.
As discussed extensively in Varian (1982) and Varian (2006), warp defines
a necessary condition for the existence of a well-behaved utility function for
single-member households. In general, however, warp is not sufficient be-
cause it does not impose transitivity. By contrast, sarp defines a necessary
as well as sufficient condition. These insights extend to the multi-member
setting that we consider here. In particular, the results of Cherchye et al.
(2011) are easily adapted to show that there exist utility functions that pro-
vide a collective rationalization of S if and only if at least one specification
of feasible personalized quantities and feasible personalized prices satisfies
L-sarp. Again, L-warp provides a corresponding necessary condition by
not requiring transitivity of the individual preferences.
5.3 Is L-warp equivalent to L-sarp?
In this section, we compare the testable implications of L-warp and L-
sarp. We start by showing that L-warp and L-sarp are empirically vacu-
ous conditions if there are no more than L goods in subsection 5.3.1. Sub-
sequently, we demonstrate that, for L+1 goods (or more), the equivalence
between L-warp and L-sarp breaks down for the general setting (without
exclusive goods) in subsection 5.3.2. Finally, in subsection 5.3.3 we also
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show that L-warp and L-sarp do become equivalent for the restricted
labour supply setting (where L out of the L+ 1 goods are exclusive).
5.3.1 At most L goods
Before presenting our results, let us first recall that for single-member
households warp and sarp are idle conditions if there is only a single
good. Indeed, in that case t R0 s is equivalent to qt ≥ qs (with qt, qs ∈ R+
and s, t = 1, ..., n), which implies that we can never reject either warp or
sarp. This non-testability result can be extended to L-warp and L-sarp,
as follows.
Proposition 5.3.1. Let S = {(pt,Pt; qt,Qt) , t = 1, ..., n} be a set of
observations. Then L-warp and L-sarp are vacuous conditions as soon
as L ≥ m1 +m2.
Proof. To show this result, we consider the following specification of feasi-
ble personalized quantities and prices. For all t = 1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . ,m1, j =
1, . . . , L:
Pit,j = 0,q
i
t,i = qt,i and q
i
t,j = 0 if i 6= j;
for all t = 1, . . . , n, i = m1 + 1, . . . ,m1 +m2, j = 1, . . . , L:
qit,j = 0,P
i
t,i = Pt,i and P
i
t,j = 0 if i 6= j;
and, if L > m1 + m2, for all t = 1, . . . , n, i = m1 + m2 + 1, . . . , L, j =
1, . . . , L:
Pit,j = 0 and q
i
t,j = 0.
For this specification, one can easily verify that for each ` = 1, . . . L, there
is at most one good in the warp (respectively sarp) test. This shows that
L-warp (respectively L-sarp) is a vacuous condition in this setting.
Proposition 5.3.1 implies that we can only meaningfully check consistency
with L-warp and L-sarp if the number of goods m1 +m2 is strictly larger
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than L. Next, it is possible to generalize Example 5.3.1 of Cherchye et al.
(2007) to show that both L-warp and L-sarp can be rejected as soon
as there are L + 1 goods. Given this, a natural next question is whether
L-warp and L-sarp are equivalent for L+1 goods. This would generalize
the result of Rose (1958) (which shows equivalence for L = 1) towards
L ≥ 2.
5.3.2 L-warp and L-sarp are not equivalent.
For the general setting, the answer to this equivalence question is negative.
We can show this for L = 2 by means of the dataset in Example 1.
Example 5.3.1. Let us consider a dataset consisting of the four observa-
tions presented in Table 5.1.
q1 = (5, 0, 0) p1 = (7.5, 0.5, 0.5)
q2 = (0, 5, 0) p2 = (1, 2, 0.9)
q3 = (0, 0, 5) p3 = (0.2, 2.02, 2)
q4 = (4, 3, 1) p4 = (1, 1, 5)
Table 5.1: Example dataset.
We use this dataset to consider two cases. In the “private case” there is
only private consumption, i.e. qt = qt and Qt = 0 for t = 1, 2, 3, 4. By
contrast, in the “public case” there is only public consumption, i.e. Qt = qt
and qt = 0 for t = 1, 2, 3, 4.
For this specific dataset we obtain the following result.
Lemma 5.3.1.
1. For both the private and the public case, the dataset in Example 5.3.1
does not satisfy 2-sarp.
2. For both the private and the public case, the dataset in Example 5.3.1
does satisfy 2-warp.
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Proof. To prove part 1 of the lemma, we make us of the scalar products in
Table 5.2.
p1q1 = 37.5 p2q2 = 10 p3q3 = 10 p4q4 = 11
p2q4 = 10.9 p3q2 = 10.1 p4q3 = 25
p1 (q2 + q3 + q4) = 37 p2 (q1 + q3) = 9.5 p3 (q1 + q4) = 9.86 p4 (q1 + q2) = 10
Table 5.2: Some relevant scalar products.
The numbers of Table 5.2 show that the following inequalities hold: p1q1 ≥
p1(q2+q3+q4), p2q2 ≥ p2(q1+q3), p3q3 ≥ p3(q1+q4), and p4q4 ≥ p4(q1+q2).
Assume that all consumption is private and consider any specification of
feasible personalized quantities q1t and q
2
t . Then, p1q1 ≥ p1(q2 + q3 + q4)
implies that there always exists at least one ` for which p1q
`
1 ≥ p1(q`1 +
q`2 + q
`
3). Indeed, assume this is not the case, i.e. p1q
`
1 < p1(q
`
1 + q
`
2 + q
`
3)
for both ` = 1 and ` = 2. Adding up these last two inequalities then
gives a contradiction: p1q1 = p1q
1
1 + p1q
2
1 < p1(q
1
1 + q
1
2 + q
1
3) + p1(q
2
1 +
q22 + q
2
3) = p1(q2 + q3 + q4). Without losing generality, let us assume that
p1q
1
1 ≥ p1(q11 + q12 + q13).
A similar reasoning applies to p2q2 ≥ p2 (q1 + q3) and p3q3 ≥ p3 (q1 + q4).
However, since p1q
1
1 ≥ p1(q11 +q12 +q13), we can now conclude that it must
be that p2q
2
2 ≥ p2(q21 +q23) and p3q23 ≥ p3(q21 +q24). Indeed, otherwise we
would have feasible personalized quantities that lead to a sarp rejection
for ` = 1. Note that these inequalities imply that 2R203 and 3R
2
04, meaning
that 2R24.
Finally, using the same argument once more for p4q4 ≥ p4 (q1 + q2), we can
conclude that any specification of feasible personalized quantities leads to
a rejection of 2-sarp. We always obtain a rejection of sarp for either ` = 1
or ` = 2. To finish the proof of part 1, we have to note that exactly the
same reasoning holds if all goods are public (or even any intermediate case
with both private and public goods).
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To prove part 2 of the lemma, we need to give one specification of feasible
personalized quantities that satisfies 2-warp, and another specification of
feasible personalized prices that satisfies 2-warp.
For the private case, let us consider the specification of feasible personalized
quantities in Table 5.3.
q11 = (5, 0, 0) q
2
1 = (0, 0, 0)
q12 = (0, 0, 0) q
2
2 = (0, 5, 0)
q13 = (0, 0, 0) q
2
3 = (0, 0, 5)
q14 = (0, 0, 0) q
2
4 = (4, 3, 1)
Table 5.3: Values of q1t and q
2
t for t = 1, 2, 3, 4.
For this specification we obtain the scalar products in Table 5.4, which
allow us to conclude that 2-warp is satisfied.
p1q
1
1 = 37.5 p2q
1
1 = 5 p3q
1
1 = 1 p4q
1
1 = 5
p1q
1
2 = 0 p2q
1
2 = 0 p3q
1
2 = 0 p4q
1
2 = 0
p1q
1
3 = 0 p2q
1
3 = 0 p3q
1
3 = 0 p4q
1
3 = 0
p1q
1
4 = 0 p2q
1
4 = 0 p3q
1
4 = 0 p4q
1
4 = 0
p1q
2
1 = 0 p2q
2
1 = 0 p3q
2
1 = 0 p4q
2
1 = 0
p1q
2
2 = 2.5 p2q
2
2 = 10 p3q
2
2 = 10.1 p4q
2
2 = 5
p1q
2
3 = 2.5 p2q
2
3 = 4.5 p3q
2
3 = 10 p4q
2
3 = 20
p1q
2
4 = 32 p2q
2
4 = 10.9 p3q
2
4 = 8.86 p4q
2
4 = 11
Table 5.4: Scalar products for the private case.
Similarly, for the public case, we consider the specification of feasible per-
sonalized prices in Table 5.5.
For this specification we obtain the scalar products in Table 5.6, which
allow us to conclude that 2-warp is satisfied.
The next non-equivalence conclusion follows directly from Lemma 5.3.1.
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P11 = (7.5, 0, 0) P
2
1 = (0, 0.5, 0.5)
P12 = (0.2, 0.1, 0.2) P
2
2 = (0.8, 1.9, 0.7)
P13 = (0.2, 0.1, 0.1) P
2
3 = (0, 1.92, 1.9)
P14 = (1, 0, 0) P
2
4 = (0, 1, 5)
Table 5.5: Values of P1t and P
2
t for t = 1, 2, 3, 4.
P11Q1 = 37.5 P
1
2Q1 = 1 P
1
3Q1 = 1 P
1
4Q1 = 5
P11Q2 = 0 P
1
2Q2 = 0.5 P
1
3Q2 = 0.5 P
1
4Q2 = 0
P11Q3 = 0 P
1
2Q3 = 1 P
1
3Q3 = 0.5 P
1
4Q3 = 0
P11Q4 = 30 P
1
2Q4 = 1.3 P
1
3Q4 = 1.2 P
1
4Q4 = 4
P21Q1 = 0 P
2
2Q1 = 4 P
2
3Q1 = 0 P
2
4Q1 = 0
P21Q2 = 2.5 P
2
2Q2 = 9.5 P
2
3Q2 = 9.6 P
2
4Q2 = 5
P21Q3 = 2.5 P
2
2Q3 = 3.5 P
2
3Q3 = 9.5 P
2
4Q3 = 25
P21Q4 = 2 P
2
2Q4 = 9.6 P
2
3Q4 = 7.66 P
2
4Q4 = 8
Table 5.6: Scalar products for the public case.
Proposition 5.3.2. There exists a dataset S with only 3 goods that sat-
isfies 2-warp but not 2-sarp. In general, this implies that 2-warp is not
equivalent to 2-sarp for N + K = 3. This non-equivalence conclusion is
independent of the public or private nature of the goods.
It is possible to construct datasets (similar to the one in Example 5.3.1) to
obtain exactly the same conclusion in a setting with L household members
and L+ 1 goods. The following proposition states the general result.
Proposition 5.3.3. Let L ≥ 2. There exists a dataset S consisting of
four observations, and with only L+1 goods, that satisfies L-warp but not
L-sarp. In general, this implies that L-warp is not equivalent to L-sarp
for N +K = L+ 1. This non-equivalence conclusion is independent of the
public or private nature of the goods.
Proof. Take L ≥ 3. We start with the dataset S from example 5.3.1
and we add goods 4, 5, . . . , L + 1 and observations 5, 6, . . . , L + 2 to it.
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The quantities for goods 4, 5, . . . , L + 1 are 0 in observations 1, 2, 3 and 4
and the corresponding prices in these observations are  < 0.14L . It can be
checked that in this case the following inequalities hold: p1q1 > p1(q2+. . .+
qL+2), p2q2 > p2(q1+q3+q5+. . .+qL+2), p3q3 > p3(q1+q4+q5+. . .+qL+2)
and p4q4 > p4(q1 + q2 + q5 + . . .+ qL+2).
For each observation t = 5, 6, . . . , L+2, it is the case that qt = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0,
. . . , 0), with the non-zero quantity for the (t− 1)th good. The correspond-
ing prices are pt = (, . . . , , 1, , . . . , ). Again, it can be checked that
ptqt > pt(q1 + . . .+ qt−1 + qt+1 + qL+2).
A similar reasoning as in Lemma 5.3.1 then shows that this dataset does not
satisfy L-sarp. Personalized quantities or prices can be found as follows.
Assign all goods (prices) of observations 1, 2, 3 and 4 to members 1 and
2 as in the original examples. Furthermore, assign all goods (prices) of
observation k ≥ 5 to member k − 2, k = 5, . . . , L+ 2.
5.3.3 Labour supply setting
Let us now turn to the restricted labour supply setting. More precisely,
we consider a household with L members in which there is only private
consumption of the L + 1 goods. The first L goods represent leisure and
are exclusively consumed by individual members. The (L + 1)-th good is
a Hicksian aggregate. We will treat this Hicksian good as a private good
for which we do not observe the intrahousehold allocation. As indicated
in Section 5.1, this restricted setting corresponds to the labour supply
model of Chiappori (1988), which is widely used in empirical analyses of
collective consumption behavior. Importantly, while we treat the Hicksian
aggregate as a private good to facilitate our discussion (and for the analogy
with Chiappori’s original model), our following results actually also hold
if the Hicksian aggregate were a public good.1
To formally explain the relation between this restricted setting and the gen-
1 The proof of Proposition 5.3.4 is easily adapted.
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eral setting that we discussed before, assume a dataset S = {(pt, 0; qt, 0) , t =
1, ..., n} that contains L+ 1 private goods. Then the first L entries of the
feasible personalized quantities q`t pertain to the exclusive goods, and are
defined as follows for all t = 1, . . . , n and `, j = 1, . . . , L:
q`t,` = qt,`, and q
`
t,j = 0 if ` 6= j,
Thus, each member ` consumes only two goods: the exclusive `-th good (of
which the individual consumption is observed by construction) and a share
of the (L+1)-th non-exclusive good (of which the individual consumption is
not observed). Our proof of Proposition 4 exploits this two-goods feature.
In particular, we can build on the original result of Rose (1958) to obtain
the following conclusion.
Proposition 5.3.4. Let S = {(pt, 0; qt, 0) , t = 1, ..., n} be a set of obser-
vations with L+1 goods. Assume households with L members of which each
member consumes exclusively one of the goods. Then L-warp is equivalent
to L-sarp.
Proof. Clearly, if S is a dataset that satisfies L-sarp, then it also needs
to satisfy L-warp. So we only need to prove the reverse statement. Let
S be a dataset that satisfies L-warp. This means that there exist fea-
sible personalized quantities q`t such that for each ` = 1, . . . , L the data
{(pt,q`t), t =, 1, . . . , n} satisfies warp. By construction, all entries of q`t
are zero except for the `-th and L+1-th entries. Clearly, all the zero entries
are irrelevant for checking consistency with warp. Therefore, we can use
Rose’s result to conclude that, for each member `, the corresponding sarp
condition is met, and thus that S satisfies L-sarp.
Thus, if L (out of L+1) goods are exclusive, then transitivity of individual
preferences does not have empirical bite. As a result, the empirical analy-
sis of multi-member consumption behavior need not explicitly account for
transitivity, which can substantially alleviate the computational burden in
practical applications. For instance, Cherchye et al. (2011) introduced an
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integer programming method to check consistency of a dataset S with re-
vealed preference axioms of collective consumption models.2 When using
this method for the L-sarp condition that we consider here, the equiva-
lence result in Proposition 5.3.4 implies that we can drop n3 transitivity
constraints without affecting the conclusions of the analysis. Given that
integer programming is often time consuming, this may considerably facil-
itate the empirical analysis when n gets large.
5.4 Conclusion
We showed that, in general, the equivalence between warp and sarp for 2
goods does not generalize to L-warp and L-sarp for L+1 goods. The im-
plication is that transitivity of preferences does have testable implications.
By contrast, the equivalence between L-warp and L-sarp does hold for
L+ 1 goods if each of the L household members is the exclusive consumer
of one good (as in the collective labour supply setting of Chiappori (1988)).
In that case, transitivity does not generate empirical bite. This can sub-
stantially facilitate the empirical revealed preference analysis in practical
applications.
2 Actually, Cherchye et al. (2011) consider the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Prefer-
ences (garp) rather than sarp in their analysis. However, the integer programming
problem for L-sarp is directly analogous to the one based on garp. For compactness,
we do not include it here.
Chapter 6
The Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference for Collective
Households
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we investigated the possibility of equivalence be-
tween collective models with (L-sarp) and without (L-warp) transitivity.
Our main findings is that transitivity does have testable implications in
collective models, as soon as there are more goods than household members
(If there exist fewer goods, both models are trivially satisfied). However, it
turns out that in practical applications they often have identical empirical
implications, i.e. most data that satisfy warp also satisfy sarp. Putting
it differently, in empirical work transitivity usually plays little role when
testing data consistency with revealed preference axioms. This observation
is an important one in view of practical tests of the collective models, as
tests of collective versions of sarp are known to be difficult to test. Most
This chapter is the result of a collaboration with Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock,
Fabrice Talla Nobibon and Frits C.R. Spieksma. An article based on this chapter has
been submitted for publication.
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notably, it has been shown that testing the sarp conditions for collective
models is np-complete, even for households with only two members Deb
(2010); Talla Nobibon et al. (2013); Talla Nobibon and Spieksma (2010).
This directly motivates the purpose of the current chapter, which focuses
on the computational complexity of the collective warp conditions. Es-
sentially, we will evaluate whether the computational hardness of the col-
lective revealed preference conditions can be mitigated by dropping the
transitivity requirement. In particular, our following analysis will consider
the warp characterization of three collective consumption settings: (i) the
private setting where all goods are consumed privately without externali-
ties, (ii) the public setting, where all goods are publicly consumed inside
the household, and (iii) a general setting where no information on the
(private or public nature) of the goods is available.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. A first “negative” conclu-
sion will be that testing the collective warp conditions is computationally
difficult (i.e. np-complete) for the private and public settings. In these
cases, dropping transitivity does not solve the hardness problem associ-
ated with the collective sarp conditions. However, as a second “positive”
conclusion, we also show that testing collective warp for two members
is computationally easy for the general setting. Here, we can effectively
test consistency with the collective consumption model in an efficient way
(i.e. in polynomial time) if we omit transitivity. (As we will indicate, for
this general setting the complexity in the case of three or more member
remains an open question.)
The remainder of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 6.2 presents our
basic set-up. Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 contain our main complexity results
(for, respectively, the private, public and general settings). Section 6.6
concludes.
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6.2 Notation
We consider multi-member households that take consumption decisions
over m goods. These goods can be consumed either privately (with or
without externalities) or publicly. More precisely, private consumption of
a good means that the consumption by one household member affects the
supply available for the other household members (e.g. drinking water can
only be consumed privately). Next, consumption externalities refer to the
fact that one household member gets utility from another household mem-
ber’s private consumption (e.g. a wife enjoys her husband’s nice clothes).
Finally, public consumption of a good means that consumption of that
good by one household member does not affect the supply available for the
other household members, and no one can be excluded from consuming
the good (e.g. the rent of a shared house represents public consumption).
The collective models of household consumption explicitly recognize the
individual preferences of the household members. These preferences may
depend on the private quantities (with or without externalities), the pub-
lic quantities, or both. Throughout, we assume that preferences of the
household members can be represented by a well-behaved (i.e. continuous,
positive monotonic and concave) utility function. The following sections
will define explicit specifications of these member-specific utility functions
for alternative collective consumption models.
We assume a setting in which the empirical analyst observes n household
decisions resulting in consumption quantity bundles qi := (qi,1, . . . , qi,m) ∈
Rm+ , with corresponding prices pt := (pt,1, . . . , pt,m) ∈ Rm++, t = 1, . . . , n.
The component qt,j (respectively pt,j), for j = 1, . . . ,m, corresponds to
the quantity of good j bought by the household (respectively, the unit
price of good j) at the time of observation t. Note that the pq represents
the total cost of the bundle q ∈ Rm+ at the prices p ∈ Rm++. We denote
the set of observations by S := {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N}, where N := {1, . . . , n},
and we refer to S as the dataset. For ease of exposition, throughout this
chapter, we use t ∈ N to refer to the observation (pt, qt).
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6.3 The collective consumption model with only
private consumption and no externalities
In the first collective consumption model that we study, we assume that
all goods are consumed privately without externalities. In other words,
the member-specific utility functions only depend on the private goods
consumed by that member. To facilitate our discussion, we will mainly
focus on two-member households in what follows. However, as we will
also indicate in Theorem 2, our np-completeness result for two-member
households can easily be generalized to households with L members (L ≥
2).
Because a typical dataset only contains information on consumption quan-
tities that apply to the aggregate household level, we have to deal with
the fact that we do not know which fraction of the observed bundle qt
is consumed by each individual household member. To this end, we con-
sider, for each observation t ∈ N , a feasible personalized quantity vector
(q1t , q
2
t ), which describes the division of the goods over the two household
members. Since the true split up of qt is unobserved, we clearly need
to consider all possible feasible personalized quantity vectors.1 For each
member ` (` = 1, 2) we define the personalized consumption dataset by
S` = {
(
pt, q
`
t
)
: t ∈ N}.
The extension of warp to this collective consumption model is then as
follows.
Definition 6.3.1. private 2-warp
Let S = {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N} be a dataset of a two-member household. We
say that S is consistent with private 2-warp if and only if:
(i) For each t ∈ N there exist q1t , q2t ∈ Rm+ such that qt = q1t + q2t , and
1 In some datasets we have some information on how consumption is shared. This is
called assignable information or exclusive goods in the literature. Such information
can easily be integrated in our analysis and would not change our results.
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(ii) For each member ` ∈ {1, 2}, the set S` = {
(
pt, q
`
t
)
: t ∈ N} satisfies
warp.
This problem can be rephrased as the following decision problem:
Problem 6.3.1. private 2-warp
Instance: A dataset S = {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N}.
Question: Do there exist q1t , q
2
t ∈ Rm+ satisfying qt = q1t +q2t for each t ∈ N
such that for ` = 1, 2, the set S` = {
(
pt, q
`
t
)
: t ∈ N} satisfies warp?
It turns out that answering this question is np-complete.
Theorem 6.3.1. Testing private 2-warp is np-complete.
Proof. We use a reduction fromMonotone not-all-equal 3-sat, which
is known to be np-complete (Garey and Johnson, 1979) and is defined
as follows.
Problem 6.3.2. Monotone not-all-equal 3-sat
Instance: A set of variables X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and a set of clauses
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} with each clause consisting of 3 non-negated literals.
Question: Does there exist a truth-assignment so that for each clause, ei-
ther one or two of the literals are true?
It is not difficult to see that private 2-warp belongs to the class NP.
The rest of this proof is structured as follows: given an arbitrary instance
of mnae 3-sat, we first build an instance of private 2-warp and next,
we prove that we have a yes instance of mnae 3-sat if and only if the
constructed instance of private 2-warp is a yes instance.
Consider an arbitrary instanceX = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}
of mnae 3-sat. We build an instance of private 2-warp using 3n+4 goods
and 2n+2m+3 observations. We next describe the quantity and the price
of goods for each observation. We use  = 14n and M = n + 1. The first
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block of 2n observations corresponds to the variables and is given in table
6.1
The second block of 2m observations corresponds to the clauses. For each
clause ca = {xi, xj , xk}, we have the observations 2n + a and 2n + m + a
(a = 1, . . . ,m). The prices and quantities are given in table 6.2. The
prices of the goods corresponding to variables xi, xj and xk equal 1, and
the prices of the goods corresponding to other variables equal . Finally,
we have observations 2n+ 2m+ 1, 2n+ 2m+ 2, 2n+ 2m+ 3, given in table
6.3.
We have now described the dataset S. Before embarking further on the
proof, let us describe the main idea. Consider the n goods, 5, 6, 7, . . . , n+4
in observation 2n+ 2m+ 3. Each of these goods corresponds to a variable
in the instance of mnae-3sat. We will argue that each of these n goods
is allocated for a large part (i.e. ≥ 34) to some member ` ∈ {1, 2}. This is
akin to setting the corresponding variable to true (if the good goes for the
larger part to member 1), or to false (if the good goes for the larger part
to member 2). Of course it remains to show that this is a satisfying truth
assignment. Recall that we say that for member ` ∈ {1, 2} q`a is directly
revealed preferred to q`b, when we have paq
`
a ≥ paq`b with a, b ∈ S.
Claim 6.3.1. If paqa ≥ paqb for some a, b ∈ S, a 6= b, then there exists an
` ∈ {1, 2} for which q`a is directly revealed preferred to q`b
Proof. Consider any split of qa into q
1
a, q
2
a, and qb into q
1
b , q
2
b , i.e., let q
1
a +
q2a = qa and q
1
b + q
2
b = qb. Since paqa ≥ paqb, it follows that pa(q1a + q2a) ≥
pa(q
1
b + q
2
b ). Hence, either paq
1
a ≥ paq1b or paq2a ≥ paq2b (or both).
Notice that, apart from bundle q2n+2m+3, all other bundles are unit vectors.
We will use qi,j (pi,j) to denote the quantity (price) of good j in observation
i, i = 1, . . . , 2n+ 2m+ 3, j = 1, . . . , 3n+ 4. We now exhibit a trick that we
will use throughout the proof. Consider a hypothetical dataset, containing
the observations a and b as follows:
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qa = (1, 0), pa = (1, )
qb = (0, 1), pb = (, 1)
We say that the split of a bundle is extreme if each unit good of that bundle
goes to one (of the two) members with fraction at least 1− .
Claim 6.3.2. In any feasible solution to private 2-warp of some dataset
containing observations a and b, the split of bundles qa and qb is extreme.
Proof. Clearly, we have both paqa > paqb and pbqb > pbqa. So using Claim
1, it follows that for one member ` we have that q`a is directly revealed
preferred to q`b and simultaneously for one member `
′ q`′b is directly revealed
preferred to q`
′
a . Thus in any feasible solution ` and `
′ must be different
(otherwise private 2-warp is violated). Let us assume, without loss of
generality, that for member 1 we have that q1a is directly revealed preferred
to q1b and q
1
b is not directly revealed preferred to q
1
a. Let α be the fraction
of bundle a allocated to member 1, and β the fraction of bundle b allocated
to this member. We then have that
pbq
1
b < pbq
1
a ⇒ β < α.
Since α ≤ 1, we conclude β <  = 14n . Likewise, since for member 2 we
have that q2a is not directly revealed preferred to q
2
b , we find:
paq
2
a < paq
2
b ⇒ 1− α < (1− β)⇒ α > 1−  =
4n− 1
4n
.
Claim 6.3.2 follows.
Clearly, Claim 6.3.2 is applicable to any pair of observations involving bun-
dles that are unit vectors, and price vectors that feature price  and price
1. When applying this claim further on in our proof, some price vectors
also include price M . However, whenever this is the case, the quantity of
the goods will be 0 in both bundles, so the M prices can be ignored in
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these situations.
We now proceed to show that when the constructed instance of private
2-warp is a yes-instances, a satisfying truth assignment exists.
Claim 6.3.3. In any feasible solution to this instance of private 2-warp,
we have for ` = 1, 2: p2n+2m+3q
`
2n+2m+3 > 1.
Proof. Observe that Claim 6.3.2 is applicable to observations 2n+ 2m+ 1
and 2n+ 2m+ 2. Thus the split of the bundles q2n+2m+1 and q2n+2m+2 is
extreme. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that good 3 is allocated
to member 1 with fraction at least 1−, while good 4 is allocated to member
2 with fraction 1− . Thus:
p2n+2m+1q
1
2n+2m+1 ≥ 1−  =
4n− 1
4n
≥ 1
4
= n
1
4n
= n ≥ p2n+2m+1q2n+2m+3. (6.1)
It follows that for member 1, in any feasible solution, observation q12n+2m+1
is revealed preferred over q12n+2m+3. Then, in order to satisfy private 2-
warp, we must have:
p2n+2m+3q
1
2n+2m+3 < p2n+2m+3q
1
2n+2m+1 ≤ p2n+2m+3q2n+2m+1
⇒
n∑
i=1
q12n+2m+3,4+i < n− 1. (6.2)
Since, for a ∈ S, q2a = qa − q1a, we derive, using (6.2):
n∑
i=1
q22n+2m+3,4+i = n−
n∑
i=1
q12n+2m+3,4+i > 1. (6.3)
Finally, since p2n+2m+3,i = 1 for i = 5, 6, . . . , n + 4, it follows that (6.3)
can be written as:
p2n+2m+3q
2
2n+2m+3 > 1.
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A similar reasoning involving member 2 and observations 2n+ 2m+ 2 and
2n+ 2m+ 3 leads to:
p2n+2m+3q
1
2n+2m+3 > 1.
To proceed, let us consider observation i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and observation
2n+ 2m+ 3. Using Claim 3, we observe:
p2n+2m+3q
`
2n+2m+3 > 1 > p2n+2m+3qi for ` = 1, 2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (6.4)
Thus, no matter the split of qi into q
1
i and q
2
i , for both members 1 and
member 2 we have that q12n+2m+3 (resp. q
2
2n+2m+3) is directly revealed
preferred over observation q1i (resp. q
2
i ), with i = 1, . . . , n. Since we have
a yes-instance of 2-warp, we know that then, for ` = 1, 2:
piq
`
i < piq
`
2n+2m+3. (6.5)
Observe that Claim 6.3.2 is applicable to observations i and n + i. Thus,
the split of qi and qn+i is extreme. Hence, there is a member ` for which:
piq
`
i ≥ 1− . (6.6)
Inequalities (6.5) and (6.6) imply that the split of q2n+2m+3 is such that:
piq
`
2n+2m+3 > 1− . (6.7)
Consider the vectors pi and q2n+2m+3, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It follows that:
piq
`
2n+2m+3 = 
n+4∑
j=5,j 6=4+i
q`2n+2m+3,j + q
`
2n+2m+3,4+i. (6.8)
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Also:
n+4∑
j=5,j 6=4+i
q`2n+2m+3,j ≤
n+4∑
j=5,j 6=4+i
q2n+2m+3,j = n− 1. (6.9)
Rewriting (6.8), and using inequalities (6.7) and (6.9) gives for each i =
1, . . . , n:
q`2n+2m+3,4+i = piq
`
2n+2m+3 − 
n+4∑
j=5,j 6=4+i
q`2n+2m+3,j
> 1− − (n− 1) = 1− n
4n
=
3
4
. (6.10)
Concluding, each good i = 5, 6, . . . , n + 4 in observation 2n + 2m + 3 is
allocated for over 34 to some member ` ∈ {1, 2}.
Finally, we look at the two observations corresponding to each clause
j = 1, . . . ,m. It is clear that for each member ` we have that q`2n+2m+3 is
directly revealed preferred over both observations q`2n+j and q
`
2n+m+j . Ob-
serve also that Claim 2 is applicable to observations 2n+j and 2n+2m+j.
Thus, in order not to have a violation of private 2-warp, we should have
for member ` q`2n+j is not directly revealed preferred over q
`
2n+2m+3. Thus,
for each ` = 1, 2:
p2n+jq
`
2n+j < p2n+jq
`
2n+2m+3. (6.11)
Since (without loss of generality), for member 1, we have p2n+jq
1
2n+j ≥ 1−,
and thus we have using (6.11):
p2n+jq
1
2n+2m+3 > 1− . (6.12)
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This means that one of the three goods associated to clause j is allocated
over 34 to member 1. We argue by contradiction. Indeed, in case none of
the three goods of clause j are allocated over 34 to member 1, then they
are allocated for at most 14 to member 1. Then,
p2n+jq
1
2n+2m+3 ≤ 3
1
4
+ (n− 3) = 3
4
+
n− 3
4n
=
4n− 3
4n
<
4n− 1
4n
. (6.13)
Thus we would have p2n+jq
1
2n+2m+3 < 1 − , contradicting (6.12). There-
fore, at least one of the goods associated with j is allocated over 34 to
member 1. Clearly, a similar reasoning involving 2n+ 2m+ j and member
2 implies that one of these three goods must be allocated over 34 to member
2.
In conclusion, we now know the following about any valid allocation of
observation 2n+ 2m+ 3 which satisfies private 2-warp. First, that each
good is split up in a large and a small allocation for the different mem-
bers. Secondly, that for each clause and each member, there is at least one
of the goods associated with the variables that has a large allocation. A
valid truth assignment for mnae 3-sat can now be found as follows. If,
in observations 2n + 2m + 3 a good is largely allocated to member 1, the
variable is set to true, if a good is largely allocated to member 2, the
variable is false.
If we have a Yes-instance of mnae 3-sat, an allocation of goods which
satisfies private 2-warp exists. For observation 2n+ 2m+ 3, fully assign
each good associated with a true variable to member 1, and each good
associated with a false variable to member 2. Likewise, fully assign the
bundle i to member 1 if xi is true and to member 2 if it is false. Fur-
thermore, for all j = 1, . . . ,m, fully assign bundles 2n+j to member 1 and
all 2n+m+ j to member 2. Finally, fully assign 2n+ 2m+ 1 to member
1 and 2n + 2m + 2 to member 2. It can be easily checked that such an
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allocation satisfies private 2-warp.
The following argument generalizes our NP-completeness results for pri-
vate 2-warp towards private L-warp for any fixed L ≥ 2.2
Theorem 6.3.2. Testing private L-warp is np-complete for any fixed
L ≥ 2.
Proof. NP-Completeness for private L-warp, L > 2 can also be proven
through a reduction from Monotone Not-all-equal 3-SAT. We briefly
sketch this reduction. The dataset constructed is the same as for L =
2, except that for any additional member beyond the second, one extra
observation and one extra good is added. There are now 2n+2m+3+(L−2)
observations and 3n + 4 + (L − 2) goods. Observation 2n + 2m + 3 + i
consists of only one unit of good 3n + 4 + i, which has price 1 and all
other prices equal to . In all other observations, good 3n + 4 + i has
price . Using an argument similar to the proof of Claim 6.3.2, it is clear
that, in any feasible solution, allocations are extreme, i.e., any member `
who is allocated more than a small fraction of good 3n+ 4 + i will prefer
q`2n+2m+3+i over all other bundles and any member who is allocated more
than a fraction of a bundle in other observations prefers that bundle over
q2n+2m+3+i. Any feasible split will thus have the goods 3n + 4 + i in the
extra observations almost completely allocated to the members 3, 4, . . .,
while all of the bundles present in the proof for L = 2 must still be split
over two members.
2 The definition of private L-warp is trivially analogous to the one of private 2-warp.
For compactness, we do not include it here.
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6.4 The collective consumption model with only
public goods
We next turn to the collective model with all goods publicly consumed in
the household. In this case all member-specific utility functions are defined
for the same bundle of public goods. For ease of exposition, we again
mainly focus on households consisting of two members. But, like before,
our findings for this case are easily extended to L-member households (with
L ≥ 2).
For this public setting, we formalize the idea that household members have
individual-specific (unobserved) willingness-to-pay for the public goods
(bought at prices pt). To do so, for each observation t ∈ N , we define
a feasible personalized price vector (p1t , p
2
t ). Intuitively, these feasible per-
sonalized prices capture the fractions of the household prices for the public
goods that are borne by the individual members `. Given the Pareto effi-
ciency assumption that underlies the collective consumption model, these
prices can also be interpreted as Lindahl prices. We refer to Cherchye et al.
(2011) for a detailed discussion.
Similar to before, for each member ` (` = 1, 2) we consider personalized
consumption datasets by S` = {
(
p`t, qt
)
: t ∈ N}. The extension of warp
to this collective consumption model is then as follows.
Definition 6.4.1. public 2-warp
Let S = {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N} be a dataset of a two-member household. We
say that S is consistent with public 2-warp if and only if:
(i) For each t ∈ N there exist p1t , p2t ∈ Rm+ such that pt = p1t + p2t , and
(ii) For each member ` ∈ {1, 2}, the set S` = {
(
p`t, qt
)
: t ∈ N} satisfies
warp.
This problem can be rephrased as the following decision problem:
Public Goods 105
Problem 6.4.1. public 2-warp
Instance: A dataset S = {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N}.
Question: Do there exist p1t , p
2
t ∈ Rm+ satisfying pt = p1t +p2t for each t ∈ N
such that for ` = 1, 2, the set S` = {
(
p`t, qt
)
: t ∈ N} satisfies warp?
It turns out that answering this question also implies solving an np-complete
problem.
Theorem 6.4.1. Testing public 2-warp is np-complete.
Proof. We again use a reduction from Monotone Not-all-equal 3-
sat, as defined by problem 6.3.2
Instance: A set of variables X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and a set of clauses
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} with each clause consisting of 3 non-negated literals.
Question: Does there exist a truth-assignment so that for each clause, ei-
ther one or two of the literals are true?
It is not difficult to see that public 2-warp belongs to the class NP. The
rest of this proof is structured as follows: given an arbitrary instance of
mnae 3-sat, we first build an instance of public 2-warp and next, we
prove that we have a yes instance of mnae 3-sat if and only if the con-
structed instance of public 2-warp is a yes instance.
Consider an arbitrary instanceX = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}
of mnae 3-sat. We build an instance of public 2-warp using 3n+2 goods
and 2n+m+ 2 observations. We next describe the quantity and the price
of the goods for each observation. We use  = 14n and M = n + 1. The
first block of 2n observations corresponds to the variables and is given by:
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q1 = (2, 0, . . . , 0, |0, . . . , 0, |1, 0, . . . , 0, |0, 0); p1 = (1, , . . . , , |, . . . , , |,M, . . . ,M, |M,M)
q2 = (0, 2, . . . , 0, |0, . . . , 0, |0, 1, . . . , 0, |0, 0); p2 = (, 1, . . . , , |, . . . , , |M, , . . . ,M, |M,M)
...
qn = (0, 0, . . . , 2, |0, . . . , 0, |0, 0, . . . , 1, |0, 0); pn = (, , . . . , 1, |, . . . , , |M,M, . . . , , |M,M)
qn+1 = (0, . . . , 0, |1, 0, . . . , 0, |1, 0, . . . , 0, |0, 0); pn+1 = (, . . . , , |1, , . . . , , |,M, . . . ,M, |M,M)
.
..
q2n = (0, . . . , 0, |0, 0, . . . , 1, |0, 0, . . . , 1, |0, 0); p2n = (, . . . , , |, , . . . , 1, |M,M, . . . , , |M,M)
Notice that each entry i in both a price-vector and a quantity-vector cor-
respond to good i, i = 1, . . . , 3n+ 2. The second block of m observations
corresponds to the clauses. For each clause ca = {xi, xj , xk}, we have the
observation 2n+ a (a = 1, . . . ,m).
q2n+1 = ({0, 1}|0, . . . , 0|0, . . . , 0|0, 0); p2n+1 = ({M, 1}|M, . . . ,M |, . . . , |2, 2)
q2n+2 = ({0, 1}|0, . . . , 0|0, . . . , 0|0, 0); p2n+2 = ({M, 1}|M, . . . ,M |, . . . , |2, 2)
...
q2n+m = ({0, 1}|0, . . . , 0|0, . . . , 0|0, 0); p2n+m = ({M, 1}|M, . . . ,M |, . . . , |2, 2)
In the observations corresponding to a given clause ca, a = 1, . . . ,m, the
quantity of good i is 1 if the variable xi is part of the clause ca, and 0
otherwise. As for the prices, the price of good i is 1 if variable xi is in
clause ca, M otherwise. Finally, we have observations 2n + m + 1 and
2n+m+ 2:
q2n+m+1 = (0, . . . , 0, |0, . . . , 0, |0, . . . , 0|1, 0); p2n+m+1 = (, . . . , , |, . . . , , |M, . . . ,M |1, )
q2n+m+2 = (0, . . . , 0, |0, . . . , 0, |0, . . . , 0|0, 1); p2n+m+2 = (, . . . , , |, . . . , , |M, . . . ,M |, 1)
This concludes the description of the instance of public 2-warp. The
main idea used to argue the equivalence between Monotone Not-all-
equal 3-SAT and public 2-warp is as follows. The first n goods, 1, . . . , n
represent the variables considered. We will argue that the (unit) prices of
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each of these n goods in these first n observations is allocated for a large
part (i.e. ≥ 1− ) to some member ` ∈ {1, 2}. This corresponds to setting
the variable to true (if the price goes for the larger part to member 1),
or to false (if the price goes for the larger part to member 2). The proof
will show that this is a satisfying truth assignment.
We first show that the trick used in the proof for private goods can be
reused similarly in the context of public goods. Consider a hypothetical
dataset, containing the observations a and b as follows:
qa = (1, 0), pa = (1, )
qb = (0, 1), pb = (, 1)
We say that the split of the prices of a bundle is extreme if the unit prices
of goods present in the bundle are allocated to one of the two members
with amount at least 1− .
Claim 6.4.1. In any feasible solution to public 2-warp of some dataset
containing observations a and b as above, the split of the price vector is
extreme.
Proof. Clearly, we have both paqa > paqb and pbqb > pbqa. In this case,
we have for one member ` qa is directly revealed preferred over qb, and
for one member `′ qb is directly revealed preferred over qa. Thus in any
feasible solution ` and `′ must be different (otherwise public 2-warp is
violated). Let us assume, without loss of generality, that for member 1
qb is directly revealed preferred over qa, while qa is not directly revealed
preferred over qb. Let α be the part of the price of product 1 in bundle a
allocated to member 1, and β the part of the price of product 2 allocated
to this member.We then have
p1aqa < p
1
aqb ⇒ α < β
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Since β ≤ , we conclude α <  = 14n . This implies the price of the first
good of a is allocated for more than 1 −  to member 2. By the same
argument, the price of the second good in observation b is allocated for
more than 1−  to member 1. Claim 6.4.1 follows.
Claim 6.4.2. In any feasible solution, the decomposition of p2n+m+1 is
such that for some member ` we have that q2n+m+1 is directly revealed
preferred over all bundles q2n+i, with i = 1, . . . ,m, while for the other
member `′ 6= ` q2n+m+2 is directly revealed preferred over all q2n+i.
Proof. It is clear that Claim 6.4.1 may be directly applied to observations
2n+m+ 1 and 2n+m+ 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that in
any feasible solution, the price of good 3n+ 1 in observation 2n+m+ 1 is
allocated almost completely to member 1, while the price of good 3n + 2
in observations 2n + m + 2 is allocated to member 2. It can easily be
checked that p12n+m+1q2n+m+1 > 1 − , while p12n+m+1q2n+i ≤ 3 for all
i = 1, . . . ,m. A similar analysis for member 2 proves the claim.
This claim allows us to find a condition on the split of the prices in the
observations associated with the clauses.
Claim 6.4.3. In any feasible solution, for any observation 2n + i and
any member `, the split of the corresponding prices must be so that 1 <
p`2n+iq2n+i < 2.
Proof. By Claim 6.4.2, for any member `, we have that either q2n+m+1
is directly revealed preferred to q2n+i or q2n+m+2 is directly revealed pre-
ferred to q2n+i. Without loss of generality, we assume q2n+m+1 is directly
revealed preferred to q2n+i. In any feasible solution, it is then the case that
p`2n+iq2n+i < p
`
2n+iq2n+m+1. It can be easily checked that p
`
2n+iq2n+m+1 is
at most 2. As p2n+iq2n+i = 3 and p
1
2n+i + p
2
2n+i = p2n+i, p
`
2n+iq2n+i > 1
follows immediately.
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Consider now a pair of observations i and n+ i, i = 1, . . . , n. While these
prices and quantities do not coincide with those in Claim 6.4.1 exactly,
it can be easily seen that the split of price i in observation i is extreme.
Next, notice that the member ` to whom more than 1−  of the price of i
is allocated, will have p`iqi > p
`
iq2n+a, with a = 1, . . . ,m. This brings us to
the following claim
Claim 6.4.4. In any feasible solution to public 2-warp, if there exists
some clause ca, a = 1, . . . ,m with variables xi, xj , xk, it can not be the case
that for some member `, the prices of i, j and k in respectively observations
i, j and k are allocated for more than 1−  to `.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that in a feasible solution to
public 2-warp some member ` is allocated almost completely the prices
of goods i, j, k occurring in some clause ca in respective observations i, j, k.
The following inequalities follow: p`iqi > p
`
iq2n+a, p
`
iqi > p
`
iq2n+a, p
`
iqi >
p`iq2n+a. Hence, in order not to violate warp for member `, we must have:
p`2n+aq2n+a < p
`
2n+aqi (6.14)
p`2n+aq2n+a < p
`
2n+aqj (6.15)
p`2n+aq2n+a < p
`
2n+aqk (6.16)
As Claim 6.4.3 shows that p`2n+cq2n+c > 1, we must have p
`
2n+cqi > 1. This
can be rewritten as 2 × p`2n+c,i + p`2n+c,2n+i > 1, for convenience, we will
ignore p`2n+c,2n+i as it is negligeable in the following analysis. We now have
p`2n+c,i >
1
2 . However, this must hold for all three prices associated with
i, j, k, which gives the following p`2n+cq2n+c = p
`
2n+c,i+p
`
2n+c,j+p
`
2n+c,k >
3
2 .
In this case, p`2n+c,i >
1
2 is no longer sufficient, as 2×p`2n+c,i+p`2n+c,2n+i > 32
is required. By the same argument, we obtain that p`2n+c,i >
3
4 . However,
in this case p`2n+c,i + p
`
2n+c,j + p
`
2n+c,k >
9
4 . However, by Claim 6.4.3 this
can not be the case for a feasible solution. By contradiction, Claim 6.4.4
is thus proven.
Now, it has become easy to show that a yes-instance of public 2-warp
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problem corresponds to a satisfying truth assignment in mnae-3-sat, and
vice versa. It is clear that - if a feasible solution to public 2-warp exists
- the prices of good i in observation i, i = 1, . . . , n are always allocated
with an extreme split. If the price of good i in observation i is almost
completely allocated to member 1, we set the corresponding variable xi to
true, otherwise we set it to false. By Claim 6.4.4, we know that if a
feasible solution to public warp exists, and goods i, j, k are in a clause, no
member will have the prices of all 3 goods allocated to him/her. Thus, a
solution to public 2-warp corresponds to a satisfying truth assignment
in mnae-3-sat. The other direction, i.e., finding a solution to public 2-
warp when a satisfying truth assignment in mnae-3-sat is given is easy:
simply allocate almost completely good i in observation i to member 1 if xi
is true, else allocate good i almost completely to member 2, i = 1, . . . , n.
For observations n + i and goods n + 1, the reverse is done. 2n + m + 1
and 2n + m + 2 are respectively allocated to member 1 and 2. All other
prices may be split evenly between the members. This will satisfy public
2-warp.
Similar to the private setting, we can extend our np-completeness results
for public 2-warp to public L-warp for any fixed L ≥ 2.3
Theorem 6.4.2. Testing public L-warp is np-complete for any fixed
L ≥ 2.
Proof. The proof for this Theorem is analogous to the proof of Theorem
6.3.2.
6.5 The general collective consumption model
The final collective consumption model that we consider is the most gen-
eral one. It does not make any assumption regarding the nature of the
3 Again, the definition of public L-warp is directly analogous to the one of public
2-warp and, therefore, we do not include it here.
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consumed goods. That is, every good can be privately or publicly con-
sumed, and the private goods may generate externalities. If a dataset S
is a yes-instance to either public or private 2-warp, it is thus also a yes-
instance to general 2-warp. Clearly, the converse is not necessarily true.
As before, we only observe data at the aggregate household level.
Differing from before, we no longer use the notions of feasible personalized
prices and quantities to characterize this general collective model. Instead,
we follow the approach developed in Cherchye et al. (2007, 2012), which
defines a revealed preference characterization in terms of hypothetical pref-
erence relations. More precisely, for some member `, we denote by H`0 the
hypothetical preference of that member. The expression “qsH
`
0 qt” means
that we hypothesize that member ` directly prefers the bundle qs over the
bundle qt (for s, t ∈ N). In Cherchye et al. (2007) these hypothetical re-
lations are then used to derive necessary conditions that the data need to
satisfy in order to be compatible with the general collective consumption
model. We refer to Cherchye et al. (2007, 2012) for a detailed discussion.
Given our specific objective, we consider an extension ofwarp to 2-member
households that makes use of this notion of hypothetical preferences. This
extension is derived from the revealed preference characterization in Propo-
sition 2 of Cherchye et al. (2007), by essentially dropping the transitivity
requirement.
Definition 6.5.1. general 2-warp
Let S = {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N} be a dataset of a two-member household. We
say that S is consistent with general 2-warp if and only if there exist
hypothetical preferences H10 , H
2
0 that satisfy:
(a) For each pair of distinct observations s, t ∈ N : if psqs ≥ psqt, then
qsH
1
0 qt or qsH
2
0 qt;
(b) For each pair of distinct observations s, t ∈ N : if psqs ≥ psqt, qtH`0 qs
and qt 6= qs, then qsHr0 qt, with `, r ∈ {1, 2} and ` 6= r;
(c) For each three distinct observations s, t, u ∈ N : if psqs ≥ ps (qt + qu)
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and qtH
`
0 qs, then qsH
r
0 qu with `, r ∈ {1, 2} and ` 6= r;
(d) For each pair of distinct observations s, t ∈ N : if qsH10qt, qsH20qt and
qt 6= qs, then ptqt < ptqs;
(e) For each three distinct observations s, t, u ∈ N : if qsH10qt and quH20qt,
then ptqt < pt(qs + qu).
In what follows, we will show that it is possible to check this general 2-
warp condition efficiently (i.e. in polynomial time), which contrasts with
our results for the private and public settings in the previous sections.
Importantly, we will only show this complexity result for the two-member
case. Differing from before, the result is not straightforwardly generalized
towards the general case with L household members (L ≥ 2). We leave
the study of this L-member case for future research.4
As a first step towards formulating the decision problem corresponding to
our definition of general 2-warp, we define a simplification of the above
definition that is easier to use. Specifically, we replace condition (b) with
a closely similar, but somewhat more stringent condition, and we drop
conditions (d) and (e).
Definition 6.5.2. general 2-warp
Let S = {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N} be a dataset of a two-member household. We
say that S is consistent with general 2-warp if and only if there exist
hypothetical preferences H10 , H
2
0 that satisfy:
(i) For each pair of distinct observations s, t ∈ N : if psqs ≥ psqt, then
qsH
1
0 qt or qsH
2
0 qt;
(ii) For each pair of distinct observations s, t ∈ N : if psqs ≥ psqt, qtH`0 qs
and qt 6= qs, then ¬(qsH`0 qt), with ` ∈ {1, 2};
4 In this respect, we note that existing applications of the collective model usually
consider households with only two decision makers (e.g. husband and wife, with
expenses on children treated as public consumption). Therefore, we may safely argue
that the two-member case is the most relevant one from a practical perspective.
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(iii) For each three distinct observations s, t, u ∈ N : if psqs ≥ ps (qt + qu)
and qtH
`
0 qs, then qsH
r
0 qu with `, r ∈ {1, 2} and ` 6= r;
Claim 6.5.1. Definitions 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 are equivalent.
Proof. ⇒) Assume that there exists hypothetical relations for which con-
ditions (a)-(e) in Definition 6.5.1 are satisfied. It is clear that conditions (i)
and (iii) are then also satisfied, as these are identical to (a) and (c). Now
suppose the hypothetical relations include a violation of (ii), i.e., there ex-
ist distinct observations s, t ∈ N , for which psqs ≥ psqt, qtH10 qs, qsH10 qt
and qt 6= qs. We then have to consider two scenarios: either ptqt ≥ ptqs
or ptqt < ptqs. If ptqt < ptqs, then there is no need to specify qtH
1
0 qs
and thus condition (ii) is by construction satisfied. In the alternative sce-
nario, ptqt ≥ ptqs, then qsH10 qt implies that qtH20 qs (since condition (b)
is satisfied). But this entails a violation of condition (d), since psqs ≥ psqt,
qtH
1
0 qs and qtH
2
0 qs. This gives us the desired contradiction.
⇐) Next assume there exist hypothetical relations for which Conditions
(i)-(iii) in Definition 6.5.2 are satisfied. Again, conditions (a) and (c) are
identical to (i) and (iii) and are satisfied. Next, if (b) is violated, there
exist s, t ∈ N such that psqs ≥ psqt, qtH10 qs, qt 6= qs, and ¬(qsH20 qt).
Since condition (i) requires either qsH
1
0 qt or qsH
2
0 qt, it must be the case
that qsH
1
0 qt, which violates (ii), thus there is violation of (b) if (i)-(iii)
is satisfied. Now suppose (d) is violated. Then qsH
1
0 qt, qsH
2
0 qt and
ptqt ≥ ptqs. By rule (i), it must then be the case that qtH10 qq or qtH20 qq,
either of which again violates (ii). Finally, a violation of (e) implies qsH
1
0qt,
quH
2
0qt and ptqt ≥ pt(qs+qu). To satisfy condition (iii), if ptqt ≥ pt(qs+qu)
and qsH
1
0qt, it must be the case that qtH
2
0qu, since we also have quH
2
0qt,
either (ii) or (iii) must be violated if (e) is violated.
The problem of testing whether a collective rationalization of S exists is
then formulated as the following decision problem:
Problem 6.5.1. general 2-warp
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Instance: A dataset S := {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N}.
Question: Do there exist hypothetical preferences H10 , H
2
0 , such that condi-
tions (i) - (iii) in Definition 6.5.2 hold?
Before studying this decision problem more in detail, we want to make
the following remarks. If the dataset S contains only three observations,
let us say s, t, and u, then the answer to the decision problem is No
if and only if the following three inequalities hold: psqs ≥ ps(qt + qu),
ptqt ≥ pt(qs + qu), and puqu ≥ pu(qs + qt). For datasets containing more
than three observations, however, the presence of these three inequalities
is not necessary to have a No answer. Indeed, the reader can check that
the following inequalities involving four observations, let us say s, t, u, and
v, also leads to a No answer to 2-warp: psqs ≥ psqt, ptqt ≥ pt(qs + qu),
ptqt ≥ pt(qs+qv), puqu ≥ pu(qt+qv), and pvqv ≥ pv(qt+qu). Furthermore,
we mention that if there is no inequality of the form psqs ≥ ps(qt + qu) for
all triples s, t, and u in N then we have a yes instance of 2-warp.
6.5.1 A graph interpretation of 2-warp
We translate conditions (i) to (iii) into a directed graph setting (see Talla No-
bibon et al. (2011) for a related construction). We build a directed graph
G = (V,A) from the dataset S := {(pt, qt) : t ∈ N} as follows. A pair of
distinct observations (s, t) with s, t ∈ N represents a vertex in V if and
only if both psqs ≥ psqt and ptqt ≥ ptqs. Notice that V contains O(n2)
vertices and if the vertex (s, t) exists then the vertex (t, s) also exists. The
set of arcs A is defined in two steps as follows:
1: First, there is an arc from a vertex (s, t) to a vertex (u, v) whenever
t = u.
2: Second, for any three distinct observations s, t, u ∈ N satisfying
psqs ≥ ps(qt + qu), ptqt ≥ ptqs, puqu ≥ puqs, we have an arc from
(s, u) to (t, s), and from (s, t) to (u, s).
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Notice that Step 1 ensures that there is an arc from node (s, t) to node
(t, s) and vice versa. This graph construction differs from the one used
when checking whether a dataset of a unitary household satisfies warp:
in that case, a directed graph is built where a vertex corresponds with an
observation and there is an arc from s to t if and only if psqs ≥ psqt. That
approach is not considered because it is not quite clear how to deal with
inequalities of the form psqs ≥ ps(qt + qu).
Given the directed graph G = (V,A) built above, we define the 2-undirected
graph G2 = (V,E) associated withG as the undirected graph obtained from
G by transforming any pair of arcs forming a cycle of length 2 into a single
edge (undirected arc); more precisely, {v1, v2} ∈ E if and only if v1v2 ∈ A
and v2v1 ∈ A.
As an illustration of the graph construction, consider a dataset with three
observations satisfying: p1q1 ≥ p1(q2 + q3), p2q2 ≥ p2(q1 + q3) and p3q3 ≥
p3(q1 + q2). This implies the existence of the vertices depicted in Fig-
ure 6.1(a). The arcs stemming from Step 1 appear in Figure 6.1(b), and
the final graph is depicted in Figure 6.1(c), where the dashed arcs are de-
rived from Step 2. Finally, the 2-undirected graph G2 associated with G
is depicted in Figure 6.1(d). We have the following result.
Theorem 6.5.1. S is a yes instance of 2-warp if and only if the 2-
undirected graph G2 associated with G is bipartite.
Proof. ⇐) Suppose that G2 is bipartite. Thus, the set of vertices V can
be partitioned into two subsets V1 and V2 such that each subset induces an
independent set. In other words, V = V1∪V2, V1∩V2 = ∅, and there is no
edge between two vertices of V1 and no edge between two vertices of V2. We
build the hypothetical preferences H10 and H
2
0 as follows: for every vertex
(s, t) ∈ V1 (respectively (s, t) ∈ V2) we have qsH10 qt
(
respectively qsH
2
0 qt
)
.
Furthermore, for two distinct observations s and t such that psqs ≥ psqt
and (s, t) /∈ V , we set qsH10 qt and qsH20 qt. This completes the definition
of H10 and H
2
0 . Notice that there is no distinct pair of observations s, t for
which we set qsH
`
0qt and qtH
`
0qs for some ` ∈ {1, 2}. We now argue that
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(2,3) (1,3) 
(3,1) 
(a) Existing vertices
(1,2) (2,1)
(3,2)
(2,3)(1,3)
(3,1)
(b) First set of arcs
(1,2) (2,1) 
(3,2) 
(2,3) (1,3) 
(3,1) 
(c) Final graph G
(1,2) (2,1) 
(3,2) 
(2,3) (1,3) 
(3,1) 
(d) 2-undirected graph G2
Figure 6.1: Illustration of the construction of G and the associated 2-undirected
graph G2
H10 and H
2
0 satisfy conditions (i) to (iii).
Condition (i): Let s, t ∈ N be two distinct observations such that
psqs ≥ psqt. On the one hand, if (s, t) /∈ V then, by construction, qsH10 qt
and qsH
2
0 qt. On the other hand, if (s, t) ∈ V = V1 ∪ V2 then (s, t) ∈ V1 or
(s, t) ∈ V2, and hence qsH10 qt or qsH20 qt. Thus condition (i) is satisfied.
Condition (ii): As described above, there is no distinct pair of obser-
vations s, t ∈ N for which we set qsH`0qt and qtH`0qs for some ` ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus condition (ii) is satisfied.
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Condition (iii): Let s, t, u ∈ N be three distinct observations such that
psqs ≥ ps(qt+qu) and qtH10 qs. There are two cases: (1) if puqu < puqs then
(s, u) /∈ V and, since psqs ≥ psqu, we have by construction of H`0, qsH10 qu
and qsH
2
0 qu, and we are done; (2) if puqu ≥ puqs then (s, u) ∈ V . Let
us now argue by contradiction that (t, s) ∈ V . Indeed, if (t, s) /∈ V , then
(s, t) /∈ V . That however, is impossible since psqs ≥ psqt, and we would
have had by construction qsH
1
0 qt and qsH
2
0 qt, which cannot be reconciled
with qtH
1
0 qs. Thus (t, s) ∈ V , and in fact, since qtH10 qs, (t, s) ∈ V1.
Following the construction of G, we have an arc from (t, s) to (s, u) and
an arc from (s, u) to (t, s) (because psqs ≥ ps(qt + qu), ptqt ≥ ptqs, puqu ≥
puqs). Therefore, there is an edge between the vertices (t, s) and (s, u) in
G2, and we conclude that (s, u) ∈ V2, which implies that qsH20 qu. This
completes the verification of condition (iii).
⇒) Now, we suppose that S is a yes instance of 2-warp; there exist H10
and H20 satisfying conditions (i) to (iii). We want to show that the 2-
undirected graph G2 is bipartite. In other words, we want to partition V
into two subsets V1 and V2 such that there is no edge between two vertices
of V1 and no edge between two vertices of V2.
Given H10 and H
2
0 we set the vertices in V1 (respectively in V2) as follows: a
vertex (s, t) ∈ V belongs to V1 (respectively to V2) if qsH10 qt
(
respectively
qsH
2
0 qt
)
. It is not difficult to see that V1 ∩ V2 = ∅ and that any vertex in
V is either in V1 or in V2. Hence, V1 and V2 constitute a valid partition of
V . We argue, by contradiction, that V1 and V2 induce independent sets.
Without loss of generality, suppose V1 is not an independent set. There
exist two vertices (s, t) and (u, v) in V1 with an edge between them in G2.
Thus, in the graph G there is an arc from (s, t) to (u, v), and from (u, v)
to (s, t). If both arcs originate from Step 1, we have u = t and v = s,
which implies (s, t) ∈ V1, and (t, s) ∈ V1 which can only happen if qsH10 qt
and qtH
1
0 qs; this, however, contradicts condition (ii) for H
1
0 . If both arcs
originate from Step 2, we also have u = t and v = s, and the same argument
applies. Hence, one arc originates from Step 1 and one arc originates from
118 The Weak Axiom for Collective Households
Step 2. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the arc from (s, t) to
(u, v) comes from Step 1, while the arc from (u, v) to (s, t) comes from Step
2. This implies that u = t, and apparently ptqt ≥ pt(qs+qv). Since qsH10 qt,
condition (iii) implies that qtH
2
0 qv. By hypothesis, we have qtH
1
0 qv and
pvqv ≥ pvqt (because (t, v) ∈ V1). From condition (i) we know that qvH10 qt
or qvH
2
0 qt. This, together with qtH
1
0 qv and qtH
2
0 qv, implies that either
qtH
1
0 qv and qvH
1
0 qt or qtH
2
0 qv and qvH
2
0 qt. In the first case, H
1
0 violates
condition (ii) whereas in the second case H20 violates condition (ii). In
both cases, we have a contradiction with condition (ii). This concludes the
proof of Theorem 6.5.1.
6.5.2 An Algorithm for 2-warp
We present an algorithm for 2-warp that is based on Theorem 6.5.1. The
pseudocode is described by Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Algorithm for 2-warp
1: build the directed graph G from the dataset S
2: build the 2-undirected graph G2 associated with G
3: if G2 is bipartite then return yes, else return no
It is clear that each of the three steps of Algorithm 6 can be done in
polynomial time. Thus, we have the following result:
Theorem 6.5.2. Algorithm 6 solves 2-warp in polynomial time.
6.6 Conclusion
We studied three alternative extensions of the weak axiom of revealed pref-
erence (warp) that apply to the collective consumption model. We proved
that for the private and public settings, the corresponding testing prob-
lem is np-complete even for two (but also for more) household members.
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However, for the general setting, testing 2-warp can be done in polynomial
time for households consisting of two members. When there are three or
more household members, the complexity of the testing problem for this
general setting remains an open question.

Chapter 7
Testing Stochastic Models of
Preference
7.1 Introduction
A major challenge for testing theories of choice behaviour comes from the
fact that decision makers often show inconsistent behaviour when faced
with repetitions of the same choice situations. Even when faced with rel-
atively simple choices, such as binary choices between two alternatives,
and short time spans between repetitions, it is fairly common to observe
a decision maker switching between choice alternatives. Such inconsisten-
cies are often explained in two different ways. The first way is that even
though decision makers have deterministic preferences over alternatives,
the choices they actually make are probabilistic. Under this model the de-
cision maker is thought to sometimes make errors, choosing a less preferred
alternative by mistake. A second theory is that the decision maker does
choose according to his preferences, but that these preferences themselves
are probabilistic. In other words, the decision maker does not make errors,
she just changes her mind according to some underlying probability func-
This chapter is the result of a collaboration with Clintin Davis-Stober, Michel Regen-
wetter and Frits C.R. Spieksma.
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tion. In this paper, we will be working with the second of these models,
which we will refer to as mixture models (Regenwetter et al., 2010, 2011).
Compared to previous chapters, there will be some differences in the set-
ting. There is a finite set of choice alternatives over which the decision
maker has preferences, rather than a continuum of bundles over which
there is a utility function. Every observed decision situation will also be
binary, the decision maker is given only two alternatives from the set and
will be asked to choose one or the other. In this chapter, we will allow any
strict linear order over the alternatives, i.e., there are no restrictions on
the preferences a decision maker can have. The model we will test is thus
a mixture model of strict linear preferences, for ease of reading, we will
just refer to it as a mixture model. An important result for testing this
model is given by Suck (1992), he shows that testing this mixture model
is equivalent to testing membership of the linear ordering polytope. It is
shown by Gro¨tschel et al. (1981, 1993) that a polynomial time algorithm
for membership implies a polynomial time algorithm for optimization over
the polytope. Since optimization over this polytope corresponds to the
well known np-hard linear ordering problem, the result by Suck im-
plies that testing whether data are consistent with the mixture model is
np-hard.
Our contribution in this chapter is a column generation based algorithm
to test the mixture model. Such an algorithm is interesting, not only for
the problem at hand, but also in general, as it can be easily adapted for
tests of different mixture models with other forms of preferences. The rest
of this chapter will unfold as follows. In Section 7.2, we lay out the no-
tation and definitions used and we present the setting and model in more
detail. Section 7.3 will consist of a basic description of the column gen-
eration algorithm. The implementation and results of this algorithm will
be discussed in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 handles Bayes factor calculation.
The Bayes factor is a measure for the likelihood that observed choices are
the result of an underlying stochastic choice process. Finally, Section 7.6
concludes.
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7.2 Notation and Definitions
Consider a set A, consisting of n alternatives. For each ordered pair of
distinct alternatives (i, j) ∈ A2, we consider a non-negative number pij ≤ 1.
These numbers represent the probability that i is chosen over j. As we
assume strict preferences, pij+pji = 1 for each pair of distinct i, j ∈ A. We
refer to the set of numbers pij as the data. Preference orderings over the
alternatives are represented by the relation , with i  j if i is preferred
over j. These relations are strict, complete and transitive. We will use
the index m to denote a particular preference ordering. The set of all
preference orderings is O. We further consider the subsets Oij , for which
m ∈ Oij if i m j. A mixture model of preference assumes that when a
decision maker is faced with a choice, each preference ordering has a certain
probability of being used to make the choice. When these probabilities are
consistent with the numbers pij , we say that the model rationalizes the
observed data.
Definition 7.2.1. Data can be rationalized by a mixture model of strict
linear preferences if and only if there exists a probability 0 ≤ xm ≤ 1,∀m ∈
O for which: ∑
m∈Oij
xm = pij , ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j (7.1)
A straightforward test of the mixture model is thus to check whether a
solution exists to the system of equalities (7.1). However, this system of
equalities has a variable for every possible linear order over the alterna-
tives, of which there exist n!. For even moderate numbers of alternatives,
it is computationally intensive to solve this system. Suck’s result that test-
ing this mixture model is equivalent to a membership problem of the linear
ordering polytope, suggests a second approach. A polytope can also be de-
scribed by facet defining inequalities. This means that, if and only if the pij
values satisfy all facet defining inequalities of the linear ordering polytope,
the mixture model is satisfied. However, the problem of finding a violated
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facet defining inequality is also np-hard for several known classes of these
inequalities. Furthermore, the number of classes rises exponentially with
the number of alternatives. The largest number of alternatives for which
all classes of facet defining inequalities of the linear ordering polytope are
known is 7 (Mart´ı and Reinelt, 2011). The goal of this chapter is to present
a test of the mixture model that is capable of handling datasets for which
both testing the system of equalities (7.1) or checking the facet defining
inequalities is possible, which we will do in the next section.
7.3 Column Generation
In this section, we will describe an algorithm based on column generation
to test the mixture model. The advantage of using column generation, is
that it avoids having to consider all of the variables at once. Given the
exponential number of these variables, this will allow us to handle datasets
of sizes for which solving (7.1) directly is impractical. To be able to use a
column generation approach, we will first reformulate the system (7.1) into
a linear programming problem. For this linear program, we can then find
the dual formulation and, using both of these problems, devise a column
generation algorithm.
7.3.1 Linear Programming Formulation
In the previous section, we provided a system of equalities, which are both
necessary and sufficient for the data to be rationalizable by a model of
stochastic strict linear ordering preferences. This system can be easily
rewritten as a linear programming problem as follows.
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Minimize z (7.2)
Subject to ∑
m∈Oij
xm + z ≥ pij ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j (7.3)∑
m∈O
xm ≤ 1 (7.4)
xm, z ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ O (7.5)
Claim 7.3.1. The optimal solution value of (7.2)-(7.5) is equal to 0 if and
only if a solution exists to the system of equalities (7.1).
Proof. The claim can be easily checked as follows. First, we show that if
there exists a solution with z = 0, the values of the xm variables also form
a solution to (7.1). Finally, we show that any solution to (7.1) is also a
solution to (7.2)-(7.5), with z = 0.
Suppose we have a solution to (7.2)-(7.5) with solution value 0. As 1 ≥∑
m∈O xm =
∑
m∈Oij xm+
∑
m∈Oji xm = 1, we must have
∑
m∈Oij xm = pij
and
∑
m∈Oji xm = pji. The values xm are thus a solution to (7.1). Finally,
suppose we have a solution to the system of equalities (7.1). The values
of xm can then be put into the linear programming problem. As for each
ordered pair (i, j), we have
∑
m∈Oij xm = pij and
∑
m∈O xm = 1, it is clear
that the constraints (7.3) are met with z = 0.
Clearly this LP-formulation still has the same large number of variables
(n!) as (7.1). However, this formulation has a relatively small number
of constraints (n2). Since an optimal solution to an LP can be found
with a number of non-zero variables less than or equal to the number of
constraints, it is clear that not all variables are needed (Chva´tal, 1983).
We will therefore use a column generation approach. In this context, we
will refer to the linear problem (7.2)-(7.5) as the primal or master problem.
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7.3.2 The Pricing Problem
For each linear programming problem, there exists an associated dual prob-
lem. The dual problem associated with (7.2)-(7.5) is as follows.
Maximize
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
pijyij − c (7.6)
Subject o ∑
(i,j):m∈Oij
yij − c ≤ 0 ∀m ∈ O (7.7)
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
yij ≤ 1 (7.8)
yij , c ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j (7.9)
An informal description of a column generation approach tailored to solv-
ing (7.2)-(7.5) is as follows. Suppose we have a feasible solution (x, z) to
the primal problem as well as an associated dual solution (y, c). It is well-
known that feasibility of this dual solution (y, c) is equivalent to optimality
of the primal solution (x, z). In other words, if (x, z) is the optimal so-
lution to the master problem, then the associated dual solution (y, c) will
be feasible and vice versa. Thus, if we want to test optimality of (x, z),
we may test whether (y, c) satisfies (7.7), (7.8) and (7.9). In a column
generation approach, we consider a restricted master, that is, many of the
primal variables from (7.2)-(7.5) are not considered explicitly. Solving this
restricted master gives a feasible primal solution (x, z), as well as a corre-
spoding dual solution (y, c). If this dual solution is feasible, then this is
proof that the solution to the restricted master problem is also an optimal
solution to the master problem. Otherwise, a violated dual constraint is
identified which gives rise to a primal variable that should be included in
the restricted master.
Checking whether the solution (y, c) is a feasible solution to the dual prob-
lem is done by solving a pricing problem. In this case, there exists a
violated inequality if and only if there exists a linear order m ∈ O, for
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which
∑
ij:m∈Oij yij > c. This gives us the following pricing problem. The
variables bij represent preference relations for an ordered pair of distinct
alternatives, (i, j) ∈ A2: if bij = 1, then i is preferred over j.
Maximize
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
yijbij (7.10)
Subject to
bij + bji = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j (7.11)
bij + bjk + bki ≤ 2 ∀(i, j, k) ∈ A3, i 6= j 6= k 6= i (7.12)
bij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j (7.13)
A solution of the problem consists of the bij variables, which given the
constraints (7.11) - (7.13) encode a strict linear order. Any such solution for
which the objective value (7.10) is greater than c, corresponds to a violated
inequality (7.7) of the dual. This violated inequality directly corresponds to
a primal variable, which when added to the restricted master problem will
improve its solution. We notice that this pricing problem is the well known
linear ordering problem (see Mart´ı and Reinelt (2011)). This problem is
known to be NP-Hard (Garey and Johnson, 1979).
7.3.3 Column Generation Algorithm
We are now in a position to describe the full column generation algorithm,
as shown in Algorithm 7. The general idea is as follows. Initially, we solve
a restricted master problem. This problem only contains a subset of all
variables of the full master. Given a solution to the restricted master,
we test whether this solution is optimal for the full master problem, by
checking whether there exist violated constraints in the dual problem. This
is done by solving the pricing problem. If the pricing problem identifies no
violated constraints, this means the optimal solution to the master problem
has been reached. If a violated constraint is identified, the associated
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variable is added to the restricted master, which is then resolved. Since it
is clear that there can be no solution to the master problem with z < 0,
the column generation algorithm can also terminate as soon as z = 0.
Algorithm 7 Column Generation Algorithm
1: Solve Restricted Master Problem.
2: if z = 0 then
3: Optimal solution found: stop
4: else
5: Update Pricing Problem with values yij .
6: Solve Pricing Problem
7: if Value Pricing Solution ≤ c then
8: Optimal solution found: stop
9: else
10: Add variable corresponding to the linear order found to the Re-
stricted Master Problem
11: goto Line 1
12: end if
13: end if
7.3.4 Stopping Condition
To finish this section on Column Generation, we note that we are not
interested in finding an optimal solution to the master problem. We are
only interested in the decision problem, whether or not a feasible solution to
the master problem exists in which z = 0 (and as a result, every constraint
is met with equality). This subtle difference allows us to use an extra
stopping condition, based on the objective value of the pricing solutions.
Theorem 7.3.1. Given numbers yij for all pairs (i, j) ∈ A2 (i 6= j), there
is a solution to the system (7.1) only if there exists a linear order m ∈ O,
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such that: ∑
(i,j)∈A2:imj
yij ≥
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
yijpij (7.14)
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a feasible
solution (7.1), while for each m ∈ O:∑
(i,j)∈A2:imj
yij <
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
yijpij . (7.15)
Thus, since xm ≥ 0 and
∑
m∈O xm = 1:∑
m∈O
(xm
∑
(i,j)∈A2:imj
yij) <
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
yijpij . (7.16)
The left hand side is equal to:∑
m∈O
(xm
∑
(i,j)∈A2:imj
yij) =
∑
(i,j)∈A2
∑
m∈Oij
xmyij . (7.17)
Thus we have derived the validity of the following inequality:∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
∑
m∈Oij
yijxm <
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
yijpij (7.18)
Now, since (7.1) is satisfied, we have for each ordered pair (i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j
that: ∑
m∈Oij
xm = pij . (7.19)
Multiplying both sides by yij preserves the equality, thus for each ordered
pair (i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j we have∑
m∈Oij
yijxm = yijpij . (7.20)
And summing over all ordered pairs gives∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
∑
m∈Oij
yijxm =
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
yijpij , (7.21)
which contradicts (7.18)
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This result allows us to end the column generation algorithm if there is no
linear order m ∈ O for which ∑(i,j)∈A2:imj yij > ∑(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j yijpij . It
can easily be seen that this stopping condition is stronger than standard
column generation stopping condition, which is ending the algorithm if
there is no linear order m ∈ O for which ∑(i,j)∈A2:imj yij > c. Indeed,
each dual solution (y, c) will satisfy
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j pijyij > c, since the value
of the objective function of the restricted master (z) is equal to the value
of the objective function of the dual problem (
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j pijyij − c). As
long as z > 0, it is thus the case that
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j pijyij > c.
We note that this result can be seen as an application of Farkas’ Lemma.
Indeed, consider this slight rephrasing of the original system of equalities,
in which we make the convexity constraint explicit.∑
m∈Oij
xm = pij ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j (7.22)∑
m∈O
xm = 1 (7.23)
xm ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ O (7.24)
Then Farkas’ Lemma states this system has a solution if and only if there
does not exist a solution (fij , g) to the following system of inequalities.∑
i,j∈O:imj
fij + g < 0 ∀m ∈ O (7.25)∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
pijfij + g ≥ 0 (7.26)
However, given a dual solution (yij , c) for which condition (7.14) does not
hold, i.e., for which no linear order m ∈ O exists satisfying (7.14), it is
clear that a solution exists to (7.25-7.26). Indeed, let fij = yij , then for
each m ∈ O, it is the case that∑
i,j∈O:imj
fij <
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
pijfij . (7.27)
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Given this, there must exist some g, such that∑
i,j∈O:imj
fij + g < 0 ≤
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
pijfij + g. (7.28)
Furthermore, if condition (7.14) does not hold, Theorem 7.3.1 in effect
states that there is a lower bound z′ > 0 on the optimal solution z∗ of the
master problem. In general, the convexity constraint on the xm variables
allows us to derive a lower bound on the master problem in every iteration
of the column generation algorithm as follows (See Bazaraa et al. (2011),
Lu¨bbecke and Desrosiers (2005)). Let z¯ be the objective value of an optimal
solution to the restricted master problem, and bij the optimal solution to
the pricing problem. Then it is the case that
z¯ − (
∑
(i,j)∈A2
(bijyij)− c) ≤ z∗. (7.29)
Since
z¯ =
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
(pijyij)− c, (7.30)
we have ∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
(pijyij)−
∑
(i,j)∈A2,i 6=j
(bijyij) ≤ z∗. (7.31)
7.4 Implementation
In this section we discuss the implementation of the column generation
algorithm. Obviously, we can run Algorithm 7 by making use of standard
linear and integer program solvers. However, as suboptimal solutions to
the pricing problem may also identify violated inequalities of the dual,
we also use fast heuristic approaches to solve the pricing problem. We
describe these heuristic algorithms in subsection 7.4.1. Subsection 7.4.2
then contains descriptions of our datasets. Finally, subsection 7.4.3 gives
results on computation times for the various algorithms and datasets.
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7.4.1 Heuristic Algorithms
As the linear ordering problem is a well-known and well-studied np-hard
problem, an extensive literature exists on heuristics. In this section, we
describe our implementation based on best insertion constructive and in-
sertion local search algorithms (Laguna et al., 1999). In the literature, it
has been observed that these perform well when compared to other simple
heuristics (See Mart´ı and Reinelt (2011)). We use multi-start procedures,
varying the order in which alternatives are added in the insertion heuris-
tics. In this way, we have multiple solutions to compare against each other.
These multiple solutions can be used to either pick the best solution, or to
identify multiple variables to add to the restricted master in the column
generation. Furthermore, we describe an algorithm for adjusting solutions
to the pricing problem, such that the resulting linear orders more closely
resemble the observed preferences.
Best Insertion Heuristics
We describe a constructive heuristic called Best Insertion (Algorithm 8);
and a local search method based on a ‘move’ neighbourhood. The descrip-
tions of these algorithms are based on Mart´ı and Reinelt (2011) The Best
Insertion algorithm creates an initial ranking of the alternatives, by itera-
tively placing alternatives in an ordering over a (sub)set of the alternatives.
In the local search method, the position of alternatives in this ordering can
be changed by local moves. Initially, we consider a set of all alternatives
A. For every ordered pair of alternatives, (i, j) ∈ A2, the value of placing
i before j is given by yij . A linear order is denoted by 〈a, b, . . .〉.
In our implementation of Algorithm 8, the choice of alternatives i ∈ A in
line 7 is made as follows. If, initially, an alternative j ∈ A is chosen in
step 2, we pick alternatives j+1, . . . , n, 1, . . . , j−1, in that order, in step 7.
For the local search algorithm, let v(a) be the objective value associated
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Algorithm 8 Best Insertion Heuristic
1: INPUT: Set A and numbers yij for each ordered pair (i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j.
2: Select an alternative i ∈ A and set A := A\{i}.
3: Create an ordering 〈i〉.
4: Set k := 1
5: while A 6= ∅ do
6: Let 〈a1, a2, . . . , ak〉 denote the current ordering.
7: Choose an alternative i ∈ A.
8: For each t = 1, . . . , k + 1, compute qt =
∑t−1
j=1 yaj ,i +
∑k
j=t yi,aj .
9: Let r = arg maxt=1,...,k+1 qt.
10: Set j := k + 1
11: while j > r + 1 do
12: aj := aj−1
13: j := j − 1
14: end while
15: ar := i
16: A := A\{i}
17: end while
18: OUTPUT: A linear order a = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉
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with a linear order 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉. Furthermore, let v(a, i, j), be the value
of the order that results when the object in position i is moved to position
j. Algorithm 9 gives the full pseudo-code for the local search.
Algorithm 9 Insertion Local Search
1: INPUT: A linear order a = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 and values yij for all ordered
pairs (i, j) ∈ A2.
2: Set i := 1.
3: while i < n+ 1 do
4: if maxj=1,...,n+1 v(a, i, j) > v(a) then
5: Set a := 〈. . . , aj−1, ai, aj , . . .〉.
6: Set i := 1.
7: else
8: Set i := i+ 1.
9: end if
10: end while
11: OUTPUT: A linear order a = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉
In this local search heuristic, the neighbourhood of an order is defined
as all orders that can be constructed from the current order by moving a
single alternative to a different position. For a given alternative, all possible
moves are evaluated. If the best possible move for this alternative improves
the objective value, this move is made and the ordering updated. The
algorithm terminates if there are no more improvements possible through
moving a single alternative.
In Algorithm 10, we show how we combine the algorithms described so far.
We denote the best ordering found so far by a¯.
This implementation combines the constructive best insertion and local
search insertion algorithms to quickly find linear orders which are good
solutions to the pricing problem. Since the outcome of the constructive
heuristic depends strongly on the order in which alternatives are added
to the linear order, we use a multi-start procedure. For each alternative
i ∈ A, we run the algorithm once, inserting i first. From these multiple
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Algorithm 10 Pricing Problem
1: INPUT: A set of alternatives A and values yij for all ordered pairs
(i, j) ∈ A2.
2: for i ∈ A do
3: Run Algorithm 8, starting with the insertion of alternative i.
4: Run local search Algorithm 9 with starting solution a.
5: If v(a) > v(a¯), set a¯ := a.
6: end for
7: If v(a¯) ≤ 0, run CPLEX for an optimal solution to the pricing problem.
8: OUTPUT: a¯
runs, we save the best solution to the pricing problem, and if this solution
can be used to add a variable to the restricted master problem, we do
so. If the objective value found through the heuristics is lower than or
equal to 0, we have not found any variables to add to the master problem.
However, this does not mean no such variables exist. We therefore use an
exact solver as a back-up, which either finds a new variable, if one exists,
or provides us with proof that such a variable does not exist. In this way,
we are still guaranteed a correct test of the mixture model.
To further speed up the column generation algorithm, we look for multiple
solutions to our pricing problem. By adding additional variables in a single
iteration, we hope to get larger improvements in our master problem. In
our implementation, we keep using the multi-start best insertion heuristics,
saving every solution that provides an improving variable (and is different
from already saved solutions). We denote the multiple saved solutions by
a1, a2, . . ..
Adjusting pricing solutions
As a final addition to the column generation algorithm in our implementa-
tion, we propose a way to adjust a solution to the pricing problem slightly,
so that they match the data as closely as possible. The intuition of the
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Algorithm 11 Adding multiple columns
1: INPUT: A set of alternatives A and and values yij for all ordered pairs
(i, j) ∈ A2.
2: for all i ∈ A do
3: Run Algorithm 8, starting with the insertion of alternative i.
4: Run local search Algorithm 9 with starting solution a.
5: If v(a) > 0 and a 6= ak, for all saved ak, save a as ak+1.
6: end for
7: If there does not exist ak, with v(ak) ≤ 0, run CPLEX for an optimal
solution to the pricing problem, else skip this step.
8: OUTPUT: All orders ak.
adjustment we propose is as follows. Suppose a linear order with i  j
is found as a solution to the pricing program, which can be added to the
master problem as an improving column. However, if yij = yji = 0, then a
linear order with j  i could have the same objective value in the pricing
problem. Now suppose pji = 1. If this is the case, it is clear that an
order with i  j will never be used in the eventual solution to our mas-
ter problem, and we should add an order with j  i instead. A similar
reasoning can be used if pji > 0.5. It may not be the case that a variable
with i  j will never be used, but is likely that the eventual solution will
use more variables corresponding to orders with j  i. We therefore add
the steps outlined in Algorithm 12 at the end of our heuristic pricing al-
gorithms. The yij values of the pricing problem are changed, and another
local search algorithm is run, with the goal of placing alternatives i ∈ A
with large pij values higher within the linear ordering. In particular, for
every pair of alternatives (i, j) ∈ A2 for which the ranking within the linear
order has no effect on the value of the pricing solution (yij = yji = 0), we
set yij := pij and yji := pji. To ensure the value of the solution to the pric-
ing solution is not lowered, every relation in the linear ordering solution
which adds any value to the objective function is assigned an arbitrarily
high yij value.
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Algorithm 12 Adjusting the pricing problem solution
1: INPUT: A set of alternatives A, an order a and a number yij .
2: for all (i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j do
3: If i  j in a and yij > 0, set yij := 1000
4: If yij = yji = 0, set yij := pij and yji := pji
5: end for
6: Run local search Algorithm 9, with starting solution a.
7: OUTPUT: An order a.
7.4.2 Datasets
We generated four distinct classes of datasets, which we will describe in
this section.
The first two of these classes (Inside Easy (IE) and Inside Hard (IH)) were
generated so as to satisfy the mixture model in the following way. First,
for a given number n of alternatives, t linear orders over these alternatives
were randomly generated. For the easy datasets, t = 20, while t = 5 for
the hard datasets. Next, t − 1 random numbers (qm) between zero and
one were drawn and ranked from small to large. There are then t intervals
[0, q1], [q1, q2], . . . , [qt−1, 1], which define t numbers qi − qi−1 (with q0 = 0
and qt = 1). Each of these t number corresponds to a different generated
linear order, i.e., we set xm = qm − qm−1 for m = 1, . . . , t. The pij values
are then set as follows, pij =
∑t
m∈Oij xm.
The two other classes were generated so that they are unlikely to satisfy
the mixture model, these are called Outside Easy (OE) and Outside Hard
(OH). Outside Easy is generated in a simple fashion. For every pair of
alternatives (i, j) ∈ A2, with i > j, a number pij is drawn from a uniform
distribution between zero and one and pji = 1− pij . While the generation
process does not guarantee non-rationalizability, it turned out that all of
these datasets do violate the mixture model. This is due to the restrictive
nature of these models. Monte Carlo simulation shows only about 5% of
datasets containing 5 alternatives generated in this manner satisfy the mix-
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ture model, and that this percentage decreases with an increasing number
of alternatives (Regenwetter et al., 2010). For Outside Hard, initial pij
values are drawn using the same procedure. These numbers are the input
to an optimization problem, which minimizes the changes in the pij values,
under the constraint that for every triple of alternatives, i, j, k ∈ A, the
inequality pij + pjk + pki ≤ 2.01 (pij + pjk + pki ≤ 2 is a necessary con-
dition for rationalizability). In this way, the resulting dataset is generally
much closer to satisfying the mixture model than the pij values drawn from
uniform distributions. Notice however, that a dataset which violates the
conditions for rationalizability, will still violate these conditions after the
procedure.
7.4.3 Results
In this section, we will discuss some results on computation times for mix-
ture model tests. We will compare the different algorithms as described
in Section 7.4.1, tested on the datasets described in 7.4.2. All datasets
were generated for n = 20, and averages are reported over 5 datasets per
generation method. All computation times reported in this chapter were
obtained on a dual core 2.5 GHz computer with 4 GB RAM. The master
problem is solved using CPLEX 12.4, as is the pricing problem for exact
solutions.
Let us first look at a comparison of computation times using an exact in-
teger programming solver for the pricing problem, and implementations
using the best insertion heuristics. For this case, we include both the algo-
rithm for adding the best heuristic solution found (BI), and the algorithm
where all improving columns were added (BIM).
We note that the computation times decrease substantially by using heuris-
tic methods for the pricing problem. Generally, these methods are able to
find improving columns in most iterations of the pricing problem, allow-
ing the computationally expensive exact pricing problems to be skipped.
1 Computation time exceeded 2 hours (7200s) for 4 out of 5 datasets
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Datasets Exact BI BIM
Inside Easy 47.32s 10.21s 5.41s
Inside Hard 2598.48s 175.94s 182.33s
Outside Easy 20.46s 1.39s 1.15s
Outside Hard No Results1 3483.82s 3287.98s
Table 7.1: Computational results for exact pricing problem and simple heuristics.
For many satisfying datasets, the mixture model test can be done without
having to run any exact tests. For the datasets with violations, at least
one exact test is necessary for a guarantee that no improving columns ex-
ist. For the outside easy datasets, no extra exact pricing problems are
necessary. For the outside hard datasets however, most of the runtime
is linked to exact pricing problems. Furthermore, we note the similar re-
sults for the heuristic algorithm with one and multiple added columns. An
interesting observation is that while overall computation times are simi-
lar, the division over different parts of the algorithm is different. When
adding multiple columns in each pricing iteration, the number of pricing
iterations that are necessary decreases significantly (depending on the class
of dataset, between 70% and 90%). However, the total number of added
columns is much larger, which increases the time needed in updating and
running the master problem.
Next we look at the impact of the adjustment of pricing solutions, given in
Table 7.2. BIA represents the BI algorithm with adjustments, while BIMA
represents BIM with adjustments. Adjusting the pricing solutions has a
positive impact on computation times for all datasets. This reduction in
computation time is, depending on the basic algorithm, due to two effects.
In the simple best insertion algorithms, the adjustment of pricing solutions
leads to a large decrease in the number of iterations the column generation
algorithm requires. In the variant with multiple added variables in each
iteration, the improvement is due to a smaller number of variables being
added in each iteration.
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Datasets BI BIA BIM BIMA
IE 10.21s 7.69s 5.41s 5.37s
IH 175.94s 87.41s 182.33s 181.84s
OE 1.39s 1.30s 1.15s 0.71s
OH 3483.82s 3028.06s 3287.98s 2873.71s
Table 7.2: Computational results including adjustments to the pricing solutions.
Finally, we look at including the stronger stopping condition (BIA SC
and BIMA SC) discussed in Section 7.3.4 and report results for the hard
non-consistent datasets in Table 7.3. Clearly, this more stringent stopping
condition quickly identifies datasets which can not be consistent with the
mixture model, cutting computation times from almost one hour to less
than one minute on average. Due to the stronger stopping condition for
pricing problem solutions, the proof that the mixture model cannot be
satisfied is usually obtained in the first iteration that uses exact methods.
Datasets BIA BIA SC BIMA BIMA SC
OH 3028.06s 52.63s 2873.71s 33.56s
Table 7.3: Computational results including adjustments to the pricing solutions.
7.5 Bayes Factor Calculation
As we noted in several previous chapters, tests of models of behaviour are
generally sharp. Either the data satisfy the model or they don’t. The same
is true for the model we test in the current chapter. However, given that
we assume stochastic decision making, such sharp tests create additional
difficulties. Indeed, suppose we observe that an alternative i is chosen
over another alternative j only 1 out of 10 times. If we test the mixture
model on the data, we can use pij = 0.1 and we may find the model is
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rejected. However, suppose that for pij ≥ 0.15 the model is satisfied. If
the decision maker prefers i over j 15% of the time, then it is still likely that
he only picks i once over 10 trials and we “observe” a violation. Observed
behaviour can thus fail to satisfy Condition (7.1) even though the decision
maker satisfies the model.
In this section, we will look at the Bayes Factor as a way for account-
ing for this problem (Klugkist and Hoijtink, 2007). Informally speaking,
given observed behaviour, a posterior distribution can be calculated, which
represents how likely specific choice probabilities are to generate the ob-
served data. From this posterior distribution, we draw samples and test
whether these satisfy the mixture model. The percentage of such sam-
pled datasets which satisfy the mixture model (out of the total number
of tested samples), provides an approximation of the posterior probability
that the decision maker satisfies the mixture model, given the observed
choices. To be able to compare models, this posterior probability can be
compared against the percentage of samples from a prior distribution that
are consistent.
In line with Cavagnaro and Davis-Stober (2014), we take the prior distri-
bution of a pij value to be a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The
percentage of samples consistent with the mixture model is then equal to
the volume of the linear ordering polytope compared to the unit hyper-
cube. We are mainly interested in computing the posterior probability.
The posterior distributions of the pij values is given by Beta distributions.
In particular, let qij be the number of times i is observed chosen in a choice
between i and j. Then, for every pair of alternatives (i, j) ∈ A2, the distri-
bution of pij is given by Beta = (qij +1, qji+1). Given a sampled pij value
for every pair, we have a synthetic dataset for which the mixture model
can be tested.
To estimate the posterior probability as closely as possible, large numbers
of these synthetic datasets must be tested for consistency with the mixture
model. However, since all datasets are sampled from the same distribution,
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these datasets are usually quite similar. In this section, we will look at
some ways the column generation procedure described in this chapter can
exploit these similarities to quickly test many datasets. First, we will look
at how re-using the columns generated in one test as a starting set for
new datasets speeds up these tests in subsection 7.5.1. Next, in subsection
7.5.2 we show that the objective function of the final pricing problem of a
rejected dataset provides inequalities, which are necessary conditions for
rationalizability by the mixture model. These inequalities can be used to
quickly test whether datasets violate the mixture model.
7.5.1 Starting Sets
As all generated datasets are fairly similar, it is likely that the optimal so-
lutions to the linear programs (7.2-7.5) for these datasets use many of the
same variables. By testing the points sequentially and using the variables
generated while testing previous datasets as a starting set for new samples,
we attempt to minimize the number of pricing iterations needed. Table 7.4
demonstrates that this is indeed works. For a given dataset of observed
choices with 10 alternatives, we calculated the posterior Beta distribu-
tions. From samples from these distributions, we created 10000 simulated
datasets. Of these datasets, approximately 10% satisfy the mixture model.
The table clearly shows that when testing these datasets, tests of the first
datasets require a large number of variables to be generated. More than
20% of the total number of variables is generated in the first 1% of the tests.
The number of variables generated then quickly tails off, as the starting
sets for later tests are generally sufficient to prove (non-)consistency with
the mixture model.
Sampled Dataset 1 2 10 100 1000 2500 5000 10000
Total # Variables 66 113 172 430 986 1275 1587 1892
Table 7.4: Cumulative number of variables.
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The re-use of variables also has a large effect on the necessary computation
times. For this test, we used only exact algorithms for the pricing problem.
Using these exact algorithms, testing a single point from a minimal starting
set generally takes around 10 seconds. Most of this computation time is due
to the pricing problems. Given a starting set with all variables necessary for
an optimal solution to the master problem, this time drops to either about
0.05 seconds (in the case of satisfying datasets) or 0.15 (in the case of non-
satisfying datasets). The longer time needed for non-satisfying datasets is
due to the fact that these datasets require at least one pricing problem to
be solved to prove that an optimal solution to the master problem has been
found. All 10000 generated datasets could be tested in 2333.61 seconds, or
about 0.25 seconds on average.
7.5.2 Valid Inequality Pool
Using the starting sets as described in the previous subsection offers sig-
nificant speed-ups for testing many similar datasets, but one problem that
remains is that for each non-satisfying dataset, a pricing problem must be
run to prove that the optimal solution to the master problem has been
reached. Since pricing problems are a significant factor in overall compu-
tation times, we wish to avoid this if possible. One way to do so is as
follows. In case the pricing problem fails to find a new variable for the
master problem, we have identified an inequality that must be satisfied
by any dataset consistent with the mixture model. Thus, from every non-
rationalizable dataset we obtain an inequality. Before using the column
generation algorithm on further datasets, we can first test whether these
datasets violate any of the known inequalities. If violations are found, we
can conclude the dataset does not satisfy the mixture model and no test
using column generation is necessary.
Theorem 7.5.1. Suppose there exist numbers yij for all (i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j,
and a number c, such that there does not exist a linear order m ∈ O for
which
∑
ij:imj yij > c. Then there exists no dataset with numbers pij
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for all (i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j, that satisfies the mixture model and for which∑
i,j∈A yijpij > c.
Proof. This proof is analogous to the proof for Theorem 7.3.1.
Using these valid inequalities, the total computation time of the 10000 gen-
erated datasets drops from 2333.6 seconds to 408.4 seconds. This decrease
in computation time is mainly due to the number of pricing problems that
we avoid. In total, 9030 datasets are non-rationalizable, but only 119 of
these datasets required solving pricing problems to prove this. The other
8911 datasets violated one (or more) of the valid inequalities identified
solving earlier datasets. Since checking the list of valid inequalities usually
takes less than 0.001 second, this is a large improvement compared to the
0.15 seconds for solving an average pricing problem.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an algorithm for testing models of
stochastic preferences (mixture models), based on column generation. This
algorithm is capable of handling datasets of such size that the number of
linear orders over all alternatives, and thus the number of variables in
(7.1) would make the system of equalities prohibitive to solve. We propose
several ways of speeding up the algorithm, by making use of heuristics,
particular choices about the variables to be added if there are multiple
candidates and by proving the pricing solutions must reach certain thresh-
olds for the system of equalities (7.1) to be satisfied. Furthermore, we
show that the column generation algorithm is well-suited for testing large
numbers of similar datasets, as variables can be re-used and the pricing
objective function provides valid inequalities.
Chapter 8
Recognizing Single-Peaked
Preferences on Aggregated Choice
Data
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we studied a stochastic model of general prefer-
ences, i.e., for a set of alternatives, a decision maker can hold any preference
ordering. In this chapter, we will study a special case of this model, where
preferences are restricted in some sense. An important such restriction is
given by single-peakedness, introduced by Black (1948). Suppose a linear
ordering exists, that ranks all alternatives along a line. An agent’s pref-
erences are then single-peaked if she has a most preferred alternative, the
peak, and when comparing two alternatives that are both on the same side
of the peak, the alternative closest to the peak is preferred. This restriction
is very natural when considering a situation where a single attribute of the
alternatives drives the choice, for example, an election where candidates
range from left wing to right wing, or choices over budgets of various sizes.
Given these examples, it is no wonder that this restriction has gained cen-
tral importance in the areas of political science and social choice. Apart
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from being an appealing model in these areas, the assumption of single-
peaked preferences has led to interesting theoretical results. For example,
aggregation of single-peaked preferences avoids the Condorcet-paradox.
Within a social choice context, single-peaked preferences (and closely re-
lated preference restrictions), have been studied extensively. In contrast
to our setting however, this literature does not use aggregated preference
data, instead assuming the full preference profiles of decision makers are
known. We note work by Bartholdi III and Trick (1986), who provide a
polynomial time algorithm to test whether the observed preference pro-
files are single-peaked with respect to some ordering of the alternatives
and to identify this ordering. Escoffier et al. (2008) provide a different
algorithm for the same problem with a better worst-case bound. Ballester
and Haeringer (2011) give two forbidden substructures, whose absence is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the given preference profile to be con-
sistent with single-peakedness. Furthermore, Trick (1989) provides an algo-
rithm for recognizing single-peakedness on trees, which again runs in poly-
nomial time. Finally, Doignon and Falmagne (1994), Knoblauch (2010)
and Elkind and Faliszewski (2014) investigate a closely related preference
restriction, one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles, and all provide
polynomial time algorithms.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows.
• Given an ordering of the alternatives, we provide necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for testing whether aggregated preferences are con-
sistent with a mixture model of single-peaked preferences. These
conditions can be tested in polynomial time.
• We provide a polynomial time algorithm which given the aggregated
preferences, provides an ordering of the alternatives for which a mix-
ture model of single-peaked preferences is satisfied (if such an order-
ing exists).
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 8.2, we fur-
ther define single-peaked preferences and the mixture model. Section 8.3
contains our main result, necessary and sufficient conditions for a mixture
model of single-peaked preferences to hold. Next, section 8.4 provides fur-
ther results, specifically two algorithms to identify the underlying ordering
of the alternatives. Finally, section 8.5 concludes.
8.2 Notation and Definitions
Consider a set A, consisting of n alternatives, and a dataset P = {pij ≥
0,∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j}. The values pij represent the probability that i is
chosen over j. As we assume strict preferences, pij + pji = 1. We also
consider a (given) ordering of alternatives in A. This ordering is complete,
asymmetric and transitive and is denoted by. Furthermore, we consider
preference orderings over all alternatives. We will use the index m to
denote a particular preference ordering. If for a given preference ordering
m, an alternative i is preferred over another alternative j, we denote this
by i m j.
Definition 8.2.1. A preference ordering m is single-peaked with respect
to a given ordering of the alternatives  if and only if for every triple
(i, j, k) ∈ A3 we have:
if (i j  k and i m j) then i m k. (8.1)
if (i j  k and k m j) then k m i. (8.2)
The set of all preference orderings that are single-peaked with respect to
an ordering  is denoted by O. We further consider the subsets Oij ,
defined as follows: m ∈ Oij if both m ∈ O and i m j. A mixture model
of preference assumes that, a decision maker has a number of different
preference orderings, each with an associated probability. When faced
with a choice between alternatives i and j, the probability that the decision
maker chooses i is equal to the sum of the probabilities of all preference
orderings in which i is preferred over j.
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Definition 8.2.2. A dataset P can be rationalized by a mixture model of
single-peaked linear ordering preferences with respect to a given ordering
of alternatives  if and only if there exist numbers xm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈ O for
which: ∑
m∈Oij
xm = pij , ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j. (8.3)
8.3 Consistency conditions
We claim that the existence of a solution to the system of equalities (8.3)
can be checked easily by verifying a condition on the pij values. We will
prove both the sufficiency and necessity of this condition, and then finish
this section by showing that the condition may be tested in polynomial
time.
Theorem 8.3.1. A dataset P can be rationalized by a mixture model of
single-peaked preferences with respect to a given ordering  if and only if
for every triple (i, j, k) ∈ A3 we have:
if i j  k then pij ≤ pik and pkj ≤ pki. (8.4)
Before embarking on a proof of this theorem, let us first make a couple of
observations. First, we note that the condition (8.4) is similar, but subtly
different from the conditions for Robinsonian dissimilarities (Robinson,
1951). The main differences are as follows, for dissimilarities the values
pij are symmetric, i.e, pij = pji (and there is no constraint on pij + pji).
Furthermore, a dissimilarity is Robinsonian with respect to an order if and
only if for every triple (i, j, k) ∈ A3, with i  j  k, it must be the
case that pij ≤ pik and pjk ≤ pik. We also note that condition (8.4) is
a reformulation of conditions (8.1)-(8.2) for the setting with aggregated
preferences. While we will formally argue the necessity later on, it is clear
that if condition (8.4) is violated, at least part of the population has to
hold preferences that violate either condition (8.1) or (8.2). However, the
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sufficiency of this condition is not so straightforward. Indeed, if we look at
mixture models with general preferences, we find that the list of necessary
and sufficient conditions is exponential in the number of alternatives1. This
is the case, even though general preference orderings are constrained only
by transitivity, which can also be defined by a condition over all triples. To
prove the sufficiency of condition (8.4) we will proceed as follows. First, we
will describe an algorithm whose goal it is to find single-peaked preference
orders m ∈ O and associated values xm satisfying (8.3). We will show
this algorithm is able to do so if the dataset P satisfies condition (8.4).
The complete pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 13, here we will give a
short overview. The main idea is that if we know the aggregated pref-
erences of (a part of) a population, we wish to identify a single-peaked
preference order held by a part of that population, explaining a portion
of the observed preferences. This usually leaves some part of the data
unexplained, captured in the algorithm by the variables p˜ij . For this un-
explained data, another single-peaked preference order is then found, and
so on. These orders are constructed by iteratively adding alternatives,
starting from the most preferred to the least preferred. To do this, we first
identify the set of alternatives which can be added to the order (I). We
define the set M as the set of alternatives which have already been added
to the order, obviously if i ∈M , then i /∈ I, as alternatives can only be in
the order once. Furthermore, if there exists an alternative i /∈M , for which
there is some other alternative j /∈M such that p˜ij = 0, this alternative i
can not be added to the order before j is, as no member of the population
can hold such a preference ordering, thus i /∈ I. From this set I, we then
choose the alternative which is first in the underlying ordering  and add
1 Suck shows that testing the mixture model for strict linear preferences is equivalent to
testing membership of the linear ordering polytope (Suck, 1992). A full facet descrip-
tion of this polytope thus gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the mixture
model of strict linear preferences. However, since separation over this polytope is
NP-Hard, the facet description is exponential in the number of alternatives. Full de-
scriptions are only known for small number of alternatives (Fiorini, 2006; Mart´ı and
Reinelt, 2011)
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it to the ordering m. These steps are repeated until all alternatives are
ranked.
The process of constructing single-peaked linear orders is the key part of
the algorithm and is found in the loop (4-10). For this loop we will prove
four properties, which all depend on the condition (8.4) being satisfied for
p˜ij . First, that the loop always runs to completion, i.e. it outputs a strict
linear order m. Second, that m is single-peaked with regards to .
Third, that this m can be given a weight xm, and for all (i, j) ∈ A2 for
which i m j, we have xm ≤ p˜ij and that there exist some i, j ∈ A for
which i m j and xm = p˜ij . Finally, at the end of each loop, the values
of p˜ij satisfy condition (8.4). Given these four properties, we will be able
to prove that the algorithm provides single-peaked linear orders m ∈ O
and values xm that satisfy (8.3).
Algorithm 13 Finding Single-Peaked Preferences
1: INPUT: pij for all (i, j) ∈ A2 and .
2: Set p˜ij := pij for all distinct i, j ∈ A, m := 1 and create m:= ∅,
M := ∅ and I := ∅.
3: while p˜ij + p˜ji > 0 for all distinct i, j ∈ A do
4: for |M | < |A| do
5: Set I := {i ∈ A\M : p˜ij 6= 0,∀j ∈ A\M, j 6= i}
6: If I = ∅, STOP.
7: Set i∗ := i with i ∈ I for which ∀j ∈ I, j 6= i : i j.
8: ∀j ∈M , set j m i∗
9: Set M := M ∪ {i∗}
10: end for
11: Set xm := mini,j∈A:imj p˜ij .
12: Set p˜ij := p˜ij − xm,∀i, j ∈ A for which i m j.
13: Set m := m+ 1
14: Set M := ∅
15: end while
16: OUTPUT: For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} a value xi and order i.
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Claim 8.3.1. If the values p˜ij meet condition (8.4), the loop (4-10) will
return a linear order.
Proof. If for some M there does not exist an i ∈ A\M such that p˜ij >
0,∀j ∈ A\M , the algorithm will halt in line 6 without constructing an
order. We argue by contradiction : suppose this is the case and the condi-
tion (8.4) is satisfied. Now consider i ∈ A\M with i j for all j ∈ A\M .
There is some j for which i j and p˜ij = 0. Now let i′ be the immediate
neighbour of i, i.e., there is no k ∈ A\M such that i  k  i′. Then by
condition (8.4), we have p˜ii′ = 0. As p˜ii′ + p˜i′i > 0 and thus, p˜i′i > 0, (8.4)
further implies p˜i′l > 0,∀l ∈ A\M for some l  i′. Furthermore, for i′,
there also exists some j ∈ A\M for which p˜i′j = 0, this j must have i′  j.
By the same argument as for i, we can see that p˜i′i′′ = 0 and so on until
we reach the alternative n, for which j  n,∀j ∈ A\M . This alternative
n has pnj > 0,∀j ∈ A\M , a contradiction. Given that condition 8.4 holds,
there must exist an alternative which can be added to M in each step of
the for loop, and the algorithm finds a strict linear order.
Claim 8.3.2. If the values p˜ij meet condition (8.4), the linear order re-
turned by the loop (4-10) is single-peaked with respect to .
Proof. First, we note that the set I has the following property. For each
pair of alternatives i, j ∈ I, there does not exist a k /∈ I and k ∈ A\M , for
which i  k  j. This can be argued by contradiction. Suppose such a
k exists, then there also exists an alternative l ∈ A\M for which p˜kl = 0.
Without loss of generality we assume l k. By conditions (8.4), p˜lj ≥ p˜lk
and thus also p˜jl = 0 in which case j /∈ I.
Furthermore, consider an alternative j. In a given iteration of the loop, we
have j ∈ A\M , j /∈ I, and j  i for all i ∈ I. Only if there does not exist
an alternative j′ ∈ A\M , j′ /∈ I, and j  j′  i, is j ∈ I possible in the
next iteration. Again we argue by contradiction, if j /∈ I in one iteration
and j ∈ I in the next, an alternative i ∈ I with p˜ji = 0 was added to M .
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If j′ exists, condition (8.4) implies 0 = p˜ji > p˜jj′ and j can not be added
to I. The same argument applies for i j
From these two observations the claim easily follows. Suppose i ∈ A is the
first alternative set for order m. For every pair of alternatives j, k ∈ A,
for which j  k  i, k is added to the order m before j, as the iteration
in which j ∈ I must be after the iteration in which k ∈ I and k will be
added to the order immediately when k ∈ I. For every pair of alternatives
h, l ∈ A, for which i  h  l, h is added to the order before l as l ∈ I
implies h ∈ I and if both l, h ∈ I, l can not be chosen as h  l by
construction in line 7
Claim 8.3.3. In line 11, xm is set such that xm ≤ p˜ij for all (i, j) ∈ A2
for which m ∈ Oij and there exists some i, j ∈ A for which m ∈ Oij , such
that xm = p˜ij and xm > 0.
Proof. This is true by construction, an alternative i is only added to M if
∀j ∈ A\M, p˜ij > 0. As i m j is only the case if j was added to M after
i, then all p˜ij over which the minimization are done are strictly positive.
By nature of the minimization, there is also at least one p˜ij to which xm
is equal and xm is no larger than any of the p˜ij .
Claim 8.3.4. If condition (8.4) is satisfied at the beginning of the loop
(3-15), the p˜ij values will satisfy condition (8.4) at the end of the loop.
Proof. In this proof, we will denote the value p˜ij + p˜ji by y. Throughout,
we will assume that condition (8.4) is satisfied in line 3. First, let us con-
sider the situation i  j  k, as (8.4) holds, p˜ij ≤ p˜ik. Only if an order
m exists such that j m i m k is found, will p˜ik, but not p˜ij , decrease
in line 11. If both i, j ∈ I, i will be added to m first due to line 7. Thus,
j m i implies that there exists l ∈ A, such that p˜il = 0 and p˜jl > 0. We
will consider three distinct situations. First, l  i, then j  l and finally
i l j. Let us consider l i. As p˜il = 0, p˜li = y, which implies p˜lj = y
and p˜jl = 0 as l  i  j demands p˜li ≤ p˜lj . Therefore, l would prevent
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both i and j from being added to I and m. As soon as l was added to
M , both i ∈ I and j ∈ I are possible, and again i would be added to m
before j. l i thus can not lead to j m i. In the case of j  l, it is clear
that because p˜il = 0, we must also have p˜ij = 0, therefore p˜ij ≤ p˜ik can
not be violated. Finally, if i  l  j, we must have j m l, if this were
not the case i could be added to m after l but before j. By the earlier
arguments in this paragraph j m l while l j is only possible if there is
some other alternative l′ ∈ A, with l l′ and p˜ll′ = 0. j  l′ gives p˜lj = 0
and therefore p˜ij = 0. If on the other hand l  l′  j, we can repeat
the same argument until we find some l′′ with i  l′′  j and p˜jl′′ = y,
implying p˜ji = y and p˜ij = 0. In conclusion, if i  j  k, we can only
have j m i m k if p˜ij = 0. If this is the case, then p˜ij ≤ p˜ik is satisfied,
as p˜ik ≥ 0.
The second situation is k  j  i, in which case we also have p˜ij ≤ p˜ik.
Here, only an order with j m i m k can lead to the condition being
violated in line 15. In the previous paragraph, we established that if a b
and the algorithm places b m a, we have p˜ab = 0. Here, k  i and
i m k, so p˜ki = 0. As p˜ki = 0, it must be the case that p˜ik = y and thus
p˜ij ≤ y = p˜ik = y.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 8.3.1.
Proof. First, we prove sufficiency of the condition. We have shown, by
combining claims 8.3.1 and 8.3.2, that given a set of values p˜ij which sat-
isfy condition (8.4), we can find a strict single-peaked linear order. By
claim 8.3.3 we have also seen that we can attach a weight to this order
which is non-negative. Even stronger, we have shown that this weight
is equal or less than the value p˜ij for some pair (i, j) ∈ A2, for which
xm ∈ Oij . As the final step of the loop will decrease these p˜ij values, at
least one of these values is set to zero in each run. After at most O(n2)
iterations of the loop, each value p˜ij will then be zero. It can be easily
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checked that at this point, the values xm form a solution to (8.3). As this
proof requires the loop to be run multiple times, and the loop requires
condition (8.4) to hold, claim 8.3.4 is crucial, as it shows that if the input
of the loop satisfies the condition, the output will as well.
Next, we turn to the necessity of condition (8.4). This can easily be verified
by a three alternative example. Suppose (i, j, k) ∈ A3, with i  j  k.
By definition of single-peaked linear orders, each order for which i  j
also has i  k. This means Oij ⊂ Oik and
∑
m∈Oij xm ≤
∑
m∈Oik xm.
A solution to (8.3) requires pij =
∑
m∈Oij xm and pik =
∑
m∈Oik xm, and
this proves pij ≤ pik. The same argument can be used for pkj ≤ pki. This
shows necessity of the condition.
Theorem 8.3.2. For a given dataset P and ordering , Condition (8.4)
can be checked in time O(n2).
Proof. It can be easily seen that this condition may be checked in polyno-
mial time. As written, two inequalities must be checked for each triplet of
alternatives, giving an obvious O(n3) time test. This can be improved upon
by noting that when using a matrix of pij values, with rows and columns
ranked according to the ordering , values above the diagonal must be
non-decreasing in the rows and the columns. Conversely, as pij + pji = 1,
values below the diagonal are non-increasing in both rows and diagonals
(In fact, the lower triangle of the matrix is double graded). As such, each
pij value must be compared with only two other values, providing an O(n
2)
test.
8.4 Recognizing single-peaked orderings
In the previous section, we have given necessary and sufficient conditions
for the data to be consistent with a mixture model of single-peaked pref-
erences with respect to an order . In this section, we investigate the
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case where this order is not given a priori. We show that, if there do ex-
ist orderings  for which the dataset P satisfies the mixture model, we
can identify these. We note that there also exist algorithms for recogniz-
ing Robinsonian dissimilarities, which is a problem similar to the one we
handle in this section. Pre´a and Fortin (2014) describe an algorithm to
recognize Robinsonian dissimilarities in O(n2) time.
We define the set of orders LP , with ∈ LP if and only if P satisfies
condition (8.4) with respect to . In this section, we will prove that we
can identify LP . Note that if an order ∈ LP , the reverse order ∈ LP .
This can be easily checked because the condition (8.4) depends on the
relative ordering of alternatives, but not its orientation. i  j  k and
i  j  k lead to the same constraints on P . Initially, we make the
assumption that there is no subset A′ ⊂ A with |A′| > 1, for which the
following holds: ∀i, j ∈ A′, k ∈ A\A′, pik = pjk. In words, this means
that there is no subset of A with two or more items for which all items
seem identical when compared to items outside of this subset. We will call
these Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets (NIA Subsets) and show how to
recognize and handle such subsets in subsection 8.4.1.
We start with the special case without any NIA subsets and proceed as
follows. First, we derive a number of necessary conditions for all ∈ LP .
If satisfied, the second and third of these conditions, given in Claim 8.4.2
and 8.4.3, can be used to identify an extreme alternative, a¯, which is either
the first or last element of any ordering ∈ LP . This extreme alternative
is then used as input for Algorithm 14 and we will show that, if LP 6= ∅,
this algorithm has an ordering ∈ LP as output. We begin by deriving
another necessary condition on the pij values, which we will use in further
proofs.
Claim 8.4.1. For any∈ LP and each triple of alternatives (i, j, k) ∈ A3:
if i j  k then pij ≤ pjk (8.5)
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Proof. Suppose this is not the case and pjk < pij . Due to condition (8.4),
we further have pjk < pij ≤ pik and pkj ≤ pki. Equivalently, 1−pjk ≤ 1−pik
or pjk ≥ pik, which violates condition (8.4).
The next claim gives a further necessary condition for LP to be non-empty.
Specifically, LP can only be non-empty if all alternatives are indistinguish-
able from each other (8.6), or if there exists an extreme alternative a¯ which
is a Condorcet-loser (8.7).
Claim 8.4.2. Suppose there exists an ordering  ∈ LP . Then either
pij = 0.5, ∀(i, j) ∈ A2, i 6= j, (8.6)
or
∃a¯ : {pa¯i ≤ 0.5,∀i ∈ A and ∃j ∈ A : pa¯j < 0.5} . (8.7)
Proof. First, suppose there is no extreme alternative a¯ for which for all
i ∈ A pa¯i ≤ 0.5. Without loss of generality, we say pa1i > 0.5. Then,
because a1  i  an and condition (8.4), we have pa1an > 0.5, thus
pana1 < 0.5 and again by condition (8.4), we have for all j ∈ A, panj < 0.5.
Thus, there is certainly at least one extreme alternative for which for all
i ∈ A, pa¯i ≤ 0.5.
Now suppose an extreme alternative a¯ exists for which for all i ∈ A, pa¯i ≤
0.5, but there exists no extreme alternative for which there exists an i ∈ A
for which pa¯i < 0.5. Without loss of generality we assume that this is the
case for a1, thus for all i ∈ A, pa1i = 0.5. This includes pa1an = 0.5, so
by condition (8.4), we also have pani ≤ 0.5 for all i ∈ A. As we assume
there is no extreme alternative for which there exists an i ∈ A for which
pa¯i < 0.5, we also have pani = 0.5 for all i ∈ A. Now consider i, j ∈ A, with
a1  i  j  an. Then condition (8.5) and pa1i = 0.5 imply pij ≥ 0.5
and the same condition and panj = 0.5 imply pji ≥ 0.5. As a result, for
each pair i, j ∈ A, we have pij = 0.5.
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Condition (8.7) shows a way to identify an extreme alternative a¯ for any
ordering ∈ LP . However, it remains to be shown that no non-extreme
alternatives share this characteristic, which we do in the next Claim.
Claim 8.4.3. For any ordering ∈ LP , there is no non-extreme alterna-
tive a for which for all i ∈ A, pai ≤ 0.5 holds and there exists j ∈ A for
which paj < 0.5.
Proof. Suppose such an alternative exists. Without loss of generality, sup-
pose a1 is an extreme alternative satisfying the condition in Claim 8.4.2
and a1  a  an. Then pa1a = 0.5 and pana ≥ 0.5. By condition 8.5, we
then have for all i ∈ A for which a1  a i, pai ≥ pa1a = 0.5 and for all
j ∈ A for which j  a  an, pai ≥ pana ≥ 0.5. Thus, such an alternative
cannot exist.
We are now in a position to describe our algorithm for identifying the or-
ders ∈ LP . As an initial step, we will check the conditions described in
Claim 8.4.2. If neither (8.6) nor (8.7) holds, LP = ∅. Furthermore, it is
easy to see that if condition (8.6) holds, P satisfies the mixture model with
respect to any ordering. In other words, LP is the set of all linear orders
over the alternatives. Finally, if an alternative a ∈ A matching condition
(8.7) is found, Claims 8.4.2 and 8.4.3 prove it is an extreme alternative
a¯ for any ∈ LP . With a¯ as input, Algorithm 14 can now be used to
identify a complete ordering ∈ LP , provided such an ordering exists.
The main idea of Algorithm 14 is as follows. Given an extreme alternative
a¯ and two alternatives i, j ∈ A for which pa¯i 6= pa¯j , the relative ordering of
i and j is determined, such that Condition (8.4) is satisfied for the triple
a¯, i, j. When this is done for every pair of alternatives, this results in a
(partial) order of the alternatives. For any pair of alternatives, for which
pa¯i = pa¯j , a third alternative k ∈ A is sought, which in the partial order
has k  i, j or k  i, j and for which pki 6= pkj . In this way, the partial
order is refined until a full ordering of the alternatives is found.
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Algorithm 14 Ordering Algorithm
1: Input: Dataset P , set A, extreme alternative a1.
2: Create ordering .
3: For every i ∈ A\{a1}, set a1  i.
4: For each pair i, j ∈ A, for which pa1j > pa1i, set i j.
5: Divide all i ∈ A into sets A1, A2, . . ., such that for all i, j ∈ Ak neither
i j or i j.
6: repeat
7: Find a set Ak with |Ak| > 1, for which there exist i ∈ A\Ak and
j, j′ ∈ Ak such that pij > pij′ .
8: if i j then
9: For each pair j, j′ ∈ Ak for which pij > pij′ , set j′  j.
10: else
11: For each pair j, j′ ∈ Ak for which pij > pij′ , set j  j′.
12: end if
13: if There exists a pair j, j′ ∈ Ak, j  j′ and i ∈ A\Ak, for which
Condition (8.4) is violated then
14: Stop.
15: end if
16: Divide all i ∈ A into sets A1, A2, . . ., such that for all i, j ∈ Ak
neither i j or i j.
17: until For all i = 1, . . . , n,
∣∣Ai∣∣ = 1.
18: OUTPUT: An ordering of the alternatives .
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Claim 8.4.4. If there are no Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets, Algo-
rithm 14 terminates.
Proof. First, note that if there exists a set Ak with |Ak| > 1, for which
there exist i ∈ A\Ak and j, j′ ∈ Ak such that pij > pij′ , a (partial) ordering
is made of the alternatives in this set and Ak is thus further split up in
line (16). As a result, if such a set is always found at the start of the
loop (6-17), the stopping condition for this loop (line 17) is reached in a
finite number of iterations. Now suppose Algorithm 14 does not terminate,
then there is a set Ak with |Ak| > 1, and there exists no i ∈ A\Ak, such
that there exist j, j′ ∈ Ak for which pij 6= pij′ . By definition, this set is a
nearly-identical alternative subset.
Claim 8.4.5. If there are no Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets, an or-
dering ∈ LP exists and the alternative a1 is an extreme alternative of
this ordering, then Algorithm 14 terminates with output  and ∈ LP .
Proof. Given that an ordering ∈ LP exists and a1 is an extreme al-
ternative, it must be the case that a1  i for all i ∈ A. Furthermore,
it can be easily checked than whenever the relative ordering of two al-
ternatives i, j ∈ A is fixed in relation to a third alternative k ∈ A (say
k  i  j), whether in line (4) or the loop (6-17), the opposite relative
ordering k  j  i would violate Condition (8.4).
Claim 8.4.6. If there are no Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets and there
exists an ordering ∈ LP |LP | = 2
Proof. This follows immediately from the previous result. If no NIA Sub-
sets exist, Algorithm 14 terminates with output ∈ LP , and whenever a
relative ordering of two alternatives is fixed, the opposite ordering would
violate Condition (8.4). However, if ∈ LP , it can be easily checked that
the reverse order ∈ LP , thus LP = {,}.
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8.4.1 Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets
We have now shown how to identify the ordering , for which the data
satisfy a mixture model of single-peaked preferences, under the assumption
that there are no NIA subsets. In this subsection, we will show how to
handle such subsets.
As a starting point, we will again look at Algorithm 14. If NIA subsets
are present, at some point it will be impossible to find a subset |Ak| > 1
in line (7) to split up in the loop (6-17). Without loss of generality, let
us assume there is a single subset |A′| > 1, then there is a partial order-
ing of the alternatives a1  . . .  a−  A′  a+  . . .  an. It can
be easily proven, by a similar argument as for claim 8.4.5, that for any
triple i, j, k ∈ A\A′ and any triple i, j ∈ A\A′, k ∈ A′, Condition (8.4) is
satisfied. What remains to be shown is that we can extend , such that
Condition (8.4)is satisfied for any triple i ∈ A\A′, j, k ∈ A′ and any triple
i, j, k ∈ A′.
Consider a pair (i, j) ∈ A′×A′, such that maxr,s∈A′ (prs) = pij . There are
now 3 cases we can distinguish.
1. If pij > pia− and pij > pia+ , it is clear that no  ∈ LP exists, as
both a−  j  i  a+ and a−  i  j  a+ violate Condition
(8.4).
2. If (without loss of generality) pij > pia− , but pij ≤ pia+ , it must
be the case that a−  i  j. Furthermore, there is no k ∈ A′,
maxr,s∈A′ (prs) 6= pik such that a−  i  j  k, as this would also
violate Condition (8.4). As a result, for all j ∈ A′, for which there
exists i ∈ A′, maxr,s∈A′ (prs) = pij and all k ∈ A′ for which there
does not exist i ∈ A′, maxr,s∈A′ (prs) = pik, it must be the case that
k  j. At this point, the subset A′ is split into two subsets, and
Algorithm 14 can be resumed.
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3. If both pij ≤ pia− and pij ≤ pia+ , there can be no violation of
Condition (8.4) for any triple r ∈ A\A′, s, t ∈ A′. Now, the question
is whether there exists an ordering′∈ LP ′ . This question can again
be answered using Algorithm 14. If such an order is found, then both
′ and its reverse ′ can be used to complete the partial order ,
in other words, the ordering a1  . . . a′1 ′ . . .′ a′n  . . . an
and a1  . . . a′n ′ . . .′ a′1  . . . an are in LP .
We finish this chapter with the following Theorem.
Theorem 8.4.1. If LP 6= ∅, then an ordering ∈ LP can be found in
polynomial time.
Proof. We will structure this proof as follows. First, we show that the
theorem holds if there are no NIA subsets. Next, we show that it also
holds in the case where such subsets do exist.
First, notice that by combining Claim 8.4.2 and Claim 8.4.3, we show that
we can identify an extreme alternative of the ordering  using condition
(8.7). It is easy to see that given this condition, the extreme alternative can
be found by checking all pij values, of which there are only O(n
2). Next,
Claim 8.4.5 then shows that given this extreme alternative, the ordering
 can be found by using Algorithm 14. We will show that this algorithm
runs in polynomial time. The main part of this algorithm is the loop (6-
17). In each iteration of this loop, the ordering  is refined by splitting
up one subset Ak into two or more subsets. Since the loop terminates if
there are n such subsets, there are at most O(n) iterations for this loop.
Within this loop, step 7 may take O(n3) steps, since for each triple of
alternatives i, j, j′ a comparison of pij and pij′ can be done. This gives a
total worst-case bound on the loop and the algorithm as a whole of O(n4).
Let us now look at NIA subsets. In a given iteration of a loop, it may be
the case that no subset Ak can be split up using Algorithm 14. In this case,
we pick one subset A′ and we must figure out which of the 3 situations
distinguished before is relevant. This requires finding the maximum pij
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with i, j ∈ A′, which can be done in O(n2) steps and as such does not
impact the total complexity of the loop (since this is already bounded by
O(n3). Case 1 terminates the algorithm. Case 2 splits the subset in O(n2)
time and we can return to the main algorithm, also without affecting the
overall complexity. Finally, we consider Case 3 and suppose ‖A′‖ = z.
Notice that this implies Algorithm 14 terminated after n− z iterations of
the main loop. If Case 3 occurs, an ordering over the subset of alternatives
A′ must be found. First, an extreme alternative of A′ is identified (or if
no such alternative exists, any ordering over A′ is permissible) in O(n2)
time. Notice that this means the set A′ is split into two subsets. Given this
extreme alternative, Algorithm 14 can be run on A′, taking O(z4) time.
The complete computation time is then bounded by O((n− z)n3 + z4) =
O(n4) and an ordering ∈ LP is identified in polynomial time.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a mixture model from the choice behaviour
literature and applied it to a well-known choice domain from the social
choice literature. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the
mixture model to hold for single-peaked preferences and a given ordering
of the alternatives. Furthermore, we showed that these conditions are
easy to check in polynomial time, in contrast to the mixture model for
general preferences. Furthermore, a polynomial time algorithm is provided
to identify whether or not there exists some ordering of the alternatives
for which the mixture model is satisfied.
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